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    Summary 
This thesis is concerned with the dynamics and social morphology of resistance to 
mining in Bangladesh. Using the case of on-going resistance to a government supported 
open-pit coal mine project proposed by Asia Energy Corporations in Phulbari, North-
west Bangladesh, it considers the resistance within a particular context while 
investigating how the ideas held by various groups intersect and conflict in developing 
networks of resistance. Through ethnographic engagement in a particular ‘community’, 
as well as with the activism at the national level, the research attempts to explore how 
and to what extent the connection and disjuncture of observations and experiences of 
particular groups shape the resistance movement.  
The aims of this thesis are two fold. Firstly it expands on anthropological accounts of 
social movements’ rootedness in patterns of daily life. As such I examine how local 
resistance to mining initiatives emerges in specific contexts and around such located 
concerns that often remain unexpressed in the public discourse of protests. I show how 
resistance builds around anxieties of losing ‘home’ and accompanying rights and 
claims. 
Secondly, this research contributes to the anthropological analysis of ‘connection’ and 
‘network’ in this ‘global’ era. Through an ethnographic study of the resistance 
movement against mining I show how the movement’s network is not a smooth 
integration of groups and actors; tension and ambiguity is central to it. I look at the 
ways in which friction of disparate ideas attached to different level of analysis, i.e. 
‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘universal’, pave way for the formation of tentative alliances as 
the differential observations come to fit into the common discourses of protest.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
On the 26th of August 2006, five people died and many others were injured when 
security forces1 reportedly opened fire on some 50,000 people gathered in a small town 
in Phulbari2, a sub-district of Dinajpur in north-western Bangladesh. The gathering was 
a protest in response to a proposal by Asia Energy, a UK-based mining company, to 
engage in open-pit coal mining. In 1998 The Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) 
Pty, a wholly owned subsidiary of Global Coal Management Resources plc (GCM)3, 
was awarded a contract by the Government of Bangladesh to mine coal in Phulbari. 
The Phulbari coal mine is an open-pit coal mining project which involves digging huge 
pits with heavy machinery to access the mineral ore.  In Phulbari, this method would 
require removing people from their homes and farm lands. Estimates of the number of 
people that would be affected by the project vary from 40,000 to 470,000. Those 
opposing the mine claim that rivers and the water supply to Phulbari and the 
neighbouring areas would be threatened by the project. The threat of displacement to 
agriculturally dependent people and the perceived threat to their water supply were 
stressed by left-aligned activist groups in order to turn local communities against the 
mining project. Environmental organisations collaborated with the local people to 
communicate the potential environmental impacts of the Phulbari mine projects to a 
broader audience through public meetings and the use of the internet.  
Dinajpur is a major rice-producing district of Bangladesh, a staple in a country where 
food sufficiency is dependent on seasonal production. Like other parts of the district, 
land in Phulbari is generally used for the production of high quality rice. Phulbari’s 
landscape is largely comprised of flat fields with patches of flat forests, all of which 
would be destroyed to establish the proposed mine. According to the Bangladesh 
Census of 1991, the Phulbari sub-district has a population of 129,435 living within 150 
                                                           
1
 Police and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). BDR is a paramilitary force mainly involved in guarding the 
borders of the country.   
2
 See annex for map 
3
 GCM resources plc (GCM) operated under its former name Asia Energy plc. Asia Energy Corporation 
(Bangladesh) Pty now operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of London-based GCM resources plc.  
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villages. Agriculture plays a major role in the economy of this region, with 85% of the 
total population dependent on it for both subsistence and sustenance. The average 
density of people per square km is 711, which is less than the national average of 1,023 
people per square km but still substantial. According to a recent environmental impact 
assessment report of the Phulbari project by Asia Energy4, residents of Phulbari are 
largely dependent on agricultural labour. Following the protests, the Government 
suspended the field activities of Asia Energy to review the details of the mining deal. 
The Government did not, however, cancel the mining contract, and Asia Energy 
continues to lobby through different channels to resume mining while community 
mobilisation against the mining project persists. The Government drafted a national 
coal policy in August 2008 to accommodate the multiple concerns surrounding mining 
in Phulbari, but this is being scrutinized and criticised by national activist groups 
involved in promoting the protests.  This protest was one of the largest against mining 
companies in Bangladesh in recent times, and set an example for the kind of response 
that foreign mining initiatives were facing.  This thesis explores the discourses and 
practices surrounding the protests against the mine planned by the multi-national 
mining company.  
The development of the mining sector in Bangladesh and the involvement of the 
International Mining Corporation began when a new government took power through 
parliamentary election in 1991 ending fifteen years of military-backed rule.  The new 
government promised financial reform and economic growth and, in line with 
suggestions from international institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, 
invited foreign companies to invest in the oil, gas and mining sectors. This was 
followed by increased attention from various groups concerned with the impact of 
mining on local populations and the environment, as well as on the national economy. 
During this period, members of a national committee called the ‘National Committee to 
Protect Oil Gas Natural Resources Power and Ports (NC)’5, who are mainly left-aligned 
political activists and intellectuals, increased their scrutiny of the government’s deals 
with mining companies. Their goal was to increase awareness of the potential negative 
impacts of mining on national interests and the local population, and to help local 
                                                           
4
 Bangladesh: Phulbari coal project (http://www.adb.org/Documents/Environment/BAN/39933-BAN-
SEIA.PDF) 
5
 More discussion on the organization of NC, the people involved with it and the background of its 
establishment are presented in Chapter Seven and in parts of Chapter Four.   
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communities organise themselves against mining. In the wake of foreign investment in 
the country’s natural resource section during the 1990s the NC formed as a national 
forum to analyse and protest against various government deals with the foreign and 
multi-national corporations for natural resource exploration and extraction. The NC 
gradually strengthened its organisational activities and set up branch committees 
throughout many districts and sub-districts of Bangladesh. The committee established 
its organisational links with the mining site of Asia Energy through a committee branch 
in Phulbari town, a place that became the centre of organised local protests in 2005. 
During this time Asia Energy had completed their preliminary surveys for coal 
exploration and submitted its plan for mine development in Phulbari to the government. 
The plan was viewed by the NC as being against national and local interests on various 
grounds, such as the provision of coal for export and for the proposal of open-pit coal 
extraction methods that require the displacement of people living in and around the 
mining site.  Activists of the NC’s Phulbari branch mobilised people in surrounding 
villages against the planned mine, and the central leaders of the NC regularly visited 
local sites to organise mass protests, such as the one that took place in August, 2006.  
International campaign groups working for environmental protection and human rights 
collaborated with national groups and organisations using the internet and web 
campaigns. The Phulbari coal mine project attracted considerable attention from 
national and international groups, in addition to organisations who protested against the 
negative impact that mining would have on the local people and the environment. The 
UK government backed the global mining company Asia Energy, while the UK-based 
World Development Movement6 campaigned against Asia Energy and the Phulbari 
mining project.  
    **  ** 
Events at Phulbari provided both the inspiration and empirical focus for this research. 
From the outset my primary interest was to study the dynamics and social morphology 
of resistance to mining in Bangladesh, based around the case of the on-going resistance 
to the proposed government-backed Asia Energy open pit coal mining in Phulbari. This 
research is not intended to romanticise this resistance as a protest against some global 
                                                           
6World Development Movement is a UK based campaign focused on lobbying decision makers and 
campaigning about issues around poverty, climate change, trade, water etc. ( http://www.wdm.org.uk/) 
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force, nor to illustrate a breakdown of this force. Rather, it provides an analysis of a 
case where the organisation and success of protests, against what may be considered an 
exploitative global mining initiative, draw on knowledge and ideas held by local, 
national and ‘universalist’ groups. It explores the stories that characterise the resistance 
in a particular context and considers how and to what extent the ideas held by different 
groups intersect and conflict in making networks of resistance. 
As we shall see, the organisation of the resistance movement, in this case, is not limited 
to local understandings of the impact of open pit mining on the community. Various 
groups at different levels - from local to national, as well as groups with ‘universalist’ 
ideas such as those pertaining to the environment - are involved in the Phulbari 
resistance. Local communities seem aware of elements of global discourses such as 
‘environmentalism’, whilst groups at the national level, i.e. intellectuals and 
environmental campaign groups, are collaborating in the process of forming the ideas 
for resistance. Some groups at the national level, inspired by ‘nationalism’ and ‘anti-
colonial’ discourses, aim to protect the national interest and consider the 
government/Asia Energy deal as benefiting global capital and foreign companies only, 
whilst exploiting Bangladesh resources. Other groups, such as international campaign 
groups, are inspired by global discourses of environmentalism. These two groups may 
not have the same interests, but they collaborate with each other in aiding the 
communities against Asia Energy by participating in meetings and discussions at the 
local and national levels and writing for each other’s publication and websites. The 
local, national and environmentalist organisations may conflict and may not share 
common interests, but seemingly, they come together to give a general meaning to the 
resistance movement. Local communities are facilitated by the national groups to raise 
their voices against open-pit mining. The process of facilitation involves the interaction 
of national and local understandings. The question of how the resistance is shaped by 
different ideas, and conflicts and collaborations between them, sits at the heart of this 
research.  
At one level I will ask questions concerning which interest groups are involved in the 
Phulbari resistance and what meaning they attach to the cause and objective of 
resistance. This is to explore how and to what extent protests and social movements in 
a particular context are driven by disparate ideas and experiences. At another level I 
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will address how and to what extent these differences interact to find the spaces for 
collaboration.  I will explore the contextual particularities of ‘local’ resistance and 
organisation of the movement at the ‘national’ level, and ask how, rather than being a 
movement merely against some global capitalist force, Phulbari resistance is shaped by 
complex and situated realities. I will investigate how and to what extent the disjuncture 
of observations and experiences attached to different levels of analysis, i.e. ‘local’, 
‘national’ and ‘universal’, are negotiated in the spread of the Phulbari movement. That 
is, how and to what extent the connection and disjuncture of observations and 
experiences of particular groups shape the Phulbari movement.  
In order to understand the dynamics of multiple socio-political sites engaged in the 
protest, this research takes an approach that considers the ‘field’ within and beyond the 
community. Participant observation in a Phulbari community, a protest group in the 
capital and an analysis of the historical context that informs the protest ideas are the 
key techniques for this research. This thesis suggests that contemporary political 
movements in Bangladesh cannot be understood without historical analysis of land and 
labour relations in the region.  
     **  ** 
Privatisation of industries and initiatives to encourage private and foreign investment 
characterised the Bangladesh’ policy of economic development and growth from the 
1980s onwards.  Export Processing Zone (EPZ) schemes were introduced during the 
‘80s to attract foreign and private investors by offering them special situations in the 
EPZs, such as exemptions from taxes and tariffs and a reliable power supply. The idea 
of this special zone for private enterprises was not new in the region. India started 
implementing Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the 1960s and by the end of 2007 it 
had 119 such special zones in operation across the country and they became a key 
strategy for the State polity of export-led Industrialisation. Bangladesh has eight such 
zones in operation at the moment and a few more are in the pipeline. Planned and 
established by the governments, these special zones are ‘spaces of exception’7: 
transnational spaces that allow the ‘flows’ of global capital to select and ‘touch down in 
                                                           
7
 Cross, 2008; Agamben, 2005; also Ong, 2004; Palan,  2003 
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favourable enclaves’8. Like India and elsewhere in the “Third World”, these special 
zones enabled global capital to take advantage of cheap labour in Bangladesh and, in 
turn, create job opportunities for the local population. Export oriented garment 
industries, largely located in EPZs, are the largest contributor to foreign currency 
accumulation and employ over 2 million unskilled labourers’, 90 percent of whom are 
young girls and women9.  Foreign and private capital investments are stressed by the 
development policy in Bangladesh on the grounds of employment, backward flow of 
technology and industrial infrastructure. However, the State’s policy of patronising 
foreign and private capital in the region has been a contested one. For example, 
theorists of the political economy in the subcontinent - India in particular - argue that 
the state acts as a ‘vast machine of patronage and subsidies’ by transferring agricultural 
land to the ownership of corporations under terms which benefit the business elites, 
rich farmers and industrial capitalist.10  Through initiatives like EPZs, Bangladesh 
governments have tried to provide a favourable condition for foreign and private 
industrial endeavours that David Harvey calls ‘a central bias at the heart of the 
neoliberal State’ by favouring the interest of business over ‘the collective rights…..’11  
‘Foreign investors will quickly flock to invest…What matters to them is availability of 
land and quick decisions,’12 said the executive director of the Bangladesh Export 
Processing Zones Authority to a national daily when asked about the government’s 
approach to foreign investment. This reflects a synergy between the government’s 
economic development policy and the interests of global and private capital. But the 
interests of the people in the region whose lands and life are being affected lie 
elsewhere. Often we see resistance to industrialisation because land matters to rural 
people and their livelihoods are being affected by the quick decisions on land 
acquisitions. For example, in 2005, the tribal people of the Niyamgiri mountain range 
in the Indian state of Orissa, along with environmental activists, forced the India-based 
Vedanta Resources PLC, which is listed on the British stock market, to suspend their 
                                                           
8
 Ferguson, 2005.  p. 279 
9
 Bangladesh garment manufacturers and exporters association annual report, 2007 
10
 Gupta (1989) described it as a ‘national real estate scam in the making’. p. 788 
Critiques have commented it as a strategy of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ which involves the 
political and occasionally violent transformation of other forms of ownership into private property rights. 
(Chandrasekhar, 2006; See also, Bardhan, 1998; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Jenkins, 1999; and 
Harvey, 2005. 
11
 Harvey, 2005. p. 13 
12
 The Financial Express, Dhaka. 24 April, 2008 
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activities for a state supported open-pit mining project to supply raw materials for an 
aluminium plant it had built in the area. In the wake of the protests a Supreme Court 
committee recommended the project be stopped as they found it to have an adverse 
affect on the environment and tribal people. The court later asked the company to come 
up with proposals for an environmental rehabilitation project and compensation to meet 
the demands of the tribal people. In 2007, in the state of West Bengal, which has a 
similar pattern of agricultural land use to Bangladesh, farmers and agricultural 
labourers forced India’s biggest car manufacturing company, TATA, to cancel their 
ongoing construction of a car plant in Singur, near the state capital Kolkata. In this 
case, West Bengal’s communist government backed the TATA car project that 
promised to manufacture the world’s cheapest car from this plant, in association with 
Italy’s car manufacturer FIAT. The farmers’ protests, and TATA’s subsequent pullout 
from Singur, demonstrated the power the protests movements such as this have and 
renewed criticisms of industrialisation’s land acquisition processes in parts of India. 
Critical economists repeatedly noted that the land and other exemptions offered to 
foreign investors cost governments more than the benefit they deliver13 and as Collins 
(2002b, 2003) commented, such corporate investments have few social and political 
ties and local accountability towards the community where they operate. This reflects 
how the processes of industrialisation and its impacts are perceived variously by 
different interest groups as the process gives priority to the interests of some groups 
over the ‘competing aspirations’ of others14. An important component of this research 
is to explore competing aspirations and perceptions around mining in Phulbari.  
**  ** 
Mining has a history of concurrence with the processes of industrialisation, militarism, 
imperialism, and dispossession15. For example, the Royal Commission Report of 
England (1842)16 presents the scenario of the exploitation of women and children in 
English coal mines during the period of coal-fired industrialisation. Much of the social 
science work on mining and development, done since the late 1960s, presents mining as 
                                                           
13
 Baissac, 2004. EPZ Impact.  In the Financial Times FDI Magazine, October 24, 2004. See also, 
Oskarsson, 2006 
14
 Grindle, 1993. pp. 41-67 
15
 Bridge, 2004 
16
 Available at The coal mining history resource centre website 
http://www.cmhrc.co.uk/site/literature/royalcommissionreports/ 
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a process of systematically benefiting the core rather than the periphery where it 
operates17. For example, Frank (1967) uses the example of the extraction of Chilean 
nitrates, which netted British capital £16 million between 1880 and 1913 while Chile 
retained only £2 million, arguing that European agriculture was developed at the 
expense of Chilean agricultural development. Many other examples of how mineral 
extractions did not help the economies of poverty-prone countries are prevalent. 
Centuries of mainlining activities in Latin America, and decades in Africa, did not 
change the economic scenario of these regions even though Africa produced 80% and 
75% of the world’s gold and diamonds18. In this view, mining by international 
companies reinforces the dependency of the Third World in order to fulfil the interests 
of global mining capital. Bridge (2004) has commented that the juxtaposition of mining 
within the harsh economic and social history of industrialisation and the persistent 
poverty of the mining communities constitutes a collective moral position, which 
underlies the resistance against the global mining corporations. Sizeable scholarly 
literature exists which suggests that natural resources negatively impact resource-rich 
countries’ economic growth and data has been presented to demonstrate how natural 
resources increase the likelihood of negative outcomes in poverty reduction and 
economic performance19.  
In the views of the proponents of growth and development, on the other hand, mining 
has been considered as a catalyst for economic development in poorer countries. The 
World Bank is a leading advocate of natural resource extraction for uplifting the 
economic status of poverty prone countries. The Mining Department of the World Bank 
Group (WBG), for example, states, “Overall economic growth per se is a well-
documented prerequisite to sustainable development and poverty reduction”20. For the 
Bank, private investment in the mining sector became the “dogmatic preference” to 
enable mineral extraction in poorer countries as a means of ‘development’21. It provides 
the rationale for its support for extractive industries on various grounds ranging from 
job creation, large revenue generation for governments to technology transfer, which is 
all considered to directly or indirectly contribute to ‘development’. A causal 
                                                           
17
 Bridge, 2004 
18
 Lanning and Mueller, 1973 
19
 Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; see also, Bannon and Collier, 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; 
Davis et al, 2003; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001; Isham et al, 2002; Eifert et al, 2003 
20
 Weber-Fahr, 2002. p.13 
21
 Bebbington et al, 2008. pp. 965–992 
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relationship between mining and poverty reduction is stressed in its analyses and are 
often backed by statistics. According to the World Bank about 13 million employment 
opportunities are generated worldwide by small-scale mining activities, while large-
scale mining directly employs 2-3 million workers, which “has been shown to benefit 
all groups, including the poorest”22.  Neoliberal economists, such as Bela Balassa 
(1980) and Anne Krueger (1980), put forward arguments in favour of natural resource 
extraction as a way for developing countries to make the transition from 
‘underdevelopment’. Balassa, for instance, argues that natural resources could facilitate 
a country’s “industrial development by providing domestic markets and investible 
funds”23. Others stress reforms and strengthening of concerned state institutions for the 
management of mineral resources and the dealing of transnational investment in 
mining24. They suggest that reforms be directed towards better transparency over 
payments and revenues. They propose that in an improved system of governance 
mining can bring significant benefits for resource-rich countries by raising their 
national income through factors such as strengthening export market niches25.  
Rather than understanding mining ventures as inherently “good” or “bad” we need to 
ask how they are perceived by various groups of people in light of the 
“contentious…disagreement about the practices, meaning and significance of 
mining”26? In the last ten years a good amount of literature on mining has emerged, 
much of it concentrating on the impact of the operation of multinational mining 
corporations on indigenous peoples and mostly written by NGOs for policy 
recommendations or in partnership with oppositional movements27. Bridge28 discusses 
the general focus of these studies, which is on: 1) the unequal power relations between 
mining firms and indigenous peoples; 2) the struggle over resource access; 3) land 
rights; 4) revenue distribution, and 5) and environmental impacts. In the majority of 
cases these struggles are defined in explicitly moral terms of justice, human rights and 
indigenous rights. Examples include a study of the impacts of a new mining code on 
                                                           
22
 Weber-Fahr et al, 2001. p. 4 
23
 Balassa, 1980. p. 2 
24
 see, for example, Auty and Mikesell, 1998; Hilson, 2004; Hilson and Potter, 2005 
25
  Hilson, 2004; Also, Auty and Mikesell, 1998 
26
 Bridge, 2004. p. 242 
27
 Gedicks, 1993; Cousins and  Nieuwenhuysen, 1984; Howitt, Connell and Hirsch (eds), 1996; Howitt, 
2001; Evans, Goodman and Lansbury ( eds.), 2002;  O’Faircheallaigh, 2001 
28
 Bridge, 2004. p. 239 
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community groups and the environment in the Philippines in 199529 or a description of 
the effects of gold mining explorations on rivers, forests and indigenous people in the 
Guinean Shield during the 1990s30.  
More insightful studies investigate the processes of social transformation and 
differentiation. The work of Taussig, Godoy, and DeWind31 provide critical insight into 
how people give new symbolic and material meanings to the relationship between 
mining and agriculture as mining becomes increasingly capitalised in peasant societies 
in Peru, Bolivia and Columbia. Taussig32 for example, shows how people give their 
own meaning to capitalism’s claim that it is productive, articulate their critiques of 
capitalism through their own idioms. He analyses the case of peasants in Colombia and 
in an analogous case of Bolivian tin miners-principally based on the work of June 
Nash33. Semi-proletarianised peasants in Colombia believe that proletarianised sugar-
cane cutters can earn good money by making a contract with the devil, but this money 
will not cause them any good because it can be used only on silly consumer goods. 
Reinvesting such money would invite ruin and the cutter will die a premature and 
painful death. Taussig argues that this belief articulates people’s recognition that 
capitalism is productive but it is based on magic and brings poverty, disease and death.  
Evidence from Melanesia shows how aspects of social relations are redefined through 
the processes of mining and protests, and how land and other resources are deeply 
implicated in the construction and maintenance of notions of social identity. In this 
sense conflicts over mining projects are related to long-standing social disputes within 
communities34. Clearing and using the land and resources of an area shapes the identity 
and social relationships throughout Melanesia35. Filer36, for example, using the case of 
Panguan in the later part of the 1980s, shows that the destruction of forests and 
waterways, and the making of huge holes in the middle of a community’s territory, 
deeply impacted the local sense of self and community. In addition, the relationship 
between the changes in landscape and changes in lifestyles and identities is evident in 
                                                           
29
 Tujan and Guzman,  2002 
30
 Forest Peoples Programme, 2000   
31
 Taussig, 1980; Godoy, 1990; DeWind, 1987 
32
 Taussig, 1980 
33
 Nash, 1979 
34
 Yala, 2002; Goldman, 2003; also Weiner, 2002.  p. 4 
35
 Banks, 2005 
36
 Filer, 1990 
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the testimony of the landowners. In case of Phulbari, the threat of the destruction of 
land and displacement of local people has been discussed in public protest events. Thus 
the question arises: To what extent does the threat of changes to land and displacements 
implicate social relations?  
Recent work by Collier and Ross37 has focused on establishing the link between civil 
wars (‘separatist conflicts’) and resource wealth. They discuss how mineral resources 
in mineral dependent countries act as a ‘curse’ with outcomes of slower economic 
growth38, increased rates of poverty, substantial revenues that tend to make the State 
corrupt, a stronger military, even higher child mortality rates and lower investment in 
education, all of which contribute to the emergence of civil conflicts. Collier, in his 
work with Hoeffler, goes further and relates civil conflicts with ‘greed, not grievance’; 
the battle for control of resource rents as the main casual element of a conflict39. 
Although the discussions of Collier and others gives us important insight into the way 
that mineral resources can negatively impact a country’s ability to manage poverty and 
conflicts, their search for the cause of conflicts are primarily based on statistical 
analyses at the global level. Collier’s40 work, for example, is based on a statistical 
analysis of a wide range of factors from a sample of 47 countries that had undergone 
civil conflicts between 1965 and 1999. These provided a generalised model of 
resources and conflict but the need for a more elaborate kind of research is stressed by 
Weiner, “With but few exceptions...the absence of sophisticated understandings of 
indigenous motivations and cultural frameworks only seems to loom larger and more 
critical in the current period of extensive mining”41. Examples of more context-specific 
studies point out the weaknesses in Collier and Hoeffler’s arguments. Banks42, in his 
study of the OK Tedi dispute in Melanesia in the mid 1990s, shows that the causes of 
conflict are not just ‘greed’ or money; rather they involve a wish for more control over 
their lives. Filer43 argues, in his study of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, that no 
amount of money would satisfy the loss of, often unspecified, desire and the only 
demand in the landowners’ grievances was the closure of the mine. This reflects the 
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need for context specific investigations of what inspires different groups to participate 
in the protests.   
Stuart Kirsch44, in his book Reverse Anthropology, examines ‘indigenous analyses’ of 
environmental and social relations among Yanggom, an ethno-linguistic group in 
south-central New Guinea, to show how the Yanggom understanding and interpretation 
of their political struggle is shaped by these analyses. He provides an ethnographic 
account of how the Yonggom perception of human-environment relations, as envisaged 
through magic spells, form their struggle against the environmental impact of OK Tedi 
mine. He shows how the Yonggom exchange relations and how their discourses of 
sorcery are the focus of their claims of compensation.  Through magical spells, the 
Yanggoms interact with other beings who they share the landscape with, recognising 
the interdependency between humans and other species; the Yanggoms recognise that 
other species have agency. Other species may appear in dreams to portend danger if 
their agencies are recognised by the person dreaming.   A hunter needs to recognise this 
agency in order to communicate with animals in dreams or through magic spells to 
persuade animals to agree to the wishes of hunting. The hunter’s ability to find animals 
in forests through magical spells depends on the hunter’s recognition of the agency of 
the animals. This, as Kirsch suggests, exemplifies the connectedness of humans and 
other species providing an alternative approach to human-environment relations that 
acknowledges the interests of both human and other species. This mode of 
environmental analysis seeks to hold the mining company accountable, comparing the 
mining company and its impact on the environment to the ‘sorcery’ perception among 
the Yanggoom. In Yanggom exchange relations, failure to reciprocate or to fulfil 
exchange obligations, such as payments made by men to a bride during a marriage, can 
bring illness and death, which they call sorcery. They interpret the behaviour of the 
mining company in terms of its failure to fulfil the obligation to the people affected 
(failure to reciprocate). The waste materials released in local rivers by the mining 
company left the Yanggom in fear of harmful impacts, like the fear of the consequences 
of sorcery. They interpret the risk of illness, injury and accidents in terms of an analogy 
between the mine’s impact on humans and the environment, and sorcery. This way of 
seeing the impact of the mine shapes the compensation claims, which, like sorcery 
accusations, draws attention to the consequences of mining on specific persons. They 
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find the mining company acting irresponsibly towards the community, harming 
individuals and making people leave in fear of river pollution, and relate this to wide 
range of accidents, such as overturned canoes or the broken leg of a person, that are 
seen as the consequences of the company’s failure to fulfil its compensation obligation.  
Kirsch suggests that the Yanggom people’s analysis of the environmental impact of the 
mine offers “alternative perspectives that take social relations into account”45. This 
perspective can capture the claims and accusations that derive from the individual’s 
vulnerability, which, as Kirsch observes, increases the recognition of the mining 
company’s responsibility for the community. This, in turn, translates into political 
mobilisation through the formation of social solidarity of the people affected by the 
mine. In this sense political mobilisation is related to ‘specific consequences for 
persons and social relations’46.  
Suzana Sawyer47 provides ethnographic evidence based on anthropological field 
research in the Ecuadorian Amazon of how subalterns organise their oppositional 
movements through building unity across regional divides. A shared concern with neo-
liberal economic policies of privatisation and multinational-investment implemented 
across the country in the resource sector helped formulate unity on a national level. 
Local people are not just the victims of all-powerful globalising forces; rather their 
movement strategies invoke the similar transnational processes ‘that enable 
hyperexploitation under globalisation’48. Sawyer’s observations underscore that the 
success of social movements are characterised by successful alliances with outside 
supporters (e.g. environmental groups) in protesting against state policies that affect 
local people. The ‘indigenous’-environmentalist coalition that protested changes to the 
Ecudorian Hydrocarbon Law in favour of multinational oil operations who sought to 
lease more Amazonian land, is an example of such a network. These protests, as 
Sawyer notes, are against the policies that nurture transnational capital, undermining 
people’s rights within the nation. Sawyer argues that the protests against multinational 
operations and its impact on the land and the rain forests invoke the desired condition 
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of social justice and accountability that the nation will pursue. Thus, the struggle is 
more than just about the “material use of and extraction of rain forest resources”.’49  
The literature referred to above is based on locations far from the site where this study 
was conducted. I drew on studies from other regions as the existing research on mining 
in South Asia is largely conducted to inform development policy and focuses on the 
impacts of mining on the local people, in addition to the social and/or economic costs 
and benefits of mining50. Studies of the industrialisation process in general have been 
conducted either through surveys and interviews with workers that are removed from 
the social context, or through statistical analysis of data provided by employers to 
develop normative policy recommendations51. In one recent exception, Jamie Cross’s52 
ethnographic research on global manufacturing sites in Vishakhapatnam in the Indian 
State of Andhra Pradesh, shows how the stories of labourers at global production sites, 
who stage periodic protests against these global companies, are to be understood in the 
context of broader social and economic processes that shape their interests and 
aspirations for upward mobility, which people pursue through a mix of consent and 
coercion. Cross argues that labour protests against global manufacturing should be 
comprehended in relation to the social and economic processes that configure their 
interests and their desire for a favourable condition under which they are able to 
accomplish these interests.  Much of his effort is focused on exploring how the 
labourers consent and how resistance to the global production is constructed, and how 
the aspirations informing this consent and resistance are linked to wider social 
processes. He counters the portrayal of Indian manufacturing workers as simply being 
victims of global capitalism.  
This resonates with Geert DeNeve’s53 observation of labour relations in the power-
loom industry in the south Indian town of Kumarapalayam in Tamilnadu. His research 
showed that the agricultural labourer’s entry into the urban textile industry did not turn 
him into a passive victim of his employer’s desperate attempt to control and discipline 
the workforce. Workers make attempts to turn the Baki, the advance received by the 
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workers at the time of recruitment, into a negotiation tool for favourable working terms. 
While employers use Baki as a strategy to bind the labourers through debt, the 
individual labourer uses it to force the employer to take his concerns into account as the 
employer can not ‘fire at their will’ without getting the baki back. DeNeve’s 
observations reveal how resistance to working conditions in the modern capitalist 
environment needs to be understood in relation to the non-static labour relations 
characterised by “a continuous process of formation and reproduction in which all 
participants attempt to impose whatever power is available to them”.54  
While searching for available research or writings on the mining protests in 
Bangladesh, I found just a few newspaper articles and websites and some 
environmental impact assessments conducted by environmental experts hired by the 
government or mining companies. No detailed ethnographic research was available on 
issues concerning mining and the protests that shed light on how and why the protests 
against the multinational mining initiative are shaped. This research is concerned with 
the ideas, nature and processes that shape the resistance to a coal mining project 
planned by a global mining corporation in the Phulbari sub-district of Dinajpur, 
Bangladesh.  
2. Analytical approach 
2.1. Social Movements and Social Movement Theory 
How does this research fit, or fail to fit, into existing theories of social movement and 
resistance? In what follows, after presenting the principal premises of the earlier 
theories, I will discuss more insightful approaches to resistance that have emerged in 
anthropology.  In the process, the discussion will lead to a set of questions. 
Analyses of the nature of resistance and social movement are not new, but the 
emergence of new types of social movements and collective actions around the world 
has informed ‘new form of understanding and debate on resistance and social 
movement that show momentous discontinuity from the past form of analysis’55. The 
appearance of new discussions of resistance movements has generally recognised the 
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limitations of functionalism and Marxism that were prevalent until 1960s and ’70s56. 
These discussions, as Escobar & Alvarez57 commented, recognised the importance of 
continuing the systematic attempt to renew our understanding of the elements and 
complex processes of contemporary resistance movements in diverse settings.  
Jean Cohen58 summarises the classical theoretical paradigms of social movements in 
terms of the assumptions that they have in common. First, a clear line can be drawn 
between two types of action - institutional-conventional and noninstitutional-collective 
behaviour - where the latter is not shaped by present social norms but is derived by 
undefined or unstructured situations. These situations refer to structural changes that 
result in the collapse of social control and normative integration. This breakdown 
causes dissatisfaction, frustrations, and aggression that guide individuals towards 
collective behaviour.  Second, the development of noninstitutional-collective behaviour 
occurs through steps or a ‘life cycle’. These steps include linear progression from 
‘spontaneous crowd action to formation of ‘publics’ and social movement’59. The idea 
here is social movements spread through contagion, rumour, circular reaction, diffusion 
etc. These means of communication give emergence and growth to a movement within 
this cycle.  Thus, Cohen points out, these theories see social movements emerging from 
the point of ‘grievances’ and ‘values’ which guide the individual to participate in such 
events as a response to rapid social change. In this sense, collective behaviour becomes 
‘an abnormal or irrational response to atomized individuals to change,’60 which is the 
view held by most theorists in this tradition. In all cases, social movements are 
characterised by psychological responses to the breakdown of familiar social systems, 
rudimentary modes of communication and volatile objectives. Such views make 
collective behaviour as a non-rational reaction to change. It is this understanding that 
became the subject of criticism by the later theorists.  
The emergence of massive social movements in the 1960s and ‘70s challenged the 
assumptions of the classical tradition. The movements of this period showed different 
features from those described by the classical theoretical paradigm, with definite goals, 
clearly articulated general values and calculated strategies; not mere responses to 
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economic crisis or breakdown61. In light of these movements, the insufficiencies of 
previous theoretical approaches became evident. In response to this theoretical crisis, 
the ‘resource-mobilization’ approach62 and the ‘identity-oriented’ approach, or ‘new 
social movements approach’ as referred to by some,63 emerged in United Sates and 
Western Europe respectively. 
There are important differences between these two approaches. Eduardo Canel64 
discusses how identity-oriented or New Social Movement theory questions the Marxist 
view of social movements. It points out the inadequacy of Marxism, which considers 
only economic reasons as determining the unity of social groups and political and 
ideological processes, and understands social movements as essentially structured by 
conflicts between a conscious working class and their employers. Within this paradigm, 
all social formations, identity and actors, ultimately reflect class interests65. In contrast, 
the Identity-oriented/New Social Movement approach stresses the cultural aspects of 
new social movements and views them as conscious struggles to socially construct new 
identities, redefine existing social norms, and create democratic spaces for independent 
social action, putting social movements in the sphere of civil society as opposed to the 
state66. Actors in new social movements do not essentially represent economic classes 
nor do they represent the traditional ideologies of left, right or centre. Instead they are a 
combination of various categories in line with gender, sexual orientation, locality etc67. 
Resource-mobilisation theory considers social movements as more political than 
consciousness-raising, identity forming and ideological68. But some theorists in this 
school have been moving towards also understanding cultural aspects of movements 
(for example Aldon Morris, 1986). In this sense, the paradigm puts social movement 
simultaneously in the terrain of civil society and the state69. While identity-oriented or 
new social movement theory focuses on the ‘newness’ of the movements that emerged 
during the ‘60s and ‘70s, Resource Mobilisation Theory is more interested in the 
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similarities between earlier social movements and new social movements. As Tilly70 
states, both forms of social movement use the same limited range of legitimate actions 
available to collective actors; the same ‘repertoires’. Emphasis on new rights and 
resources in the Nineteenth century shaped collective struggles at that time and they 
still characterise the collective action of the present time71. The prominence of 
democratic freedom followed by the consolidation of capitalism and growth of the 
nation state in the Nineteenth century triggered the formation of purpose-centred 
organisations and the strengthening of civil society that led to the growth of collective 
actions (e.g. rallies, strikes and demonstrations) that still characterise representative 
democracies72.  
New social movement approaches emphasise the ‘cultural’ realms (e.g. movement for 
identity, rights etc.) while Resource Mobilisation is more focused on the ‘political’ (e.g. 
struggle for control over resources), which, in turn, results in the formation of ideas of 
‘new’ and ‘old’ social movements. Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar73 present arguments 
about this ‘new’/‘old’ division which is based on the perceived cultural nature of 
contemporary/‘new’ social movements. They argue that all social movements are 
‘inevitably bound up with culture’74. If new social movements are formed around 
indigenous ethnic rights, ecological issues, women’s rights, etc. and characterised by a 
focus on identity, ‘new forms of doing politics’ and ‘new forms of sociability’ then 
many movements, like urban movements of squatters and others, which are 
conventionally seen as struggling for needs and resources, also correspond to the notion 
of cultural force. ‘In their continuous struggles against the dominant projects of nation 
building, development, and repression, popular actors mobilise collectively on the 
ground of very different sets of meanings and stakes’75.  
From this perspective, all social movements are enacted within a cultural context. Thus, 
social movements are seen as cultural struggles, which are struggles over meaning, as 
much as over socio-economic conditions76. Alvarez77 emphasises the concept of 
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cultural politics in understanding the dynamics of social movements. He argues that 
culture is fluid, and influenced by politics, as ‘popular actors mobilise collectively on 
the grounds of very different sets of meanings and stakes. For all social movements, 
then, collective identities and strategies are inevitably bound up with culture’78. From 
this perspective, cultural politics means ‘the process enacted when sets of actors shaped 
by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with 
each other .... 79 
The idea of cultural politics raises the questions: what meaning do different interest 
groups attach to the causes and objective of the resistance? And how do these meanings 
conflict or negotiate? If the social movements and resistances involve interaction 
between different sets of meanings then what is the intersection of these meanings at 
different levels? Clearly, groups within communities, NGOs and leftist activist groups 
involved in Phulbari protests may not have the same agendas, interest and 
understanding about the impact of mining and the protests. How do different types of 
identity inform the movement?  
Alvarez (et al)80 suggests that the analysis of social movements, from the point of view 
of cultural politics, should be guided by complex methodological directives. It is 
difficult to draw a boundary around a particular social movement. The effort of 
drawing a line between social movements and the state may be futile as such 
movements often involve a wide range of collective actions and organisations of 
different forms. Thus, ‘when we examine the impact of movements.., we must gauge 
the extent to which their demands, discourses, and practices circulate in web-like, 
capillary fashion (e.g., are deployed, adopted, appropriated, co-opted, or reconstructed, 
as the case may be) in larger institutional and cultural arenas’81. In addition, Alvarez (et 
al)82 notes that social movement activities usually are not restricted to the institutional 
spheres of politics. So, ‘we must shift our gaze to also encompass other public spaces--
constructed or appropriated by social movements--in which cultural politics are enacted 
and subaltern identities, demands, and needs are shaped’83. This reflects the need for a 
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multi-sited methodological approach for the study of resistances in contemporary 
society. In line with the views presented above, this study takes a multi-sited approach 
to investigate how, and to what extent, ideas of the Phulbari resistance encompass 
multiple spaces. 
How is resistance expressed? James Scott writes, ‘For a social science attuned to the 
relatively open politics and liberal democracies and to loud, headline-grabbing protests, 
demonstrations and rebellions, the circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate 
groups is, like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum’84. Scott draws 
attention to the everyday forms of politics and resistance that are often missing from 
our thought because we are accustomed to big and open kinds of protests. In other 
words, ‘politics becomes synonymous with the instrumental actions of severing 
individuals or states, and thus becomes narrowly delimited and far removed from the 
messy and contingent practices of everyday life’85. Ortner86 discusses how 
conventionally, resistance was seen as a comparatively clear-cut and unambiguous idea 
explained through a simple binary: domination versus resistance. ‘Domination was a 
relatively fixed and institutionalised form of power; resistance was essentially 
organised opposition to power institutionalized in this way’87. The term resistance is 
redefined in the work of Scott who explains the notion of less organised, more 
pervasive, and more everyday forms of resistance.  
Scott’s concept of ‘infra-politics’ offers an understanding of resistance as an everyday 
struggle. For Scott, infra-politics works for more organised political action as different 
infra-structural elements work to make operations of commerce possible. He provides 
examples demonstrating that transport, banking, currency, property and contract law, 
etc. are an important basis, or infra-structural element, for commerce. In a similar way, 
micro-struggles in everyday life are cultural and structural underpinnings of more 
visible political actions, where our attention has generally been focused. In this way, 
covert forms of resistance provide the ‘building blocks’ for a ‘more elaborate political 
action that could not exist without it’88. As Amoore89 discusses, Scott’s study of 
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peasant resistance reveals how arson, petty theft, poaching, sabotage and boycotts are 
the ‘garden variety resistance’ seen in everyday life. As Scott states, people adopt 
alternative forms of resistance that are accepted by the wider community where direct 
resistance is risky under the conditions of property law and state control. Scott’s study 
shows how peasants challenge the landlord’s right to police property through 
establishing alternative norms that avoid direct confrontation and are often ‘getting by’ 
or ‘coping’. Scott argues that instances of open protests and headline-grabbing 
demonstrations are but ‘ripples on the surface’ of an inner or unorganised kind of 
resistance. In this sense, everyday experience and covert expressions of struggle are not 
detached from the more elaborate and organised protests, rather they may constitute the 
meanings, language and structure of overt expressions90. Indeed, in the case of 
Phulbari, our focus so far has been on the big and organised protests as explained 
through the example of the large public protest held in 2006 in Phulbari town. As 
Scott91 argues, focusing only on these kinds of protests would make the other forms of 
resistance invisible. This research extends its enquiry into how the resistance is 
characterised in the spheres of everyday experiences within a particular context.  
To what extent are the protests in Phulbari linked to the ‘global’ processes? Within 
recent anthropological work there have been some provocative explorations on how 
local people are connected to wider processes and how people (re)interpret these 
processes to devise their awareness and agenda. As Anna Tsing comments, ‘to invoke 
the global at the turn of the second millennium is to call attention to the speed and 
density of interconnections among people and places’92. June Nash93, based on her 
study on Bolivian tin miners, points out that the assumptions underlying most analyses 
underestimate the capacity for understanding and responding adaptively that exists 
among the people in ‘less developed countries’. The opposition of ‘traditional’ to 
‘modern’ or ‘rational’ refute the prospective at generating new interpretation and 
understandings. Nash94 shows how Bolivian mine workforces are well linked to the 
international market and are conscious of their role as producers in the global exchange 
system but that at the same time retaining a strong identification with their own sources 
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of cultural (prehispanic) identity. As a result their consciousness as a group or 
‘community’ is fundamentally coupled to an awareness of the world division of labour, 
in which they feel themselves to be exploited not only as a working class in opposition 
to the managerial and privileged, but also as nationals in a dependent economy subject 
to domination by developed nations.  
On the other hand, local protests and resistance tend to travel across boundaries through 
various channels and through ‘networks’. Kapelus95 discusses how opposition to 
multinational mining companies is increasingly becoming transnational, while many 
NGOs in the ‘developed’ world who operate at the global level are collaborating with 
local interests. These NGOs are long established, have international perspectives and 
some are specifically focusing on mining issues. A connection has been established that 
has resulted in the formation of ‘networks’ of opposition to mining companies. With 
increased numbers of communities protesting against multinational mining companies 
in recent years96, a global network of ‘local organisations’ has emerged to transport the 
ideas of protest from one place to another and share it with protesters in different 
locations97. These global organisations are bringing issues to the protests that did not 
originally derive from local concerns. Indigenous communities are now challenging the 
business procedures of the companies from profit-flows to headquarter decision-
making to social responsibility (ibid). Experiences are being shared through different 
mechanisms, such as reports of the negotiations between communities and mining 
companies which are being distributed to other communities across regions98. 
Anna Tsing99 draws attention to the possibilities of a ‘link’ in practical encounters. She 
presents evidence concerning the presence of a particular kind of ‘universality’ in the 
materiality of practical encounters. She explores the aspirations and specificity of 
universality and how they come to life in ‘friction’, which she calls ‘ethnography of 
global connection’100. Tsing conceptualises this world connection as an ‘unexpected 
alliance’ to (re)make global possibilities.  She reminds us that global knowledge is 
neither monolithic nor fixed. What is important, she argues, is to understand the nature 
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of certain kinds of ‘collaboration’ through which knowledge is created and maintained. 
This collaboration is neither a simple sharing of information nor of common goals. For 
example, environmental conservation uses the knowledge of conservation science to 
promote conservationist ideas to save engendered environment and species. But their 
effort is complemented by the rise of ‘alternative’ science and ‘self-conscious 
misinformation’ promoted through the channels of transnational political and 
informational networks. Here, conversations inspire conservationist, scientists, state 
regulators, the public, forest dwellers and other groups to collaborate. It is through the 
‘frictions of such collaborations, global conservation projects—like other forms of 
travelling knowledge--gain their shape’101. This view takes our attention beyond the 
traditional idea of opposing interest groups (e.g. rich/poor, south/north). This does not 
assume an impending compromise between them, but, as Tsing suggests, 
‘collaborations create new interests and identities’ (idid). Tsing102 notes that social 
mobilisations are redirected by disagreements between people about what their 
common concerns are. Even apparent solidarity does not necessarily mean agreement. 
‘This is the collaboration with difference: collaboration with friction at its heart’103.  
The discussion above indicates that a network or link between discourses and actors at 
various levels can be found when discussing the resistance and encounters of local 
people. The participation of environmental NGOs and ‘nationalist’ activists in the 
Phulbari protests and the international dissemination of local stories through global 
websites are all clues to a possible network between the groups and ideas at various 
levels. But we should not jump to the conclusion that this is a smooth and coherent 
integration of the movements. “Sophisticated social theorists….have been caught up in 
showing the programmatic advance of an integrated globalism of everywhere-flowing 
people and culture”104. The internal complexities of this process can be grasped by 
attending to the stories that “fall away” from the public record105. I intend to explore 
the aspects of, what Tsing calls, ‘friction’ through which alliances between the 
disparate forces of resistance may form106.  
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2.2 On ‘nationalism’ 
As we will see, idioms and sentiments of nationalism play a central role in shaping the 
protests against the mine. To establish a baseline for discussion on the subject, it may 
be helpful to start with an introductory discussion about ‘nationalism’. As a starting 
point we can take the popular definition of Ernest Gellner who defines ‘nation’ as a 
group of people with shared culture, system of ideas, symbols, and communication 
means107. In addition to these attributes, according to Gellner, in order to have a nation 
status people should have the quality of mutually identifying each other as belonging to 
a common body or nation. He finds two aspects in the formation of nationalism, 
political and national, or cultural. Nationalism is primarily a political principal where 
political and cultural are ‘congruent’108. In simple terms, nationalism in this sense is a 
mix of political principal or desire to live in a nation backed up by cultural sentiments. 
This “sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principal, or the 
feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one 
actuated by sentiment of this kind”109. 
Following the general literature on nationalism we find two versions which Gellner 
does not go on to distinguish. John Plamenatz110 proposes these two kinds of 
nationalism and clearly draws a line between them; one that formed in Western Europe, 
and another that grew later in Eastern Europe. Western European nationalism was 
based on cultural unity that gained strength with the dissemination of cultural identities 
through print capitalism, while Eastern European nationalism emerged as a political 
institution first followed by the formation of its common cultural character. Theorists 
like David Brown later branded these categories as civic and ethnic nationalism, 
respectively. Brown qualifies civic nationalism as a sense of community with a 
common destiny ‘irrespective of their diverse ancestry’111. In other words, it is a feeling 
of solidarity and making of a community where people identify each other as members 
of the community. This kind of nationalism is considered based not on past cultural 
heritage, but rather is ‘forward-looking’ and congruent with the kind of nationalism we 
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see in a number of nations today112. Authors such as James Kellas113 believe the 
formation of some earlier nationalisms in Western Europe were civic and inclusive in 
nature; that is, citizenship not ethnicity was the element of national community.  Ethnic 
nationalism on the other hand, Brown explains, is based on the belief of common 
ancestry and perceived common cultural heritage added by present day similarities in 
cultural elements of religion, language, and so on. Brown describes it as an ethnic 
sentiment and general belief of distinct ethnic bondage that need no ‘proof’. Sometimes 
strengthening of common heritage is done by myth as ‘social identity is characterised 
by a metaphoric or fictive kinship’114. This type is often characterised as the 
nationalism of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe115.  
The work of political theorist Benedict Anderson holds as a strong point of reference in 
the discussion of nationalism. Anderson’s idea of nationalism, described in his book 
‘Imagined Communities’116, matches with Gellner’s idea in the sense that they both 
suggest that the emergence of nationalism is related to the development of capitalism in 
sixteenth century Western Europe. In growing capitalist societies states initiated 
measures to control the ever-increasing communication and information exchange, 
which was not possible with the existing linguistic ‘idiosyncrasy’. So, the state 
imposed, for the functioning of bureaucracy, a common language for the nation117. The 
spread of national language identity was made possible, as Anderson (1991) suggests, 
with the growth of print capitalism. Books and printed materials played a central role in 
constructing nationalism by producing and distributing textual and linguistic 
homogeneity. Nationalism, for Anderson, is an ‘imagined’ community feeling: 
imagined because people identify themselves as members of a political community or 
nation and “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”118. For both 
Anderson and Gellner, nationalism is an ideological construction or ‘imagined’ not 
‘natural’ determinate product of given religious, linguistic, racial, and other social 
conditions. Anderson proposes that nationalism is imagined into existence in this way 
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in Europe and everywhere else119. In this sense ‘nationalism’ takes a ‘modular’ form 
that works everywhere. 
While not disputing the premises of an ‘imagined community’ and the role of ‘print 
capitalism’ as suggested by Anderson, Subaltern theorist Partha Chatterjee doubts the 
universal existence of a ‘modular’ formula of nationalism. He argues “if nationalisms 
in the rest of world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ 
forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have 
left to imagine”120? He refers to anti-colonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa to show 
how they maintained a difference from the modular form of national society, using the 
particular example of Bengal in India. Chatterjee talks about the existence of two 
domains of social institutions in colonial India – material, or ‘outside’, and spiritual, or 
‘inner’. He suggests that anti-colonial nationalism in India started to form its own realm 
of ‘sovereignty’ well before the start of movements against colonial power by 
preserving its own inner elements such as language, family tradition, and other cultural 
identities. While replicating the elements of ‘outside’ domains, such as economy and 
statecraft, science and technology, they preserved their ‘inner’ social conditions by 
keeping them away from the colonial reform process. If nationalism is imagined, then, 
Chatterjee argues, it is this ‘inner’ aspect where imagined community is brought into 
being where nation is already sovereign even within colonial rule121. 
To sum up Chatterjee’s point, there are two processes that accompanied the formation 
of nationalism in India. The first, are the processes initiated by the state to develop 
national institutions (need of this is not generally disputed) by reforming social 
traditions, customs, and language etc. Secondly, while not disputing the need for 
change, there were no simple transformations of simply echoing European patterns. To 
illustrate these processes Chatterjee provides the following example using 19th century 
Bengal. In the first half of the nineteenth century books and other print materials 
completely displaced Persian for English as the language of bureaucracy and means of 
intellectualism in Bengal, and it was not until the later half of the century that 
intellectuals, literary societies, and publishing groups made it their cultural project to 
equip Bengali as a standardised language. They considered the Bengali language as 
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their ‘inner domain of cultural identity’ that needed to be kept away from colonial 
reform122. This view represents a flexible and ‘non-modular’ form of nationalism that is 
subject to revision by the line of its internal ‘cleavages’. This view is of immense 
significance for my research in the analysis of the form of nationalism as it is applied in 
the context of the Phulbari movement.  
2.3 On Social Capital 
We will see in Chapter Six (Part One) how in Phulbari anxieties derived from the 
possible breakdown of the ‘community’ and the loss of certain qualities entailed in 
social relationships, such as the relations of ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity’, by mining 
displacement plays a significant role in the formation of local resistance to the mine. 
The discussions of social capital are concerned with these qualities of social 
relationships. Despite differences in the way the term social capital has been used it 
generally refers to resources that inhere in social relationships. As Harris writes: “they 
are resources otherwise labeled as ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity, that both underlie and derive 
from some social networks”123. The impact and function of social capital at the 
personal, community and state level has been explained by a number of scholars.  
James S. Coleman124, for example, conceptualises social capital by differentiating it 
from other forms of capital. He defines it as ‘a resource for action’ that resides in the 
structure of social relations, and argues that it differs from other forms of capital that 
lay within the control of a person or a corporate entity. Unlike other forms of capital, he 
argues that social capital inheres in the structure of relations between and among 
persons. He also sees similarities with other forms of capital; “like other forms of 
capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends 
that in its absence would not be possible.” He found three main forms of social capital; 
high levels of obligations and expectations, information potentials, and norms and 
effective sanctions125. The first form implies that people ‘do things’ for each other with 
the expectation and trust that their helpful action will be repaid; that the ‘cost’ of their 
action will bring benefit in due course. The second form relates to the potential of the 
acquisition of information from others that enable one to act in a 
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knowledgeable/rational manner. Finally, social behaviour is regulated through the 
means of social control that is constituted, Coleman argues, by social ties through the 
generation and sustenance of norms of approved behaviour and sanctioning of 
disapproved behaviour. In this third from, social capital acts in the interest of collective 
‘public’ good and guides people to concur with collective concern, not just self-interest. 
Coleman’s concept of social capital, thus, combines economic rationality and social 
organisation focusing on both action and structure. A central feature in his concept of 
social capital is family relations, which produce human capital by nurturing a child or 
young person for cognitive and social development126.  
While Coleman is primarily concerned with the individual level, Putnam relates the 
concept to the community or national level. He offers a definition of social capital as 
"features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit"127. He sees social capital as “networks 
of civil engagement” or networks of community groups linked by solidarity, integrity 
and participation. These civic networks, Putnam argues, promote social capital in the 
form of norms of reciprocity and trust held within groups, communities and societies, 
and can therefore be used for collective action. According to him, community and 
group participation, and self-sustaining voluntary associations create and sustain the 
‘bridging’ social capital that demands for conformity and enables people to ‘go ahead’.  
More insightful analysis of social capital is provided by Pierre Bourdieu who argues 
that it needs to be understood in relation to three forms of capital, economic, cultural 
and social, because these three forms are interdependent; the development of social 
capital requires the investment of some material or physical resources and the 
acquisition of some cultural knowledge, which enable people to build relations with 
‘valued others’128. By economic capital Bourdieu refers to as one’s control over 
economic resources such as cash, assets etc. Cultural capital, in contrast, denotes 
something that an individual can accumulate over time through skills, education, 
training, and advantages that a person possesses which gives him a higher status in 
society. Bourdieu, in his attempt to understand differential education outcomes in 
France, explains that the attitudes and knowledge transmitted to children by their 
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parents to succeed in France’s current education system is a form of cultural capital. 
Social capital is neither reducible to, nor independent of, economic or cultural capital. 
It is created and maintained by the transformation of economic and cultural capital in a 
constant effort of social interaction129. Bourdieu does not see social capital as a ‘by-
product’ of other purposes in social relations, rather argues that people deliberately 
build relationships so that they may benefit from them later on.  
Capital in Bourdieu’s definition is anything that is productive and can be 
accumulated130 and social capital is the “aggregate of the actual and potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”131. These networks can build up 
as reciprocal relationships that can be productive for the individual. Bourdieu’s 
definition establishes two elements of social capital; first, social relationship that allow 
people to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and, second, the 
amount and quality of those resources132. According to Bourdieu, people accumulate 
social capital through membership in networks and social institutions and then 
transform it into other forms of capital to achieve a better position in society. 
Obligations and mutual recognition of group membership is produced by material and 
symbolic exchanges within these relationships. The amount of social capital people 
possess depends on the extent of their network, on the extent and quality of the capital 
possessed by those networks, on expectations of reciprocity being met, and on their 
status within the society.  
‘Connections’, according to Bourdieu, play a part in the reproduction of classes. He 
points out that membership, for example, of a prestigious club can act as an investment 
to build a form of social capital that might be converted into economic capital. In other 
words, the possession of particular durable social relationships may facilitate unequal 
access to resources. In this view, social capital is an aspect of differentiation of class, 
and of power133. Economic, cultural or social capital, Bourdieu argues, takes the form 
of symbolic capital “when it is grasped through categories of perception that recognise 
its specific logic or…misrecognise the arbitrariness of its possession and 
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accumulation134. According to him, social networks, education and cultural knowledge 
are forms of symbolic capital that are all subject to the same laws of accumulation, 
inheritance and exchange that are applied to material forms of capital. Bourdieu’s 
theory of cultural capital puts forward a model of symbolic competition, personal 
aspiration, and choice.  
Geoffrey Wood’s135 reflection on social relations in Bangladesh diverges from 
Bourdieu’s concept of social capital as a weapon “in winning and keeping the 
confidence of high society”136 and suggests that it is not only the domain of the elite. 
Wood suggests that poor people in Bangladesh invoke a ‘perverse’ social capital to 
access financial and other resources. A particular type of social capital is formed 
through connections with powerful people in unfavourable terms. In countering 
Putnam’s and other’s suggestion that social capital works better in the well-governed 
and rich communities than the underdeveloped one, Wood shows that, in Bangladesh, it 
works more for poor than the rich137.  
Wood suggests that Bangladesh, like many of the world’s poorest countries, lacks two 
important pre-conditions for providing welfare to its citizens, efficient government 
and/or a pervasive formal labour market138. He argues that the absence of welfare 
provisions has led to the creation of an ‘informal security regime’ where poor people 
have to rely heavily upon community and family relationships of various kinds, as they 
cannot fulfil their needs from state or market. The provision of this informal security, 
however, comes at the cost of reliance on clientelism and patronage, as rural society 
and relations in Bangladesh are characterised by inequality and hierarchy. People seek 
social capital within multi-dimensional social ties. Hierarchical relations between 
patrons and their clients, and more reciprocal relations within keen groups, represent a 
density of interactions that “bind social actors into complex overlapping obligations 
reinforcing the predictability of mutual expectations”139. Wood observes that an 
informal system of rights and claims operates as these interactions imply norms, 
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customs, habits and expectations of conduct between kin, neighbours, and community 
acquaintances140.  
Cultural and religious codes, as well as symbolic capital, Wood argues, reinforce 
networks of mutual solidarity, subjective empathy, and affective value. Social capital is 
not simply reducible to mutual insurance and protection. According to Wood, the sense 
of public betterment in Islamic ideology in Bangladesh influences the way one’s duty 
to people in need of help is viewed. Lending money to poor kin or providing them with 
a job is often labelled as a duty. In the context of Bangladesh, ignoring the difficulties 
of others is considered shameful and may cause one to be labelled ‘uncaring’.  An 
uncaring reputation is detrimental for one’s own ‘social insurance’ and may prevent 
future support and assistance. Extreme, non-conforming behaviour in one dimension 
(i.e. wages or interest rates charged by money lenders) may undermine the security 
value of other dimensions. The crosscutting ties act as a moderator to maintain social 
and cultural limits to these non-conforming behaviours. Within these ‘pools of 
relationship options’ poor people manage the support of patrons, neighbours and kin. 
The social insurance built over time and through multi-dimensional relationships, 
whether hierarchical or reciprocal, is an important feature of social relations in rural 
Bangladesh141. Wood’s view of social capital provides an important perspective to 
explore how the spheres of social relationships influence the formation of local 
resistance to the threat of displacement due to the mine planned in Phulbari. 
Conclusion  
This introductory chapter has focused on the theoretical discussions and debates around 
the nature and processes of resistance.  This chapter started with the events and 
background of the protests against the mining corporation, which have inspired this 
research. The relatively unexamined context of protests against the mining in Phulbari, 
in the northern districts of Dinajpur in Bangladesh, sets the site of this research. Some 
theories of resistance, and the nature of the ideas and knowledge that shape it, 
discussed later in this chapter, present a more insightful analysis of the resistance 
movement. Much of these discussions are focused on the intersection of ideas and 
knowledge as they apply to the notion of resistance and the expressions of protests, and 
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one of the dynamics of the resistance movement in the context of an increasingly 
‘connected’ world.  
All of these ideas inform the succeeding chapters. My thesis will focus on examining 
how, and to what extent, the Phulbari movement is shaped by groups with different 
levels of analysis, i.e. local, national and ‘universal’, and by the disjuncture and 
connection between them.  By doing this I will show that, rather than being 
‘homogenous’ protests against the global mining corporation, the Phulbari movement is 
embedded in divergent ideas and socio-political particularities. I will argue that the 
conflict of divergent ideas is characteristic to the collaboration of resistance. 
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Chapter Two 
Research strategy, sites and the politics of fieldwork 
Outline  
This chapter describes my methodological approach and the politics of ‘fieldwork’. 
After presenting a brief chronological description of my travels to and through field 
sites, I discuss how my methodology and choice of sites fit into the premises of a 
‘multi-sited’ approach. I draw on the possibilities and challenges as experienced by 
some of its advocates and followers to make the point that my ethnographic endeavour 
in more than one location is driven, like most ethnography, by anthropology’s familiar 
focus on sets of situated practices and relations between them.  
Reflecting on my ethnographic engagement in the village of Borogram, where most of 
my research was conducted, I address some key points of the post-modern analysis of 
the ‘crisis of ethnographic representation’142. I share my field experiences of interaction 
with my informants to suggest how post-modern agendas are also inadequate for 
addressing politics around textual representation and how the process of representation 
is contingent and contestable. Situating myself within the context of Borogram village I 
reveal the inherent problems of essentialising the researcher’s positionalility (i.e. 
‘native’/ ‘non-native’).  This is followed by a discussion of my research strategies and 
the ethical issues I encountered.  
1. Finding my ‘field sites’ 
The basis for this research is part of a wider project funded by the ESRC/DFID143 on 
Mining, Livelihoods, Resistance and Social Networks in Bangladesh, and was 
primarily conducted in Borogram village of ‘Phulbari’ in Dinajpur. A part of my field 
research was also conducted in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, to follow the organising 
forces of the protest, which became the site for regular anti-mining demonstrations and 
protest activities.  
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In Borogram I conducted participant observation to explore the ethnographic 
specificities and realities that shaped the resistance to the proposed mine at the local 
level. In the capital I engaged, as a participant, in the day-to-day activities of a national 
forum called the National Committee to Protect Oil-Gas-Mineral Resources-Power and 
Ports (NC)144 organising and facilitating the protest at the national scale. Through the 
process of participation in NC’s activities I gathered the perspectives of the organisers 
and officials of a non-government environmental organisation that was collaborating 
with the protest.  
In conducting my research amongst different levels, the challenge was to grasp the 
ideas and observations held by these different groups. Despite their differences, various 
groups with their diverse understandings and commitments ultimately connected at the 
discursive realm of the protests.  The research in Phulbari will reveal, on the one hand, 
how resistance is shaped by distinct realities and disparate experiences and, on the 
other, how it all works together and is translated into a seemingly unified network of 
resistance.  
My social background influenced the way I obtained access to the field. I obtained my 
graduate degree in Anthropology from the Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh 
located in the outskirts of the capital Dhaka. One of the central leaders and organisers 
of the movement was a teacher of mine from the Anthropology Department at the 
University. Some of the young activists of the movement were involved in Dhaka-
based literary and cultural organisations, some of which I was associated with. My 
previous associations with some of the leaders and activists of the movement proved 
helpful in making contacts and finding and accessing the field.  
Early communications with groups and parties involved in the movement were 
conducted through email and telephone conversations before leaving for the field. My 
connection with the activists assisted with indentifying the appropriate contact persons 
to discuss the possibility of a longer-term involvement with the movement processes. 
Some academic cum political figures of Bangladesh had become involved in the 
movement and had taken on central organising leadership roles. I invoked my 
University associations with one of these academics to make early contact with the 
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groups involved in the movement. Having contacted these groups at different levels, 
from the villages in Phulbari to groups in the capital, I was exposed to numerous 
potential ethnographic ‘sites’, all of which looked worthy of following and all of which 
seemed “capable, recursively, of shaping the unfolding study”145.  
This initial dilemma was dealt with through the process of my actual engagement and 
‘interplay’ within the field that directed and shaped my field sites as I went through the 
process. Provoked by an apparent feature of the Phulbari movement that demonstrates 
the organisational link between the villages in Phulbari, activists in Phulbari town and 
actors in the capital, I needed my research to be multi-sited in order to explore how the 
movement is shaped at and within these three different levels. During my early 
engagement in the daily activities of the NC, and through a few short-term visits to 
towns and villages around Phulbari where the mining project is planned, I began to 
identify the actors within the movement. In order to examine the stories and realities 
that were often absent in the formal agendas of the NC, I found it necessary to establish 
a dwelling in one of the villages suffering from the threat of displacement. 
Simultaneously, I found it important to examine how the movement was achieving 
success, at least in forcing a delay to the mining project, through the initiatives of 
apparent collaboration between political parties, individuals, environmental 
organisations and the villages. Participation in NC activities provided opportunities to 
explore the dynamics and limits of this kind of collaboration, as it became the 
organisational platform of collaboration for the movement, as is discussed in Chapter 
Seven. This does not mean that I simply submitted myself “to a track laid out”146 for 
me; rather, that my field was envisaged through my engagement and ‘interplay’ with 
it147.  
The first two months of my fieldwork were spent in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, 
where I participated in the day-to-day organisational activities of the NC. During this 
time I became familiar with the organisational structure of the committee and the 
groups and actors involved with the movement. I observed their working processes and 
the ways that they organised themselves and connected with local actors in Phulbari. 
Three days after I arrived in Bangladesh I called the member secretary of the NC, who I 
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had known prior to this research, and requested his help. I expressed my interest in 
being a part of NC activities in order to understand the protest processes.  He 
immediately asked that I attend a press conference the very next day to start my work 
with NC.  
The conference was organised to force the NC’s agenda on the proposed Phulbari mine 
to the government. The building where the press conference was held was actually one 
of the main offices of the Bangladesh Communist Party, placed in the commercial 
centre of the capital. As I approached the building aptly named ‘Mukti Bhaban’ or 
‘Freedom House’, I noticed the red flag of the communist party hanging from the top 
corners. At that time I was not yet aware of the working relationship of the communist 
party and the NC, and thus was not sure if Mukti Bhaban was also an office of the NC. 
As I had been instructed to do, I entered the meeting room where the conference was 
scheduled to take place, introduced myself and nervously explained my purpose to 
some of the present activists. Having been previously notified of my arrival by the 
member secretary, the activists provided me with a warm welcome.  After the press 
conference the member secretary introduced me to some other leaders of the 
committee, all of whom represented various left political parties, including the 
Communist Party. Through our discussions I found that this meeting room was being 
regularly used as a space for events, such as press conferences and internal discussions, 
for planning particular protest activities and coordinating meetings of the NC. This 
building became a regular destination for me during the first two months of my 
fieldwork as I participated in these organising events.   
After two months in Dhaka I made a fifteen-day visit to Phulbari, the actual mining 
site. Just before entering Phulbari I observed a large banner that had been posted on a 
wall reading, ‘No to foreign company, No to export, No to open pit mining’, reminding 
me that people there are sensitive about the word ‘foreign’. The next morning a few 
local leaders and activists of the NC welcomed me in their Phulbari office. The central 
leaders of the NC had informed them of the purpose of my visit and had requested that 
they cooperate with me. I was introduced as a PhD researcher from a UK University 
working to understand the reasons and processes of the Phulbari protests. A few local 
leaders politely questioned the purpose and use of my research. I was always 
uncomfortable answering this question and never sure if my answer was satisfactory. 
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My discomfort stemmed from the fact that I was not sure of the possible known and 
unknown uses of my research once documented and disseminated. However, I always 
explained my research purpose as clearly as I could.  
Being a native Bengali speaker my language skills were useful in explaining my 
purpose and in clarifying some aspects of my research. While explaining my research 
purpose as part of my ‘rapport building’ initiatives to people I met in Phulbari city, I 
was asked, ‘how would your work help stop mining in our area?’ For few seconds I 
simply did not have an answer to this question. I had already begun to feel an emotional 
attachment to the people protesting against the proposed mining and I wanted them to 
see me as a supporter of their protest. This added to some of the ethical issues that 
arose during my fieldwork, which will be discussed later in this chapter. I replied that 
my work might not help stop Phulbari mining directly. I did not know if my answer 
satisfied him, but rather than trying to satisfy everyone I wanted to keep my answers 
honest. Throughout my entire visit I explained the actual purpose of my research in 
order to avoid any undue expectations. My foreign university background, in reality, 
did not create any problems for gaining cooperation from local activists. They promised 
their cooperation during my stay in Phulbari and they provided me with all possible 
help in establishing myself in the village, including helping me to find a house.  
My methodological position did not subscribe to the assumption that a subject can only 
be found in “natural units of difference such as cultures and communities” as some 
would argue inherited from ‘Malinowskian ethnography’148. Trouillot discusses the 
broader point that some landmark works in the histories of fieldwork have given rise to 
the habit of naïve treatment of space149. He argues, “the problem is not fieldwork per se, 
but the taking for granted of localities upon which the fetishization of a certain kind of 
fieldwork was built and the relation between such supposedly isolated localities and 
supposedly distant cultures”150. I, however, was committed to understand the socio-
political dynamics of Phulbari movement within the context of the everyday realities of 
societies in actual mining sites. This led me to the ethnographer’s familiar strategy of 
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establishing a longer term dwelling in one of the villages within the planned mining 
areas where village groups were regularly participating in anti-mining events organised 
by Phulbari town activists.  
Having a guide was a necessity, as I had been informed by the activists in Phulbari 
town that it would not be possible for an ‘outsider’ to access the villages without a 
guide known to the villagers because they might suspect an unknown outsider as an 
agent of Asia Energy trying to convince the villagers in favour of mining. My guide 
was an activist from Phulbari town who had contacts in the village as a result of his 
interaction with the village groups in discussions around the issues of mining. He 
assisted me in gaining access to the village and helped to alleviate early suspicions held 
by the villagers I met during my early visits. Sometimes explaining my research 
objectives served little purpose in obtaining their consent for the research, as the 
question of which side of the movement, anti-mining/pro-mining, I belonged to became 
the key consideration for the villagers. One of the elderly villagers said, “You are like 
my son. Assure us that you are not actually working for Asia Energy under cover. We 
have seen a lot. Many outsiders like you come to us; speak nicely with us with a hidden 
mission of spying for Asia Energy”. My guide assured them that I was not serving for 
the company and I tried to clarify my reasons for wanting to live in the village and what 
I would be doing during my stay. I spent a couple of days with different groups in 
various pockets of the village discussing issues around mining and protests. I was, of 
course, not trying to convince people in favour of mining and as we talked more over 
the next few days, I was given clearance to come to the village anytime.  
Once I established myself as a researcher looking into issues around the anti-mining 
protests I began to approach groups of activists in the town and people in the pockets of 
the village to explain my purpose. It was through these interactions that I developed my 
initial impressions of the groups and actors involved in the protests. Once I was assured 
of my access to the village for a longer-term stay I went back to Dhaka to participate in 
the NC activities taking place in the capital. Upon my return to Dhaka I had gained a 
better understanding of how the NC organises its movement at the local level, as well 
as how the village actors relate to activities organised by local activists based in the 
town. After another two months in Dhaka I returned to Borogram where I intended to 
stay until the end of my fieldwork, approximately nine months. During my stay I made 
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almost daily visits to Phulbari town, as this is the site where many villagers come for 
their daily necessities, such as buying food, selling vegetables and rice, and learning 
about the latest developments in the mining proposals and protest events from town 
activists. Along with exploring daily life and the social politics attached to ideas of 
resistance in the village, I tried to become a part of the communication between the 
village actors and the activists in the town. I ended my research with an additional two 
months of participation in the activities of the National Committee in the capital. 
Clearly, my sites of enquiry move beyond the orthodox tradition of single-community 
based ethnographic exploration as I sought to find and engage with research subjects 
who were “displaced” from longstanding units of analysis - that is, community.  This 
kind of methodological shift is nothing new in anthropology. The importance of such 
shifts has been noted in discussions of anthropological methods and locations in the 
contemporary world. Gupta and Ferguson, for example, have asked, “Why has there 
been so little anthropological work on the translocal aspects? Why do translocal 
phenomena of various kinds evade classical methods of participant observation? Why 
is it that, for example, local politics is so anthropological, whereas national or 
international politics is not? The household economy has long been considered 
eminently anthropological, but the study of unions much less so.” 151 Reflecting on 
ethnographic tasks, Geertz has pointed out that, “Anthropologists don’t study villages; 
they study in villages”152. Gupta & Ferguson153 wonder why we have to study ‘in 
villages’ in the first place. They have argued that the objects of study in anthropology 
have traditionally been chosen according to a kind of ranking of the anthropological-
ness of them. That is, things that did not look ‘at home’, ‘different’ or ‘local’, were 
considered as appropriate for anthropological study and places and phenomena that 
were some way closer or familiar to us were deemed to be non-anthropological.  
These methodological issues received particular attention in the wake of 
anthropology’s interest in translocalities in the contemporary era of ‘globalism’, for 
example, migration research. Working in more than one locality was already becoming 
an established practice in studies of migration, as they were following the trend of 
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observing both the points of departure and the points of arrival154. Thus, questions of 
studying “travelling cultures”155 were already directing towards a renewed 
methodological scope. Traditionally, anthropological studies have faced 
methodological problems in studying issues that involve global processes.  As 
Forman156 points out, the problems were the methodological commitment to the local 
and the disciplinary preoccupation with the subaltern and concern with ‘the other’.  It is 
important to be able to follow the actors and issues in order to explore the global 
networks or the circulation of cultural meanings157.  Eric Wolf similarly invited the 
anthropologist to move beyond the familiar local societies to explore the ways in which 
these are situated in the thread of global interconnections, and the power relations by 
which these connections are shaped158. In recent times, similar views as they relate to 
the methodological suggestions of multi-sitedness are emphasised in the analysis of 
various anthropologists 159. The idea is to move away from a regionally described field 
to a conceptual field160. 
The idea of multi-sited ethnography is usually taken to imply that the anthropologist 
embarks on multiple fieldwork sites that are connected by mobile people or cultural 
representations; acknowledging spatial separation and, at the same time, overcome the 
spatial distance by focusing on the “simultaneity of linked events is distinct places”161. 
It contends to break the norms of taking the field as a particular set of social relations, 
which could be possibly compared with some other sets elsewhere162. The reformative 
argument to move beyond these norms was stressed by George E. Marcus (1995). He 
argued that the project of a multi-sited approach is to study social phenomena that 
cannot be totally grasped by examining a single site. As Falzon writes, reflecting on 
Marcus’s points163, it was a desire for a shift from anthropology’s convention of seeing 
a ‘world system’ as a framework within which the local could be contextualised and 
compared to a realisation that the system was already embedded in multi-sited 
                                                           
154
 See, Watson, 1977 
155
 Clifford, 1997 
156
 Forman, 1995. p. 7 
157
 Marcus, 1995. pp. 95–117; Hendry, 2003. pp. 497–512 
158
 Wolf, 1990. pp. 586-596; Marcus, 1998  
159
  For example, Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1998 
160
 Gupta and Ferguson, 1997. pp. 1-47 
161
 Coleman, 2006. p. 35 
162
 Falzon, 2009. p. 1 
163
 Falzon, 2009. pp. 1-2 
 45 
situations and objects of study. Falzon adds164, the idea of a multi-sited research is to 
track people, connections, and associations across spatial difference. This implies, he 
notes, an ethnographic approach that takes into account that the field can be spatially 
dispersed as ethnographers try to engage with his or her objects of study; it implies the 
actual movement of the researcher in two or more places or the conceptual 
juxtaposition of places through techniques of data analysis. Despite variations in 
approaching the theme in some other articulations on multi-sitedness165 the central 
focus of it remains on ‘place(s)’ or ‘location(s)’. Falzon, for example, denies any 
possible suggestions that multi-sitedness can mean not only place or location but also 
perspective, and says perceiving it as synonymous with perspectivism may mean going 
back to the methodological practice it intended to reform166.  
The importance of such a methodological approach gains particular strength in the 
conceptual shift that challenges opposition between global and local, which is often 
taken for granted.  Multi-sited ethnography seeks to connect sites rather then leave 
them in opposition. As Marcus argues, the approach is inspired by the notion of ‘the 
global’, rather than a nominated space, set in opposition to the ‘local’167. When 
knowledge, ideas and objects are interconnected and flowing from one space to 
another, the traditional anthropological focus on to ‘local’ is not sufficient for 
understanding the dynamics of this flow which is, as Tsing notes, ‘hurtling through 
space’168. 
A number of researchers have recently followed and then assessed the path they 
adopted suggested by the advocates of multi-sitedness. It would be relevant to bring 
their experience and assessment into the discussion of my methodological 
considerations. Kathryn Tomlinson169 decided not to dwell in a single village and chose 
to travel between places and institutions in order to capture the role of the idea of 
indigenous rights in shaping political struggles over issues of access to land and natural 
resources in Venezuela. To understand how the meaning of land rights are re-
appropriated in a conflict over the building of an electricity power line through 
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indigenous lands, she followed the different actors, such as people involved in the 
conflict and people engaged in land demarcation, attached with her theme of 
exploration. To achieve this she moved between places, such as NGOs, offices of the 
electricity company and the offices of the central government in the capital Caracas, to 
the Indigenous People’s Federation and regional offices of the electricity company, in 
two regional cities of Venezuela. Along with informal interviews and conversations she 
searched for data in the media archive and unpublished documents and communication 
papers relating to the conflict. She was led to the movement by her realisation that the 
process she was interested in was not so much taking place in the communities, but in 
meetings and conversations throughout the country. In assessing her lack of long term 
engagement with the research subjects and reflecting on the anxieties she faced in her 
doctoral viva for the examiner’s concern, she discovered the unease and anxieties of the 
variation of multi-sited research that does not commit to participant observation.  
Kanwal Mand170 followed the members of transnational Shikh households to 
understand the ways in which mobility across places intersects with gendered identities 
and phases in the life course. To explore the women’s journey through Tanzania, Indian 
Punjab, and London in their life phases she adopted Marcus’s call for “following 
thing”171 by tracking people, charting the movement of the objects, and collecting 
biographies and narratives. Reflecting on her own experiences she acknowledged the 
benefits of multi-sited enquiry to focus on ‘subjects’ who are also learners (like 
ethnographers) of the meanings of interconnection between places (Marcus172 used the 
term para-ethnographer). Mand shared her experience of needing to use a number of 
data collection techniques, i.e. narratives and biographies, to bridge the distance and 
separation between the ethnographer and mobile key informants and between time and 
space.  
Dinah Rajak173 travelled between the corporate boardrooms of the Anglo American 
mining corporations in London and Johannesburg to the mineshafts of South Africa’s 
platinum belt to explore the discourses and practises of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and how it is constructed and implemented within these sites. Her ethnographic 
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exploration involved less prosperous dwellings in the mining sites of Rustenburg, 
South Africa. In assessing the methodology she adopted, Rajak174 points out that the 
multi-sited approach’s ability in dealing with the construction of CSR “which 
simultaneously claim to be locally responsive, nationally aligned, and under-written by 
universal values”175. She finds that the “mobility and flexibility” of this approach 
allows focusing on ‘connections (and disjunctures)” between the discursive ingredients 
of CSR (i.e. universalist ethical values, actual practices in local sites)176; but she shared 
that it was the actual practice and her efforts to grasp it that drove her ethnography of 
CSR, as it was the operational context within sites that needed to be captured.  
My methodological direction was inspired by some of the possibilities and challenges 
of the multi-sited approach as shared in the above experiences. My ethnography was 
aimed at researching the organisation of a social movement that involves local and 
national actors and universalist ideas, and to explore the realities that shape the 
movement initiatives. My ethnographic quest raised questions around what should be 
focused on in studying the complexities of the organisation of the social movement. 
Critiques noted that the simple acknowledgement of the relations between the 
development of social movements and social ties of some kind were no longer 
adequately addressing the complexities of this relation177. MacAdam, for example, 
noted that it was important to specify the elements, such as attributes and emotional 
dynamics of individuals in relation to their attachment to social movement178. Tsing 
stressed the importance of illuminating how differences of places and ideas become 
inherent ingredients of collective actions179. My research focuses on situated emotions 
and attributes, and threads of collaboration and networks across spaces and ideas. For 
an ethnographer, understanding individual emotions and attributes traditionally means 
engaging with an individual’s daily life and society where his or her experiences are 
shaped.  To gather the threads of differences and commonalities between locations, the 
multi-sited approach offers the freedom and mobility to engage in more than one 
location. My ethnographic approach combined the significance of longer-term 
engagement in a ‘community’ with the enabling possibilities of multi-sited research. I 
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dwelled in a village of the proposed mining site for nine months to capture the 
everyday realities that shape local resistance, and I participated in the day-to-day 
activities of a national level activist group based in the capital to understand the 
processes of organisation of what was called the national movement in order to identify 
the connection and disjuncture between them.  
Most of my research is ethnographic in the traditional sense. The majority of my field 
research was spent living in a village trying to immerse myself into the social life of a 
‘community’. When I was observing and enquiring into the activities of actors and 
organisations based at a distance from the community, I was primarily exploring the 
old anthropological devices of relations and sets of practices. As Ferguson argues180, by 
reconceptualising objects as a set of practices and taking relations as primary, not the 
objects, we can address the new objects of study of multi-sited research however 
transcending they may be. The multi-sited approach offers the possibility of updating 
the principles of ethnography; it is not a call for getting rid of these principles. For 
Ferguson, even when we are engaging in multi-sited fieldwork we are actually 
maintaining the same ethnographic fundamentals of “constructing intelligible facts 
through contextualisation, through building webs of relations” by following 
relationships and interconnections across space181.  
To understand the dynamics of the social movement against planned mining in 
Phulbari, I had to understand a number of questions, such as, what are the local socio-
political realities that inspire the resistance? What is the nature of the nationalistic ideas 
held by the movement activists in the capital, who organise the movement at national 
scale? How does an environmental NGO relate to the local realities of resistance? What 
is the nature of collaboration within the national activist groups called the National 
Committee? I looked at places beyond the community to understand these questions as 
I explored how and why resistance operates. I had to “carefully connect, to establish 
relations, to build context” to reach a comprehensive understanding of the processes 
that did not initially seem intelligible182. Even though I engaged myself in more than 
one location to reach intelligibility, these exploratory processes would sound familiar to 
conventional ethnographers. Some argue that the pioneer of ethnography, Malinowski, 
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had gone multi-local in following Trobianders along the Kula ring. To understand 
Trobiand gardening he had to seek the political authority of chiefs which took him to 
the realms of gift exchange, matriliny, and so on, all of which had to be put in relation 
to each other in order to make sense of them183. Similarly, in the end, it was the situated 
realities, actual practices and relations between sets of practices that I, like most 
ethnographers, sought to grasp.  
2. Dwelling in Borogram and politics of fieldwork 
I have mentioned before that the majority of my research was conducted following 
conventional ethnographic endeavours of longer term dwelling in a ‘community’. In 
preparation for this ethnographic mission I had to become aware of the processes and 
critics of ethnography in order to equip myself to deal with the ‘puzzle’ of fieldwork. 
Going into the field for such a long time and conducting fieldwork there was, indeed, 
puzzling, as I had only anticipated different fieldwork situations whilst sitting in my 
workspace far from the field sites. Being Bangladeshi and having been born and raised 
relatively close to my field sites I was supposed to be an ‘indigenous ethnographer’, 
however, my puzzle was not any less complicated than that of my fellow students going 
to a field far away from their home country. I was far removed from the ‘community’ 
in Phulbari and did not feel ‘at home’184. Later in this section I will discuss some of the 
benefits and challenges I experienced during my fieldwork in the ‘community’ due to 
my ‘nativeness’. A discussion about meanings and problems in ethnography will lead 
to those points.  
The definition and meaning of ethnography is diverse. Sherry Ortner prescribes this 
frequently used and minimal definition, “[ethnography] has always meant the attempt 
to understand another life world using the self - as much as possible - as the instrument 
of knowing”185. The sense is that it is a process in which researchers engage themselves 
with ‘another world’ to understand it. This view is an echo of Malinowski’s fieldwork 
tradition where ethnography entails making a description of the ‘other’ culture from a 
‘native’ point of view186. Through participant observation, it is a process of ‘initiation’, 
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variously designated as a puberty rite, ritual ordeal or rite of passage187. For Geertz, it is 
the meaning of social actions that ethnography strives to capture. He observed that 
ethnography reads cultures or social actions as ‘texts’.  
“Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of ‘construct a reading 
of’) a manuscript - foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious 
emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in 
conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient example of shaped 
behaviour188 ”.  
Interpretations must be made for the meanings of symbols ‘read’ in these actions by 
both researcher and subject 189. ‘Reading’ or capturing the meaning of these symbolic 
acts is a slippery job. Geertz found it is like reading a poem, getting a joke or 
understanding a proverb190. The slipperiness of this job refers to processes of 
interpretation where multiple meanings (‘readings’) can be made of any particular 
action, poem or text, and where the ethnographer’s subjectivity comes into play; 
“…what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to…”191. 
Ethnographic ‘representation’ has been questioned on a variety of grounds ranging 
from the researcher’s position in the text and problems of translation, to the 
ethnographer’s responsibility to the respondents. I will address the key issues raised in 
these criticisms to help position myself as a researcher. Asad’s criticism of modern 
ethnography raised discussions as to the legitimacy of this technique. He links 
ethnographic representations to the colonial/imperial conceptual context192. As a result, 
anthropology was caught up in a complex historical web of colonial relations that, in 
turn, influenced ethnography193. Asad argues that the colonial power structure was used 
to gain access to the anthropological object of study and made possible ‘the kind of 
human intimacy upon which anthropological fieldwork is based, but ensured that 
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intimacy should be one-sided and provisional (1973: 17). Similarly, Said194 argues that 
the notion of ‘observer’ in anthropological representations is based upon imperial 
discourse. In representing the ‘other’, he contends that early anthropologists 
constructed the Orient as inferior and the Occident as superior.  It is this colonial 
discourse, where anthropological practice is rooted, that makes the ‘native’ inferior.  
In response, post-modernists offer an alternative epistemological standpoint195 to 
overcome the problems raised by Asad and Said. This school criticised traditional 
ethnographers as using subjective judgements and postulated that it creates a dualism 
between subject and object, theory and practice, and so on.  In the process it captures a 
‘partial truth’, a fiction of human understanding196. Post-modernists have criticised that 
the purpose of conventional ethnographic writing is to legitimise its authority and 
authenticity through textual devices; and to overcome this they offer to disperse the 
authority through dialogue and through allowing the ‘native’ voices to be heard197.  
However, such an approach also faces criticism for its ignorance of the processes 
through which ethnographic writing is carried out and its exclusive focus on the end 
product only198. The post-modern idea of dialogue is problematic as ethnographic 
writing can only draw on a few members of a heterogeneous society who might not 
represent the ‘native’ voice. Drawing on samples and edited interviews with the ‘other’ 
can no longer be considered more authentic as interpretation is ultimately influenced by 
the researcher199. Post-modernists, thus, fail to offer any revealing methodological 
solutions to the problem of ‘representation’ that they raise200. It is not to put down the 
questions raised in the analysis of post-modernists, but to make it more explicit that 
such limitations are inherent in the ethnographic representations. The textualist devices 
that post-modernists offer also fall into the trap of the problem of interpretation. Any 
account imposes dominance by carrying the interpreter’s stamp. It is the author who 
ultimately makes data understandable and there is no interpretation that is not 
influenced by his/her own existential situation201. Ethnographers, thus, cannot claim 
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that there are texts that do not entail power. The ontological constitution inherently 
poses the relation of domination between writer and subject202. It would be problematic 
to deny that ethnographers, as writers, exert dominance textually. Rather by addressing 
these politics around fieldwork203explicitly into ethnographic accounts ethnographers 
can produce ‘good enough’204 text.   
One can question whether being a ‘native’ researcher provides any help in this respect.  
Rabinow (1986) comments that anthropologists should shift their focus from the ‘exotic 
other’ to their own society and Clifford (1986) suggests that ‘indigenous 
ethnographers’ carry enormous advantages in representing their own ‘native’ society205. 
He notes, “insiders study their own cultures offering new angels of vision and depths of 
understanding, their accounts are empowered and restricted in many ways” (p.9). This 
raises questions as to what extent a native/non-native divide is a useful way of looking 
at an ethnographer’s positionality. It may well be argued that anthropologists working 
in their own society carry their social background and their ontological construction, 
which can make the ‘native’ anthropologist an ‘outsider’. In my case, my upper middle 
class orientation, educational background and attachment to ‘city culture’ made me an 
‘outsider’ in the village where I conducted my fieldwork. Apart from that, ‘outsider-
ness’ can be characterised by specific experiences derived from particular local 
situations.  I will now reflect on my fieldwork and describe how, along with my socio-
economic and educational background, the local experiences of an outsider in a village 
under the threat of displacement by mining development “blurred” 206 my native 
identity. The broader point I will address is, to what extent my ethnographic endeavour 
‘at home’, and the power relations involved in these processes, was any less 
problematic.  
Upon my arrival in Borogram for my first visit, one of the villagers shared a story with 
me. He said,  
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“One day a city guy like you came to the village and was talking nicely with us. 
He started to ask questions regarding our professions, income sources and so 
on. We asked him why he was asking these questions. He couldn’t give us any 
satisfactory answer. We suspected that he was from Asia Energy and was trying 
to know about the village situation to make a plan for our displacement. We tied 
the person to a pole and left him there until one of our friends in Phulbari town 
assured us that he was an employee of Proshika [a credit service provider]. Few 
years before we had seen people like him coming to us and taking notes on 
papers. We didn’t know much about the mining plan at that time. Now we 
realise that if we hadn’t allowed them to survey the village it would have been 
difficult for them to make plans. Now we don’t allow any outsider to come to 
our village and collect information about us”207.  
Noting the challenge I assured him, “I can promise you I am not from Asia Energy. I 
am here to study as part of my degree at my University.” 
To this he replied, “We don’t understand your degree and your university. Its just we 
need to know more about you. It might be dangerous for you if you still want to roam 
around the village now. People don’t like outsiders roaming in the village. We are all 
very alert now.” 
At that moment I felt quite helpless. Although I eventually convinced the village 
groups that I was not there to collect information for the mining corporation, my 
Bangladeshi identity did not help in any way to alleviate the uncertainties attached to 
the people’s experiences and perceptions of ‘outsiders’. To negotiate their suspicions 
and doubts I had to use several strategies. Sometime I took my early village contacts 
with me when I wanted to be introduced to someone I had not met before. Sometimes 
an activist from Phulbari town would introduce me to a village group during 
discussions of mining and protest issues. “Ethnographers may have to correct, 
negotiate, even alter their role in interacting with their subjects. These modifications 
lead an ethnographer into an interactive process, representing a newly established 
relationship”208. In the subsequent months my identity was constantly contested and 
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negotiated as I was exposed to the complexities of the relations between my informants 
and myself. Ideas of the simple native/non-native demarcation were challenged.  
My affiliation with a UK university influenced the dimensions of my relations with my 
subjects. The UK is mentioned in discussions of mining and protests as the place where 
Asia Energy is located. I was advised by some of the activists in Phulbari town that I 
should not disclose my attachment with the UK in the village, as the people would be 
very suspicious about someone coming from the same place as Asia Energy. Although 
I did not feel that it was right to hide things, my affiliation with the UK created 
significant confusion among my informants. Their suspicions grew even stronger when 
it was imagined that I might have had hidden relations with Asia Energy and had come 
to the village in the guise of a university student. These suspicions were vocalised to 
me during the following conversation: 
Village resident: You live in London…such rich country! Why are you spending your 
time in this village? What you could learn from here? What is here to learn? 
Me: I am here to learn about the protests. 
Village resident: It doesn’t take months to learn about protests, does it? We have told 
what we know. If you don’t mind - when will you leave? 
Me: I want to live here so that I can observe things more and talk to more people. I 
need to learn more and stay here to write my exam papers.  
Village resident: Listen, people are asking questions about you. I don’t want to hurt 
you but people in the hat [village market] were saying you might go back to London 
and contact with Asia Energy and disclose things they want to know. He smiled.  
This is an example of how elements attached to my background created uncertainties 
that were beyond my control. My background influenced my relations with my 
informants and my ethnographic relations with the field. This takes me to Clifford’s 
reminder that “even the best ethnographic texts -serious, true fictions- are systems, or 
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economies of truth. Power and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot 
fully control”209. 
Language was another aspect that disturbed my efforts to understand the local idioms 
and some subtle expressions. Borogram village generally spoke a particular pattern of 
Bengali dialect that they called Chapai vasha (Chapai language). As I will discuss in 
Chapter Five, the village was established by migrants, people who had been displaced 
from their land in a northern district called Chapainawabganj by river erosion. This 
river erosion forced people from the Chapainawabganj area to follow the first set of 
migrants to the new place composed of residents from the village. The Bengali dialect 
they spoke was identified as their ashol vasha (original language), which consisted of 
certain lexical and phrasal characteristics that posed difficulties for me in 
communicating with my informants. Local people sometimes had different ways of 
expressing themselves and used the same word for different purposes, or with different 
meanings. “My son has gone to bidesh,” said one of my informants in a conversation 
with me. In my shohure (town) bidesh means a foreign country, but in local Chapai 
vasha bidesh can mean either a town far from the village or a foreign country, 
depending on the context of the conversation. My informant clarified that he meant his 
son went to find work in Dhaka between harvesting seasons when there was not enough 
work in the village. “I built my house last year,” one man said to me, meaning that he 
had married last year. My inability to understand the language despite being 
Bangladeshi made me an outsider in the village. As one man said with a smile, “You 
are bideshi manush [foreign people]; how would you understand our vasha?” It was 
only through my longer-term associations with the village that, like any other 
ethnographer, I was gradually able to gain an understanding of the invasiveness and 
contextual meanings of some of the local idioms and phrases. I had to constantly 
‘negotiate’ my Bengali knowledge with the one practiced in the village.  
This process is what Page210 called a communicative exchange that occurs under certain 
‘dialogical conditions’ and within specific a ‘historical climate’. As Page notes, the 
dialogical condition is not merely a conversation between two parties, but is a process 
of exchange between ethnographer and subject where both assess each other’s role. 
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This is an interactive process that guides ethnographers to a newly established 
relationship that is ‘constituted dialogically’211. In the process, “ethnographic 
approaches may be negotiated and modified, methodology may be called into question 
or even suspended if negative emotions associated with conflicting definitions of the 
situation occurs”212. This provides a researcher with the flexibility and opportunity to 
look back at any challenging situations they face and to assess and reconfigure the 
position of ‘self’ in relation to ‘others’. A conversation with a local Mulla (religious 
leader) provided me such an opportunity. 
Participating in the Bichar (village court)213 was an important field strategy for me to 
understand the functioning of social relations in Borogram. This community gathering 
serves as a platform for local disputes to be discussed, judged or mediated by the 
leaders of the village in agreement with other present villagers. I will now present my 
conversation with a local Mulla (religious leader) as it occurred during a Bichar 
organised to provide judgement in the case of a family dispute.  
Mulla: You have come today as well? 
Me: Yes, I have come to participate in the Bichar. Is it ok? 
Mulla: You can’t attend the Bichar today. Today we have women here. Females will 
not speak in front of unknown persons. 
Me: Ok I will leave if you want but I have spoken to the females present here before 
and they have talked to me gladly. 
Mulla: Did you take permission of their husband before you talked to them? 
Me: Yes. I think their husbands are present here. If you want, and if they want, I will 
leave. 
Mulla: Women should not speak in front of unknown persons. It is haram [religiously 
prohibited] in Islam. If their husband permitted you I would say they should not have 
done so. It would be good if you don’t come when females are here. I don’t understand 
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why do you have to come to these Bichars? What do you have to learn from here? You 
better don’t come to Bichars.  
Though the women and their husbands, who were present, said they did not have any 
problem speaking in front of me, I decided to leave the Bichar to avoid any 
misunderstanding with the Mulla. I stopped participating in Bichar where female 
members attended as I felt this was a better strategy for my immersion. After a few 
weeks, I went to the Mulla’s house to talk about my research and to clarify my 
purposes for wanting to participate in Bichar. He promised me that he would speak it 
over with the other Mullahs’ in the village. A few days later I was called to his home 
and was asked to explain my purpose of participating in the Bichars to two other 
Mullahs. Upon hearing my explanation one of the Mullahs stated: “If participating in 
Bichars helps your work you can participate there. Our women maintain purdah (veil) 
when they come to Bichars. Females can speak in front of outsiders if they maintain 
purdah.” 
The social authority and power of Mullahs as religious leaders challenged my position 
of ‘self’. The ethnographic reality I faced here and the way I negotiated with the 
Mullahs can be seen as what Page (1998)214 called interactive learning between the 
ethnographer and the respondent. I felt very much of an outsider in these instances and 
I had to strategise ways of responding to these situations by trying to convince the 
Mullahs or, in failing to do so, by leaning towards his fellow Mullahs. The 
ethnographic narrative produced within these contexts was powered by, like 
Narayan’s215 experience, my sensitivity to the various ways in which I interacted with 
members of the community, sometimes aligned with particular groups, sometime set 
apart. Despite being a Bangladeshi Muslim I was treated as an outsider in the Bichar by 
the religious leader. The anti-essentialist interpretation of ‘self’, thus, becomes 
somewhat blurred as it relates to the personal experiences in ethnographic text216. The 
example presented above can be seen as a reversal of power relations. A large part of 
the conversation presented above can be read as ‘respondents’ making the researcher 
their subject to carefully scrutinise and reach an informed decision. Indeed, as Page217 
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argues, ethnographic fieldwork is always a dialogic, power laden and conflictive 
process, regulated by dual agency.  
It can be argued that I was better equipped than a foreigner for ethnographic work in a 
Bangladeshi village since I had a great deal of prior understanding of the study area. 
Being a ‘local’, I, like all others in Bangladesh, have been following the protest events 
published in local media. I had acquired a lot of background information about the 
Phulbari movement, such as local issues of land ownership and the threat of 
displacement by the mining corporation, which I had obtained through my previous 
associations with some of the academicians involved in the movement. My familiarity 
with certain notions of land ownership in rural Bangladesh helped a great deal to grasp 
the relations between distinct land ownership patterns in Borogram and the resistance 
to the mine. Though my Muslim identity was not much help in placing me as a native 
in certain social realms, as evidenced above, it did allow me to participate in certain 
social spaces, such as in religious discussions at the local Mosques after Jummas 
(Friday prayer) where villagers occasionally discussed cases of village conflicts and 
sought the views of the Musulli (participants of religious discussion). This is one way 
that the frame and functioning of Samaj (solidarity group/ ‘community’) became visible 
to me. I have provided examples of how my Bengali skills were not adequate in 
understanding certain shorthand idioms and some invasive expressions, but I was 
definitely in a more advantageous position than a foreign ethnographer to negotiate 
these difficulties. I was well prepared to engage in interactive communication and to 
understand linguistic nuances attached to cultural attributes. Having grown up in 
Bangladesh and having had previous exposure to the area as part of my involvement in 
a community development project in Phulbari, it was easier for me to interpret the local 
meaning of some narratives, gestures, and body language. This is not to celebrate my 
role as a ‘local’ anthropologist compared to an ‘outsider’ anthropologist. This is to state 
that Clifford's call of ‘indigenous ethnographer’ can be seen as partially credible218.  
No doubt, my position as a researcher was ‘subjective’, but strenuous efforts were 
made to produce a ‘good enough’ ethnography by accommodating post-modern 
critiques and a commitment to ‘true description’ in line with Scheper-Huges’s 
experience. “Even though I make no claims to privileged scientific mentality, I do try 
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to offer a fair and true description and analysis of events and relationships as I have 
perceived and sometimes participated in them219”.  
3. Research strategies 
 
As previously mentioned, the majority of my research was conducted through 
participant observation in a village located in the proposed mining site of Phulbari in 
the northern district of Dinajpur, Bangladesh. During my nine months of dwelling in 
Borogram village I participated in a wide range of daily, routine and periodic activities 
to explore the realms of ‘community relations’ and ‘private’ spheres and their relations 
with local resistance to the mine. Participating in Bichar, religious discussions at the 
mosques, evening adda (idle chat) at village tea stalls and in marriage ceremonies are 
some examples of social events that I regularly participated in. Following the 
conventional manners of ethnographic observation, staying ‘there’ was my main 
strategy and included informally observing leisure activities such as hanging out with 
informants and using everyday conversation as an interview technique. ‘Going 
native’220 was not possible, as I have discussed, neither did I pretend that it was. 
Understanding the meaning of resistance by observing the everyday spheres of the 
village was the idea, and using participant observation as a research strategy lent to 
blurring boundaries between my informants and myself or of insider/outsider 
connotations221.  
Interpretation of ‘data’ accompanies the processes of participant observation. 
Anthropologists face problems when interpreting ‘data’ collected through participant 
observation. Rabinow222 comments that: “You are not an anthropologist until you have 
the experience of doing it. But when one returns from the field the opposite 
immediately applies: anthropology is not the experiences which made you an initiate, 
but only the objective data you have brought back”223. However, it is critical to 
recognise that the ethnographic techniques of representation are shaped ‘not only by the 
kind of data collected but also the manner in which those data were obtained’224. It 
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would not claim that the ‘data’, the feelings and the narratives that I would like to 
capture, would be ‘objective’.  I am aware of the fact that the way I plan to conduct my 
‘fieldwork’ creates concerns about the problematic self/other relations, the problem of 
representations and the nature of anthropological voice and authority it involves225. 
I also participated in the regular activities of the National Committee, a national forum 
of left leaning political parties and sympathetic individuals, who organises the 
movement at the national level. I began by hanging out with some activists of the NC to 
gain enough of their trust to allow me to participate in the organisational activities of 
the committee. As I spent more time with them my association with the activists 
became more ‘natural’ and the relationship became less formal. The length of 
association enabled ‘natural’ interactions to be observed and participated in226. This 
allowed me to participate in the regular organising meetings of the committee, held 
three to four times a month, to discuss the issues of protests and issues around 
organising particular protest events. I also attended NC monthly coordination meetings 
where members who are representatives of different political parties discuss their views 
on issues around the mine and protest activities. Other regular activities of the 
committee included organising discussions with sympathetic professionals, such as 
engineers or geologists, environmental NGOs involved in the movement such as 
Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), and committee members. Participating in these 
discussions and the organisation of events helped me to explore the actors and groups, 
and the agendas they promote. During my fieldwork I participated in a number of NC 
protest events, such as protest rallies, processions, street marches and hunger strikes, 
that deepened my understanding of the organisation of the movement.  
Though my aim was to engage in ‘natural’ interactions with the actors in the NC, I was 
often viewed as an ‘artificial’ participant of the organising and coordination meetings. 
During the first few instances some of my early contacts introduced me as an 
acquainted researcher; this was one of the ways that I earned access into the spheres of 
the committee. However, I was not usually asked to present any views and I was not 
usually given a turn to ask any questions. My participation was, thus, at times, limited 
to simply observing the proceedings and listening to what was talked about. This, 
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however, changed to some extent as I extended my participation to street protests and 
demonstrations. I, like other activists participating in the events, began to reflect on 
how the protests went in the post-event meetings. The balance between my roles as 
researcher and a participant in the activism had to be established in the process, as I 
constantly kept my informants, and myself, aware of my research motives to avoid any 
undue expectations regarding my role in the movement.  
I conducted informal interviews and collected oral histories from the participants of 
protest activities in the village in Phulbari town and in the capital. The history of the 
protests was documented through these oral accounts. Oral histories provided me the 
capability to textualise people’s knowledge and identity.  As Wendy Singer comments, 
oral history undercuts post-modern arguments concerned with the fixity of text and 
authority because it is continually changing and shifting227. Collecting narratives helped 
to understand issues, such as why people participated in the protests and how they 
organised themselves during the events and moments of protests228. Narrative is 
spontaneous representations of both history and the present and has a central function 
in complex relations.229 
In addition to my fieldwork in Phulbari I conducted interviews ‘by appointment’ with 
officials and actors in an environmental NGO called Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon 
(BAPA) that promoted the environmental agenda in the Phulbari movement and 
collaborated with the National Committee on certain protest activities. I made contact 
with some of the actors in BAPA through my participation in coordination meetings 
arranged by the National Committee where members of BAPA often attended. I had 
friendly conversations, or ‘speech events’230, with them during those meetings, which 
were followed by in-depth interviews at a set time and place. The in-depth interviews 
helped explore the role of BAPA in propagating discourses of environment and how 
they were connected with other ideas and groups, i.e. villagers in the mine site, in the 
movement. The interviews helped to explore the informant’s thoughts and 
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understandings of the issues of environment and the Phulbari mine project, as well as 
their experiences of involvement in the movement’s activities both at the national and 
local level. Interviews were beneficial in identifying BAPA actors involved with the 
Phulbari movement and also helped to explore their experiences of the background and 
agendas of the organisation. Interviews, however, are conducted within a structured 
setting and the narratives they produce do not carry the context of participatory 
engagement. I was aware that the narratives produced from my BAPA interviews, 
while often enthusiastic and well-versed in presenting the importance of their 
organisation in the movement and the role and value of environmental agendas, were 
influenced by a rhetorical edge.  
A clearer picture of the role and views of BAPA was obtained through participation in 
National Committee meetings in Dhaka where representatives of BAPA participated. 
These meetings were organised periodically to press the demands of the protesters and 
were generally held in a meeting room at the office of the Communist party of 
Bangladesh in Dhaka. The National Committee also used the office of the Communist 
Party for their regular organisational discussions. For me, this office became a place for 
interacting with the activists. Participation in their discussions helped explore the 
agendas BAPA brought to the movement.  
4.  Ethical issues  
The root of present philosophical premises of research ethics and codes takes us to 
elements of the Enlightenment doctrine, based as it is in concepts of radical freedom 
and self-determinism, to ensure ‘neutrality between different conceptions of the 
good’231. In a society of diverse beliefs, traditions, religions and occupations, ‘value 
neutrality’ was considered the light of Enlightenment. This ‘value neutrality’ led to 
‘value-free experimentalism’ in social sciences with reference to ethical issues such as 
moral deliberation, choice and accountability on the part of the researcher throughout 
the research process232. Postmodernists have reflected on the complexity around the 
notion of ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ when it comes to ethnographic research and 
pointed out the ‘authority’ of researchers in ‘field’ research (Clifford and Marcus, 1986 
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for example)233. I have discussed some of the key arguments of this school in the 
methodology section. I have also hinted that an awareness of a post-modern critic’s 
viewpoints and a commitment to ‘true description’ can produce, in Scheper-Hughes 
terms, ‘good enough’234 ethnography. Different ethical guidelines or codes have come 
into being to guide the field research process, most of which generally focus on, 1. 
objectivity and integrity, and 2. disclosure of rights applicable to the research 
population. Objectivity and integrity refers to the researcher’s effort to maintain these 
characteristics in the research process; the disclosure of the rights of the research 
population refers to a researcher’s awareness of power relations, wealth, and status 
disparities between the researcher and the researched. 
Maintaining objectivity and integrity is influenced by several interrelated factors.  
Researchers and their positionality, or ‘who you are and what you do’, can greatly 
influence the research process235. My interest in researching the dynamics of ongoing 
resistance to a multinational mining corporation, Asia Energy, in Phulbari grew from a 
particular background. Before coming to the University of Sussex to do an M.A in 
2006, I was in contact with national activist groups that were collaborating with local 
communities to strengthen the protests against Asia Energy. As mentioned earlier, these 
groups of activists involved university teachers and academics, some of who are from 
my alma mater, Jahangirnagar University in Dhaka. Because of this connection, I was a 
keen follower of the development of the Phulbari movement and my position in this 
context was also influenced by the ideas and views, often inclined to anti-colonialist or 
nationalist discourses, of some of the activists from the National Committee. This pre-
orientation about the Phulbari resistance from the perspective of a particular activist 
group posed some challenges while conducting anthropological research to understand 
the protest. These challenges were overcome by an even greater orientation towards the 
different theories and examples of social movements, and complexities involving 
community resistance. Pre-fieldwork training helped me prepare intellectually and 
methodologically to overcome any pre-assumptions arising from my positionality 
within the context.  
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A researcher’s complex subjectivity arising from crosscutting identities may also 
impact their relationship with the researched236. My Bangladeshi identity, my language, 
my religion and my familiarity with the field, as I mentioned before, certainly 
positioned me in comfortable situations while conducting my field research. But it 
becomes less comfortable when it has come to writing my findings. The question asked 
by an activist, “how would your work help the movement?” created an ethical dilemma 
on my part and is indicative of the multiple accountabilities I am called to. As an 
anthropologist I write for other anthropologists, yet at the same time the activists of the 
movement, with whom I have developed a social relation with over the period of my 
field engagement, call upon my accountability. In addition, my writing is subject to 
scrutiny by the educated activists.  My previous associations with Dhaka-based 
activists add to the dilemma of how and what I write, or do not write, about the 
activism. My background in anthropology and my connections with the activists 
presents the challenge of positioning me “with reference to two communities”237. While 
writing I constantly attend to these positionalities to minimize the problem of 
‘positioned truths’238 in the representation. Also, I must maintain a balance between 
multiple accountabilities in order to address my responsibilities towards my subjects 
and my commitment to ‘good ethnography’.   
This was not an easy task; I broadly share the values and emotions of the activists who 
are predominately members of left-liberal political parties trying to uphold the promise 
of ‘secular’ social ideologies as opposed to ideals based on Islamic principles 
propagated by the pre-independent Pakistan State (see Chapter Three).  I also share the 
values that inform the political agenda of ‘Dharma Niropekhhata’ (which literally 
translates to ‘religious neutrality’) held by left political activists. My moral position 
lends support to the activist’s demand to remove Islam as the state religion as is 
inscribed in the constituency of Bangladesh. Within the context of activism against the 
mine, protest messages, as we will see, take on anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
sentiments. This led me to face the difficult question of whether I should support the 
activists rather than conduct an ‘objective’ inquiry into the dynamics of the protests that 
may reveal message fragments.  In sharing the experience of Nayanika Mukherjee’s 
ethnographic encounters within left-liberal politics in Bangladesh the relationship 
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between the researcher and the activists becomes “even more complicated in the 
context of activism that seeks redress for colonialism, imperialism…”239   
The dilemma has presented itself as whether I should take the side of the activists to 
help strengthen the protests and circulate straightforward and uniform anti-mining 
agendas, or look for situated realities that different groups experience and that, in turn, 
inform the protests of different groups. The Dhaka-based activists asked me to write for 
Meghbarta, an e-magazine run by the anti-mining activists, to help strengthen their 
web-based activism.  
“You now know the misery people would face if the mining takes place. You 
have lived there, talked with them; you have seen how much people in Phulbari 
hate Asia Energy’s mining proposal. You can tell others what you have learned 
there. Why don’t you write for us? We are collecting writings for our websites” 
(an activist involved in managing Meghbarta). 
This certainly added to the dilemma of what I should and should not write. My 
ethnographic engagement with the village people in Phulbari revealed, as we will see, 
aspects of collaboration and friction of ideas and experiences as people came to engage 
with the protests movements; this is what my research intended to explore at different 
levels of the protests. My writings for Meghbarta, if based on my methodological 
exploration, would definitely demand some form of formatting as per the general tone 
of the ‘anti-Asia Energy’ sentiment of the magazine.  
I chose not to write for the magazine. Instead I tried to take solace in the very 
incitement of the activist: ‘you can tell others what you have learned there’. This is not 
to say that ‘neutrality’ is what I have sought.  I subscribe to Mookherjee’s suggestion 
that whether we can take sides “needs to be examined in the context of the historical 
and moral political trajectories within which such engagement takes place”240. For the 
moment I “ask the awkward questions”:241 to what extent, and how, do ideas held by 
different groups form the protests.  
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My connection with the national activists and their co-activists in Phulbari town helped 
me gain access into the village for field research. The beneficial features of a ‘native’ 
researcher also contained the risk of creating an ambivalent relationship with the 
community members. Accessing the community with the help of an activist group 
could have labelled me to the community as a member of an activist group. To 
minimise this, my research purpose, possible consequences, and the use of my research 
were clearly explained to the activist groups and to the community people I 
encountered. However, it was impossible to explain my research purpose to everyone 
in the community who I observed, spoke to or listened to. Under the conditions of long-
term participant observation I sometimes observed people from a distance; sometimes I 
observed passively without face-to-face contact, sometimes I listened to people from a 
distance. Obtaining informed consent in all of these ethnographic settings would not be 
possible for an ethnographer looking to engage in ‘formal and informal’ manners. Even 
in suitable situations where I explained my research purposes I encountered some other 
inherent problems with ‘informed consent’.  
People in Borogram sometimes did not understand the explanation of my academic 
research because of the differences between my language and local (Chapi) dialects. 
Some local people asked for further clarification before they would agree to talk to me 
about my research. In doing so, they sometimes had different ways of expressing 
themselves. ‘Explanations offered by people may be expressed…in idioms signalling 
distrust, as ethnic norms or as uncertain exploratory hypothesis’242.  There was no 
simple solution to this problem. The entire issue of informed consent is problematic243. 
This is a general problem for field research, which I tried to minimise through my 
longer-term ethnographic interactions with the people of Borogram. I acknowledged 
this problem during the initial stages of gaining informed consent. My familiarity with 
the research area might not have helped overcome this problem totally, but it did help 
to minimise it.   
The ethical dilemma I faced was in my responsibility to the people and organisations I 
studied. For Starn244 and Scheper-Hughes245, anthropological research should aim to 
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have a positive impact on the researched people rather then being ‘cold’ and 
‘objective’. This takes us back to the debate about the meaning of anthropology itself. I 
do not wish to enter into this debate around the relative merit of ‘political activist 
ethnography’246 or ‘activist research’, but I feel that the point raised by Starn and 
Scheper-Hughes has important implications as to the kind of relationship I was required 
to build with my research subjects while employing an ethnographic method. While 
communicating with the National Committee and explaining my research and 
objectives for participant observation in the committee, I was asked to explain how my 
research would benefit the movement and protesters. Participant observation in 
Borogram required intense personal relationships with the protesters. This kind of 
relationship made it difficult to separate ‘facts’ from ‘emotions’. Any research in the 
community should help the people rather than hinder them247. These are the debates that 
complicate my ethical position and create some dilemmas. As I carried out my field 
research and writings I have kept these issues in mind and worked hard to ensure that 
these dilemmas have not had a significant impact on my research.  
Maintaining the anonymity and confidentiality of research subjects is a key 
consideration in most ethical guidelines. Safeguarding people’s confidentiality, not 
using their names and reference, is the usual process. However, in this case it was 
impossible to totally ensure the anonymity of public figures. The position of the 
General Secretary of the National Committee was one such example where it was not 
possible secure anonymity; some unavoidable descriptions of my research processes 
would inevitably reveal his identity.  In these situations I was assured by my informants 
that they did not have any objections to their names or identities being revealed. 
However, extra care had to be taken to create feelings of trust when interacting with 
people involved in activism. In cases where names and identities were obvious I have 
adopted pseudonyms in my text, and statements and information have been used in a 
way that will not harm their confidentiality.  
It was not possible to assure my informants about the possible use of my thesis, as these 
reports can be accessed by university students, be quoted in different publications, and 
can be shared in seminars and with wider audiences verbally. Also, my responsibility 
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towards the ESRC, who are funding my research, compels me to make the reports 
available to stakeholders so it can be disseminated to wider audiences. There is the 
potential risk of creating a misunderstanding between my informants and I about how 
informant’s views are being represented through research reports. To minimise this 
problem, in line with the suggestion of James (2001)248, I used a lot of original quotes in 
the text to avoid any misinterpretation of information and observation. This will help to 
avoid over interpretation of what a research subject has said or done, thus, ‘moving 
away from ethnographic authority’. Having said that, I do acknowledge that it is the 
author in the end, who controls what quotes are included and excluded, and the manner 
and context in which they are used249. 
Before focusing on my empirical data, I will discuss the historical background to the 
political conditions within which the present-day movement against the mine operates. 
In the next chapter I present an analysis of how the negative image of a ‘foreign 
company’ was historically formed through the policies of the East India Company in 
Bengal. The main discussion focuses on the political discourses and practices that 
inform the Bangladeshi political field. I start with a discussion of the history of the 
agrarian struggle in the Dinajpur region and a scholarly analysis of the nature of these 
struggles to establish how this informs my analysis of the protests against mining 
planned in Phulbari.  
This is followed by a more context specific discussion in Chapter Four, which 
explores how ‘nationalism’, as a central discourse of dissent, is played out in the 
movement against the mine. Organised protests against mining in Phulbari are often 
propagated as a ‘national’ movement to protect ‘national interests’ by an activist group 
based in the capital, in collaboration with groups and actors based at both the local 
level and within the capital. The chapter explores the idioms of nationalism, 
characterised by the concerns of ‘national interests, that play a significant role in the 
dissent around mining, and discusses how the ideas of ‘national interests’ are internally 
varied.  
What does anti-mining mean at the local level? Chapter Five and Six discuss the 
complexities and situated realities of resistance to the Phulbari mine. Chapter Five 
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presents ethnographic descriptions and the background of Borogram village, the site for 
the planned mine, where I was engaged for a longer period of time. It begins with a 
discussion around the social structure of rural Bangladesh, which, as evidenced by 
some critical analyses, is distinct throughout the country’s different regions. The main 
body of the chapter is focused on aspects of the social structure and relations within a 
particular village of Borogram.  To provide a clear picture of the village’s social 
settings, the history of the village’s establishment is described, detailing the groups of 
people who had migrated from river affected northern districts of Bangladesh. The 
notion of ‘community’ and the functionality of certain social processes, such as the 
‘bichar’ (village court), ‘Samaj’ (solidarity group) and the patterns of land relations, are 
discussed to provide an understanding of the complexities and particularities of social 
relations in Borogram. An ethnographic account of the history of the village, together 
with notions of certain social functions and land relations, are presented in order to 
demonstrate how these are implicated in the production of a ‘Chapai village’, as it is 
locally called, with its distinct socio-political characteristics.  Details of the context of 
social relations and the make-up of the village provide a background for the discussions 
in Chapter Six (Part One) where I explore how local resistance is embedded in distinct 
socio-political characteristics of Borogram. This is followed by a discussion in Chapter 
Six Part Two where I show how, at another level, a localised movement builds around 
an actor’s own ‘moral commitment’ to control the tangible and intangible benefit that 
arise from the protests.  
In Chapter Seven ‘friction’ between disparate ideas and observations that characterise 
the organisation of the Phulbari movement is explored. To achieve this, I first examine 
the make-up of the forum that organises protests at the national level through its 
branches located throughout Bangladesh, including in the mining sites of Phulbari 
town, the National Committee. The left-oriented National Committee, with its 
propagation against global and foreign capital, is formed by members with varied, and 
sometimes conflicting, opinions and observations of the movement. I discuss how 
members of the National Committee negotiate these divergences by putting their 
differences aside and finding commonalities. An environmental NGO, whose 
motivations lie within the global environmental agenda, gets in the way of this 
compromise for a common space of protest. I reflect on the efforts of collaboration 
between the Borogram ‘community’ and the environmental NGO and present examples 
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of how disparate observations of certain ideas about the environment, such as the 
protection of the forest, finds spaces of compatibility in strengthening the protests. This 
is not a smooth integration of ideas and knowledge within the network of resistance. I 
argue that the processes of connection are characterised by conflicts, and these conflicts 
open up the possibilities for networks of resistance.  
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Chapter Three 
Political discourse and practice: historical context 
Outline 
The aim of this chapter is to present the histories of socio-political processes in 
Bangladesh in order to establish the background to the present social and political 
environment in which the protests against the UK-based global mining company 
operate.  
I draw on some informative analyses of the socio-political histories in the Bengal 
province, a major part of which later became independent Bangladesh. This extensive 
engagement with history is important to provide a background to the discourses and 
practice of activism. History is conceived of as a discursive tool in this thesis as it 
informs the ideas and agendas of the groups involved in the protests. As we shall see, 
‘nationalist ideas’, cemented historically, (often characterised by anti-colonial 
languages and an ‘anti-foreign corporations’ position) in the current context play an 
important role in the workings of the movement against the mine.  
I discuss how a British trading company in India, the East India Company, began to 
turn into a military entity, and how its trading policies during the colonial period 
formed a ‘negative’ collective image of foreign companies in Bengal. 
 The next section presents the background for the creation of Pakistan and historical 
evidence of the varying inspirations contained in the image of a desired ‘Muslim 
community’ that were attached to the idea of its independence. The second part of this 
section is concerned with the breakdown of Pakistan and the emergence of an 
independent Bangladesh, sketching the socio-political context within which the new 
country emerged. In the third part, this historical context is used in an analysis of how 
idioms of Bengali nationalism did not take a ‘modular’ form, and were subject to 
revision by internal ‘cleavages’. The last section is concerned with political conditions 
and practices of dissent in Bangladesh; the chaos in the political and economic fields of 
a post-independent Bangladesh that gradually shifted from a ‘socialist’ character to one 
of private and foreign investment. These sketch the terrain of protests.  
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I began by looking at the histories of struggle in the Dinajpur region and the scholarly 
analyses regarding the nature of these struggles. Let us start with these.  
1. Struggle in Dinajpur: a historical background   
Dinajpur1 has its history of organised struggle and resistance during both pre and post 
colonial eras. Some veterans are still involved in present day activism against mining in 
Phulbari for, some would say similar, some would say different, reasons. This research 
explores these discrepancies in further detail.  
The following section explores the history of struggle in Dinajpur and the scholarly 
debates around the nature of these struggles. Particular attention has been paid to 
debates concerning the possibilities of alliances within the struggles, a central theme of 
the thesis.  
Organised struggle in Dinajpur historically centred around land relations and land 
rights, and mainly carried out by people directly involved in land cultivation, known as 
sharecroppers and the landless. The system of land tax collection under colonial rule 
through tiers of landlords (zamindars) proved to be exploitative for the cultivators2. 
Large-scale zamindars used to underlet their land to smaller-scale zamindars who came 
from the local rich class. The smaller-scale landlords used to sublet it again to actual 
cultivators (sharecroppers) at an ‘advanced rate or for half the produce’3. Some local 
zamindars with huge amounts of land also existed in this part of Bengal4 whose acts of 
exploitation towards their under-tenants were recorded by writers such as Buchanan 
Hamilton and Colebrooke5. As Colebrooke noted, “the undertenants depressed by an 
excessive rent in kind and by usurious returns for the cattle, seed and subsistence 
advance to them can never extricate themselves from debt…whenever the system of an 
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intermediate tenancy subsists, the sharecropper is indignant, the husbandry ill-
managed”6. 
From the advent of colonial rule, British rulers and their nominated Dinajpur zamindars 
frequently encountered unrest from the cultivators. The last of the large-scale 
movements was ‘Tebhaga’ during 1946-47, and was also the most organised 
sharecroppers’ movement in 20th century Bengal7. Memories of the Tebhaga movement 
can still be found in the narratives of local veteran residents, some of whom directly 
participated in the movement in the locality of this research. Tebhaga is a local Bengali 
term which means two-thirds of the produce. Like the name of the movement, the 
demand for Tebhaga was for two-thirds instead of a half share of the sharecropper’s 
produce. Sharecroppers were the tenants of local landlords who used to sublet 
agricultural land for half the produce and without any permanent rights to the land. 
Sharecroppers had to bear the cost of production along with the labour. This 
sharecropping system did not put any obligation on the part of the landlord to provide 
the capital for production. Also, landlords could cancel any tenancy at their will and 
evict the farmers from the land. The crop was usually taken to the landlords’ threshing 
ground to divide which provided an opportunity for the landlord’s men to manipulate 
the weights. Thus, the demand of common threshing ground for the crop share division 
was central to the Tebhaga movement8. Examination of the slogans of this movement, 
which were popularised through organised village meetings documented by Majumdar 
and others, highlights the issues central to this struggle; demand for a common 
threshing ground for the division of crop share, two-third share of the produce instead 
of half, no interest on loaned paddy and no illegal exaction of various kind9. Access to 
land and its produce was central to the movement.  
The organisation of the Tebhaga movement was facilitated by the communist party of 
India (CPI) and its associate left organisations. Sunil Sen10 described memories of his 
own engagement in the movement as a village organiser when urban middle class party 
members went to their villages and organised village committees for the sharecroppers. 
These village committees acted as the main force of the movement at the local level 
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where the provincial leaders gave a coordinated and organisational form of the 
movement. Through the facilitation of communist party activism, a group of village 
leaders emerged from the actual sharecroppers group who led the confrontation11. The 
Tebhaga movement in this sense is not something entirely rooted to locality. There is 
an interesting similarity to note between the organisation of the Tebhaga movement and 
present day mining resistance, which is the presence of village committees at the local 
level and the facilitation role by left orientated groups. The role of these village 
committees and left groups in the present scenario demands closer attention. 
Many discussions of the Tebhaga movement in Dinajpur derive from left orientated 
historians and writers and are based on their memories of the involvement of the 
communist party in the movement12. Often, these writers draw on the presence of 
general ‘communist’ consciousness in this movement. Ranajit Guha13 argues that 
historiography has considered the sharecropper’s ‘consciousnesses’ as arising naturally 
from their class position. He argues that these writings have limited the 
‘consciousnesses’ by making the cultivators and sharecroppers as an empirical person 
only. Sharecroppers’ revolts are seen here as natural phenomena and described with 
rhetoric: “they break out like thunderstorm, heave like earthquakes, speak like 
wildfires, infect like epidemic14.” He notes that historiography tends to attribute 
sharecropper uprisings to a number of key causes that are somehow external. By doing 
so, it denies any claims of sharecroppers’ own consciousness15.  
According to Guha, these writings are made up of three kinds of discourse, which can 
be categorised as ‘primary, secondary and tertiary’ based on their ‘appearance in time 
and their filiations’.  These categories are different from each other by the ‘degree of its 
formal and/or acknowledged (as opposed to real and/or tacit) identification with an 
official point of view, by the measure of its distance from the event to which it refers, 
and by the ratio of the distributive and integrative components in its narrative’16. In 
these writings ‘rural uprising’ is expressed in a way that finds general solidarity 
                                                           
11
 Majumdar, 1993 
12
 For example, Sen, 1972;  Ghosh and Suniti, 2001; Das,  2002; Ray , 2000 
13
 Guha, 1996. p. 2 
14
 Guha, 1996. p. 3 
15
 Guha, 1996. p. 38 
16
 Guha, 1996. p. 3 
75 
 
emerging from a larger political goal and fails to see the local and territorial 
particularities17.  
Guha analyses three discourses to demonstrate how ‘particular blind spots’ are 
maintained in historical writings. The primary discourse is official in nature in the 
sense that it is originated mainly for administrative use or for reasons of state by the 
bureaucrats and others employed by the government. The same trend is followed by the 
non-official local writers who are ‘symbiotically’ attached to state authority such as 
missionaries, landlords, and moneylenders and so on. The discourse is official because 
its generation and distribution is primarily for government decision making on issues 
related to state administration and action. These writings include statements from the 
insurgents or their allies only as a part of administrative concern, often as ‘enclosures’, 
as is done in direct reporting or letters from field employees. Secondary discourse 
interprets these events and uses an ‘open up perspective’ to make it history.  
According to Guha, this turns an event or ‘primary source’ into something processed or 
a product that we generally recognise as history. This kind of discourse is characterised 
by two kinds of writings, the first being memories or reflections on the experience by 
the participants without acknowledging their own attachment to state interests; the 
second as representations that came from administrators related to a particular event. 
Guha concludes the discursive character of these writings, in many ways, is 
contaminated by bias, judgment and opinion. This form of historiography is rooted in a 
specific kind of knowledge which serves to maintain state authority.  
Tertiary discourse, on the other hand, is likely to take the insurgent’s perspective, 
particularly in the case of the ‘left’ group. These writings are not entirely rooted in time 
and memories of events and are likely to take a third person view. Tertiary discourse 
relies on causes as an explanatory tool to reveal the larger political interests. Guha 
presents examples of Ray’s writings again where the mobile indigenous labour force is 
described to have indicated the struggle of ‘Indian people in general and peasants and 
workers in particular against foreign and local oppressor’18. Historians in this tradition 
are not interested in exploring the consciousness attached to a particular struggle. This 
means, as Guha puts it, ‘denying a will to the mass of the rebels themselves and 
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representing them merely as instrument of some other will’19 and producing an 
ahistorical history of insurgency that deny the contradictions.  
Subaltern scholar Ranajit Guha’s analysis points to the importance of a more 
anthropological emphasis on locality. But it’s not that anthropology is/should be about 
the search of local politics only. It is, rather, the particularity of a movement that needs 
to be explored. Irfan Habib20 criticises subaltern scholars for denying external influence 
on any movement and assuming that the external source of ideas could only be the 
‘bourgeois elites’ and not any other group. Their view isolates a struggle to its very 
own context which could never themselves dictate a unified national movement. Local 
struggle in this sense is never a part of a national movement and always and only forms 
a part of its context. They only stress the ability of autonomous actions of a particular 
group. Any ‘mystical belief in the virtue of an externally untainted movement of any 
segment of the non-elites’ is not helpful for exploring the possible networks between 
different interest groups in a particular movement21. However, this is not to subscribe 
back to radical historiography where Irfan Habib belongs. Rather, an approach that 
seeks both the contextuality of a particular movement and its possible ability to 
‘connect’ to other ideas or groups is important to understand the nature of the 
movement. In this research I attempt to look both ways.  
2. The Collective Images of a ‘Foreign Company’ 
The history of Bengal is inseparable from the British East India Company’s affairs in 
India. The company was originally formed as an English joint-stock company for 
pursuing trade with the East Indies in the 1600s under the name Governor and 
Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies22. After a merger with a 
rival English company that challenged its business monopoly, it was renamed the 
United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies in 1708, by which 
time the Indian subcontinent had become the main interest of the company23. 
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In Bengal, the first factory of the company was established in 1633 to trade cotton, silk 
and spices24. Though early presence of the company in Bengal was characterised by 
conflicts with other similar European companies, mainly Portuguese and Dutch, it 
secured business successes by managing tax and other concessions from the State. The 
Company was allowed to anchor ships wherever they wanted, build factories and 
warehouse where needed, and buy and sell freely without taking advance permission25. 
By the late seventeenth century provincial rebellions against the Mughal Empire spread 
to different parts of India, including Bengal, and weakened the central control of the 
empire26. At the end of the seventeenth century the Indian Muslim Empire, also known 
as the Mughal Empire, faced a rebellion from a local landlord who, with his own army, 
captured and held areas of Bengal for sometime27. Competition to capture central and 
provincial power also broke out. It was within this background that the East India 
Company started to strengthen military measures, such as building forts, in different 
parts of India28. Emerging rebellions in Bengal and elsewhere on the Indian-
subcontinent forced the rulers to agree with the British East Indian Company’s demand 
of establishing military forts to protect business interests29. Change in the regional 
administration of the monarch, as a result of increased rebellion, created tensions with 
the Company, as new provincial rulers did not feel the need to regard concessions 
provided by their predecessors30. The combination of these factors, such as the 
increased military capacity of the company, changes in regional military and 
administration posts, and increased regional rebellion, resulted in the East India 
Company transforming from a trade entity into a trade and military entity31. 
Marshall32 noted that by 1765 the East India Company and private English traders 
spread their business ventures deep into the eastern provinces33, which brought conflict 
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with government interests. The government experienced conflicts around issues such as 
the commercial infiltration of individual British traders into areas where they were not 
officially granted permission to trade. In 1757 the Company fought, and won, a war 
against the new ruler of the province who denied the continuation of tax concessions.  
With that, the Company had gained de facto control of the province without formal 
ruling authority. A new ruler of the province was positioned under certain conditions 
stipulated by the Company, such as the continuation of tax concessions and liberty for 
the Company to spread businesses into new areas. Local officials and forces of the new 
ruler often made the English private traders stop their businesses in the new areas. The 
East India Company provided support to private British traders, which led to another 
war with government forces in 1765. This resulted in the formal transfer of authority 
over the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, to the Company, thereby establishing 
British rule over the region. This historical moment can be recognised as the dividing 
line between the Muslim period and the periods of British rule in Bengal34.   
Taxation on land was the largest source of revenue collected by the Company for 
maintaining military and business ventures35. To improve management of the land and 
tax system, the Company developed a new land revenue system in 1776. This system 
was based on a simple principle of contracting land proprietorships out to middlemen, 
usually Zamindars, in exchange for revenue at a level fixed in perpetuity. If the 
Zamindars failed to pay the revenue within the time limit fixed by the Company, the 
land would be transferred to a new owner under the same conditions. As such, the rule 
was that as long as revenue was paid punctually, proprietorship of land was secured36. 
The new system brought changes to traditional land relations in Bengal and proved 
oppressive for the cultivators of the land. Some underlining characteristics of this new 
system, and its implications on the cultivators of Bengal, led to the cultivator’s and 
sharecroppers’ insurgency, as discussed later in the chapter.  
The story of the East India Company in the Indian subcontinent, particularly in Bengal, 
as discussed by Nick Robins, is configured with a profound moral, “that foreign 
companies want not just trade, but power”37. Every child in Bengal knows the story of 
how, defeating the ruler of Bengal, the company took control of the province in 1857; 
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Gurcharan Das writes, “it is not surprising that we are suspicious of foreign 
companies”38. Robins39 discusses how the company’s business policy contributed to the 
formation of such collective images of the company. The textile industry of Bengal is 
one example that was affected by the company’s trade. The company’s policy 
prevented Bengal weavers to sell their cloths to private merchants and forced them to 
sell to the company’s agents (gamastas) at whatever price offered. Upon taking control 
of Bengal, the company used the existing military and administrative establishments to 
control the market in order to force “the manufacturers to work for them and to work at 
an under price” and to establish a monopoly in the textile business40. This, as Robins 
notes, resulted in the weavers becoming unable to earn enough money to pay back the 
advances taken from the company, causing them to fall into debt and poverty. Hameeda 
Hossain, a Bangladeshi writer, recorded this history; “the corporate buyer, who had 
provided the weaver with his working capital and access to the market [that] became 
the root cause of [weaver’s] pauperisation”41. The Corporate policies shape the popular 
memories of the foreign corporation, the East India Company, in Bengal as poet Shahid 
Ali expresses, “the looms of Bengal silenced; and the cotton shipped raw; by the British 
to England”42. 
Robins refers to the monopoly of the textile trade and the control over the land revenue 
system as the ‘unrequited trade’ that brought resistance from the people affected43. He 
pointed out that the company’s policy for textile business faced resistance from the 
Bengal weavers in 1767 when a group of weavers sent their representatives to the 
company office in Calcutta requesting an increase in the price of cloth. As mentioned 
earlier, the land revenues systems in Bengal attracted an armed uprising from the 
cultivators and the sharecroppers. 
This can be seen as analogous with Stuart Kirsch’s44 analysis, though in a different time 
and context, of how the people affected by a mining corporation in south-central New 
Guinea found the corporation guilty of ‘unrequited reciprocity’, as it failed to meet its 
accountability for the impact of the mine. Kirsch shows how Yanggom People in New 
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Guinea mobilised their political struggle against the corporation, who they observed, 
did not fulfil its due responsibility toward the community where it operates. Shahid 
Ali’s poetic expressions or Hameeda Hossain’s analyses of the role of the foreign 
corporation, the East India Company, reveals the consequences of what was termed the 
‘unrequited trade’ on the people of Bengal. The collective memory of the East India 
Company, as expressed in Gurcharan Das’s note, places the role of a foreign 
corporation as conflicting with the ‘local’ interest. The image of foreign corporations as 
being against local interests continues to shape present day conflicts around the Asia 
Energy Corporation’s mining project in Phulbari, and provides force for nationalism 
against the mine. Though, as the next chapter will reveal, the ‘nationalist’ ideas around 
the planned mine are not homogenous. 
3. Transition to ‘nationhood’ 
3.1 Towards a ‘Muslim Community’? 
The partition of the Bengal province by the British government in October 1905 was 
the first political development towards the creation of a separate political group for 
Bengal Muslims45. The partition was followed by the formation of the political party 
All India Muslim League (AML) in Dhaka in December of 1906.  The British 
authorities facilitated the partition by declaring East Bengal a separate province, with 
Dhaka as its capital46. Sir Salimullah became the first party leader who expressed a 
desire for a separate province for Muslims. “There are many good things in store for 
us… and the Mohammedans (Muslims) being the largest in number in the new 
province, they will have the largest share.47” The leaders of the Muslim League 
propagated Muslim unity in defence of interests of the Bengal Muslims from Hindu 
landlords and professionals48. However, the new party did not represent any single 
community with a common aspiration. Matiur Rahman found people of various 
characters who came together under the banner of the Muslim League and characterised 
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their aspirations into four categories, the Fundamentalists, the Radical Humanists, the 
Bengal protectionists, and an amorphous group of Muslim middle class youth49.  
Not everyone in East Bengal supported partition. The event was followed by anti-
partition protests in both parts of Bengal, particularly by student cultural organisations 
and Hindu landlords who owned large properties in predominantly Muslim East 
Bengal50. The result was the annulment of the Bengal partition in 1911. After that, 
Eastern Bengal saw an emergence of a new generation of Muslim League leaders with 
a more liberal outlook51. A. K. Fazlul Huq was one of these and he stressed unity of the 
Hindu-majority west and the Muslim-majority east in his public speeches52. He became 
president of the All India Muslim League in 1916 where he served until 1921. His 
political stance was best expressed in a speech delivered at a party conference where he 
stated, “the relation between a landlord and his tenant, between a lawyer and his client 
are merely personal and individuals and are seldom affected by communal 
consideration. I do not think that the Muslim representatives of those sections of the 
society are more merciful to their respective victims”53.  
The next stage of politics in Eastern Bengal was influenced by elements of the 
communist revolution that was developing in Russia during that time. The Russian 
Revolution of 1917 was followed by communist political penetration in Bengal, as well 
as in India. The Communist party of India was born in 1921 with Muzaffar Ahmed of 
Eastern Bengal acting as a founding member. Just prior to that, the All India Trade 
Union Congress, a leftist worker’s party, was formed in 192054. It was at this time that 
peasant organisations started to form in Bengal. For example, land tenants and 
sharecroppers association was founded in 1920 with office bearers coming from both 
west and east Bengal55; the Calcutta Agricultural Association was formed in 1917 by 
Muslim league leader Fazlul Huq and a group of lawyers and journalists56. In 1929 the 
All Bengal Tenants’ Association was formed with another Muslim league leader, 
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Abdur Rahim, as its first president57.  The tendency of the new generation of Muslim 
league leaders in Bengal to become involved in issues of land cultivators was evident. 
These parties stressed the rights of land tenants and cultivators to the land. They 
campaigned for revision of the existing land act in order to bring cultivators ownership 
of the land they cultivated. The land act implemented by the British government, the 
Permanent Settlement Act, did not ensure ownership rights of the land tenants58. 
Though revolution was not the aim of these parties, their socialist motivations were 
expressed by certain political agendas. They campaigned for the abolition of landlord 
authority over land revenue collection and for cultivator’s ownership rights59.   
The sharecropper’s insurgency proliferated in the 1940s and was facilitated by 
communist party activists who acted on similar agendas60. Although the leaders of 
these parties never associated themselves with communist parties, central leaders of the 
Muslim league disliked their involvement in peasants’ issues. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
who took over party leadership in 1934, made the accusation that “all the talk of hunger 
and poverty is intended to lead the people towards socialistic and communistic 
ideas.”61. In a speech delivered after taking over the party leadership, he asked the 
Muslims of India to join the Muslim League and build a community based on Muslim 
solidarity62.  Huq, on the other hand, appealed for Muslim unity in Bengal for different 
reasons. In a public meeting in 1936, he said, “…my fight is with landlords, 
capitalists…The landlords are ninety five percent Hindus. And capitalists are about 
ninety eight percent. I apprehend that they will soon join their Muslim compatriots, viz. 
Muslim landlords…there is no difference between the poor Hindus and poor Muslims 
as their interests are welded into one another”63. A blend of socialist ideas and 
inspirations for Muslim communal unity can be gathered from his statements; it is this 
blend that characterised the politics of Eastern Bengal in the first half of the twentieth 
century. One example of this can be found in the result of the Bengal provincial 
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election held in 1937 where the Muslim League won 60, and Huq’s Peasant Tenant 
Party, the Krishok Praja Party, 54, electoral seats64. 
Examples of the varying inspirations contained in the image of a desired ‘Muslim 
community’ can also be found in the scholarly arenas of East-Bengal. The Muslim 
Literature Society, founded in Dhaka in 1926 by teachers and students of colleges and 
universities, aimed to foster the Bengali-Muslim literati65.  Kazi Abdul Wadud, a 
member of the society, wrote, “…since the majority of the scholarly institutions were 
based in Calcutta the residents of Dhaka (the majority of who were Muslims) were 
lagging behind in fostering their intellectual capacities.” He added that, “the Muslim 
Literary Society would increase the Muslim’s contribution to the body of Bengal 
literature”66. The society, however, took on projects that could be viewed as the re-
reading of Muslim society and culture through secular eyes. Shikha, the society’s 
monthly journal, published writings of Bengali Muslim scholars who often stressed the 
need for a shift from a religious to a humanistic approach. Qazi Motahar Hossain, a 
Dhaka University Teacher, wrote, “…let me do my part. God will not fail to do his! 
Instead of spending a lot of time arguing about God and his attributes it is better to 
mind the little things that press urgently for attention”67. In an appeal for a prejudice-
free society Abul Hossain, a writer, often stated, “Man can attain the quality of 
Allah”68. Hossain, at the same time, desired a ‘Muslim Society’. He wrote, “Although I 
do not appreciate the present state of affairs in the Muslim society, I rather feel 
fortunate that I get ample opportunity to do something for a wretched society. All great 
men of the world were born in the wretched society. Let their memories guide our 
vision”69. Kazi Nazrul Islam, who was later named a national poet of Independent 
Bangladesh, created a genre for Islamic spiritual songs and poems in modern Bengali 
literature. Muslim Ummah, Muslim solidarity, had repeatedly taken a place in his vast 
collection of literary works. Islam, simultaneously, along with Bengal communist 
Mozaffar Ahmed, facilitated the publication of a number of popular journals and 
newspapers to circulate socialist ideas among peasants and workers. Langal, the 
Plough, the Ganabani, People’s Voice, and Navayug, New Age, are the titles of Islam-
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edited publications circulated among the peasants and labourers in the 1920s70. Nazrul 
Islam and Abul Hossain’s view of Muslim society was conditioned by other 
inspirational elements, a feature that characterised socio-political aspects of East-
Bengal in the first half of twentieth century.    
The Muslim League continued their propagation for a united Muslim ‘community’ in 
India, which officially turned to a demand for a separate nation for Muslims when the 
central party leader Jinnah expressed the need for a Muslim polity at a party conference 
in Lahore in 1940; “The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious 
philosophies, social customs and literatures…they belong to two different civilizations 
which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions71.” The conference passed 
a resolution, known as the Pakistan Resolution, with the demand for independent states 
in the Muslim majority areas of northeast and northwest India72. After 1940, the 
Muslim League strengthened its party activities by creating its district and village level 
committees in Muslim Majority East-Bengal and other Muslim majority areas in the 
northeast and northwest of India73. Prior to Indian independence in 1947 the demand 
for a separate Muslim state was supported by interest groups for various reasons. 
‘Muslim officers…expected to get speedier promotions in the new state in absence of 
competition with Hindu officers; The Muslim traders and industrialists…backed the 
demand for a separate state for similar reasons of achieving less competitive business 
environments74. For peasants a new Muslim state meant liberation from the Zamindar’s 
authority over the land, the majority of whom where Hindus 75. In this background 
Pakistan emerged as a nation in 1947 when the British withdrew their administrative 
authority from India. The Muslim majority of the eastern part of Bengal province, 
under the new administrative name of East Pakistan, came under the new state of 
Pakistan while the western part remained with independent India.  
3.2 From ‘Muslim community’ to ‘Bengali community’ 
The Pakistan-period of political history in Bangladesh is characterised by divisions and 
oppositions between the Eastern and Western parts. Within two years of the creation of 
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the Pakistan state its major political party, the Muslim League, broke down and a group 
of Bengali Muslim League leaders formed a new party, the East Pakistan Awami 
Muslim League (EPAML) in 1949. The new party consisted of youth leaders, including 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who would later lead the war for the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971. The breakdown of the Muslim League followed growing 
discontentment among Bengali leaders regarding the government’s differential budget 
allocation between two parts of Pakistan. According to the Pakistani Government’s 
expenditure on education during that period, as presented by MS Jilani, East Pakistan 
was allocated 28.9% of the total budget for over half (55.4%) of the total population 
that lived in that part76. Dissatisfaction was also growing amongst Bengali Muslim 
League leaders as a result of the appointment of a growing number of non-Bengali 
leaders in the East-Pakistan Muslim League77, as was noted by one of the party leaders 
in the Pakistani parliament, “…a feeling is growing among the east Pakistanis that 
eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as ‘colony’ of West Paksitan”78. 
The agenda of the new party moved away from the focus of Muslim brotherhood to one 
of territorial autonomy and the socio-economic development of poor peasants and 
workers. Some of the points the party made in its inaugural meetings included: “1) 
Pakistan should be a federal state whose units will enjoy full autonomous status. Only 
defence, foreign affairs and currency should be the concern of the central government; 
2) Recognition of Bengali as one of the State languages of Pakistan; 3) Abolition of 
Zamindary system (hereditary landlords authority over the land) without compensation; 
4) Nationalization of jute industries; 5) Ensure civil rights and liberties”79. As 
expressed in the above points, the socialist tradition of the nationalization of industries, 
secular languages of civil rights and liberties, peasant’s issues of land relation, and a 
stress on Bengali identity featured in the programme of the new party.  
The programme of the East-Pakistan Awami Muslim League (EPAML) reached a new 
level when it organised a mass protest against the Pakistani government’s decision of 
making ‘Urdu’ the state language in 194880. The protests, known as the Bengali 
Language Movement, presented a platform where the EPAML and communist party of 
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East Pakistan could work together81. Collaboration between left-oriented parties and 
non-communist parties was a feature of the movement. An action committee was 
formed in March 1948 that included representatives from the student wing of EPAML 
and the Student Federation, a pro-communist student organisation82. The committee 
also included representatives from a student organisation called Tamaddun Majlish 
(TM) that was formed by the non-communist Muslim students of Dhaka University83. 
A national convention was held in November 1950 in Dhaka under the joint initiative 
of the EPAML and the communist party and a protest was launched demanding the 
Bengali be made one the state languages.  Soon, other demands, such as adequate share 
in the allocation of economic resources for East Bengal, were added to the movement. 
When the decision to make Urdu the only state language was withdrawn the movement 
moved on to other demands, such as equal numbers of appointments for Bengali people 
in bureaucratic positions. The movement became widespread and the EPAML gave 
way for non-Muslim Bengalis to become members of the party by dropping the word 
‘Muslim’ and renaming the party the Awami League.  
The Awami League soon became a popular political party in Eastern Pakistan as was 
evidenced when they secured an absolute majority in the national election of 1969. 
Demands for regional autonomy and interests, and the quest for the Bengali language 
turned into a call for independence shortly after the Pakistani government disregarded 
the election results.  The Liberation War in 1971 was organised and led by the Awami 
League, a party which moved away from the Muslim League’s manifesto of Muslim 
‘community’ to one of the Bengali nationalism, with the influence of certain social 
traditions as expressed in its party programme. Stronger examples of the influence of 
socialism came out towards the end of the Pakistan period when the founding chief of 
the East Pakistan Muslim League, Maulana Bhasani, formed his own party under the 
idea of ‘Islamic Socialism’. Bhasani, who was educated in Islamic theology, declared 
his party position in 1970 and stated that he wanted to establish “socialism through 
peaceful revolution by peasants, workers and intelligentsia; and with God and Islam as 
guiding force”84.   
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Intellectuals of East Pakistan took the Language Movement, which later turned into a 
war of Independence, as their agenda. They formed the All Parties National Language 
Action Committee in 1952, which was made up of intellectuals, students and political 
leaders. Kazi Motahar Hossain, a Dhaka University teacher and writer, was made head 
of the committee85. Groups of Hossain’s students toured different corners of East 
Pakistan to spread the ideas of the movement among the peasants86. The influence of 
the Language Movement by these Bengal literati can also be found in the increased 
popularity of Bengali courses at Dhaka University during the 1950s, as the University 
recorded a higher number of entrants for Bengali courses during that period87. As 
discussed earlier, Eastern Pakistani intellectuals desired a ‘society’ that accommodated 
other inspirational elements within Muslim society. Inspirations were sometimes 
expressed as ‘secular’ interpretations of Islam in scholarly work, sometimes urged for a 
Bengali identity, and sometimes as an inclination towards socialist ideas. Independent 
Bangladesh emerged in 1971 within this socio-political context.  
3.3 ‘Fragments’ of nationalism  
The history above tells us about the various elements that influenced the creation and 
growth of a national identity.  It is in this context that we can consider historical and 
present day aspects of nationalism in Bangladesh.  
The urge for a Bangladeshi identity existed well before the demand for an independent 
country. It was there even when the main nationalist demand was for a separate country 
for Muslims. Pakistan came into existence based on the general demand for an 
independent and separate Muslim country where Islam would be the key cultural 
identity for the nation. Generally this was not opposed by anyone in either part of 
Pakistan both before and after 1947. The affiliation to Islam as a main national identity 
is generally still not disputed. However, even within an ‘imagined’ Muslim nation, then 
East-Pakistan, now Bangladesh, had different ways of practicing Islamic principles in 
their cultural life which did not submit to the idea of the Islamic state of the Pakistan 
nation. Certain daily life practices, such as the way the marriage ceremony was 
                                                           
85
 Maniruzzaman, 1975. p. 229 
86
 Gankovsky and  Gordon-Polonskaya, 1958. p.153 
87
 Bengali department attracted 1028 graduates among total 4466 graduates of eleven arts department at 
the University during the period 1963-68. From, “Supplies of educated manpower in East Pakistan 
(Students)”, 1971. Institute of Education and Research. University of Dhaka. pp. 80-82  
88 
 
conducted, the way girls dressed, the way the Bengali New Year was observed in East-
Pakistan, were considered as Hindu culture by the unofficial propaganda machineries 
of the nation, such as newspapers (newspaper would be an element of Anderson’s 
‘print capitalism’). Wearing dots on the forehead as part of a girl’s make-up, observing 
Bengali New Year, applying bridal facial makeup in a certain way, and even wearing 
the ‘Sari’, were all viewed as elements of ‘Hindu’ culture heritage in West Pakistan. Of 
course replicating so-called ‘Hindu’ culture was not what people desired for their 
Pakistan nation. While an Islamic brotherhood was a desired national identity, certain 
elements of their internal social life retained their own version of national identity. 
There is a general belief that the Bengali language movement set the tone for the 
demand for an independent Bangladesh. However, the urge for a Bengali linguistic 
identity existed well before the separatist sentiment emerged. This was equally true for 
the leaders and proponents of a Pakistan nation. Chatterjee88 provides an example of 
how the Bengali language was considered an ‘inner’ aspect of national identity in 
colonial Bengal, just as was the development of a Bangladeshi identity. Pakistan started 
to develop a nation-wide, or national, language well before it formally declared Urdu as 
a state language in 1957. The state and its machineries considered that Urdu should be 
the standardized and only language for the bureaucracy and other state functionaries. 
The practice of Urdu as an official language did not require any official declaration; it 
was brought about through government institutions and bureaucracy in the politically 
dominant West Pakistan, but the extent of the practice of Urdu was limited to the level 
of official communication. While the state’s idea of Pakistan and Urdu as the national 
language was congruent, this was not the case in East-Bengal. The Bengali language 
was so much part of their own ‘inner’ culture that they were not ready to give up 
Bengali for the sake of the nation, even though that ‘nation’ was generally desired. An 
example of this is one of the student leaders who formally protested against the 
declaration of Urdu as a state language while simultaneously being a strong advocate of 
the Pakistan nation; he would later become the top leader of the Islamic political party 
Jamaat-e-Islami. Meanwhile politicians, intellectuals, and the full set of literary bodies 
alike took on the cultural and political project of making Bengali their own official and 
cultural language. Elements of ‘print capitalism’ were set up to preserve and promote 
Bengali literary practices. Initiatives such as the weekly publication Ittefaq, a Bengali 
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print newspaper came into existence before the anti-Pakistan movement emerged. Urdu 
was not allowed to intervene in the realms of Bengali language culture. Bengali 
nationalism was already ‘sovereign’ within the broader structure of the Pakistan nation. 
It may be ‘imagined’ in Anderson’s sense but the internal ‘cleavages’ put this 
imagination into constant revision89. Alternate discourses can exist ‘parallel to state-
sponsored ideas of national belonging’ or in tension with them depending on the 
specific situation90.  
In the next chapter, a closer look at the specific situation of the ongoing movement 
against the mine will reveal how the ideas of ‘nationalism’ are worked out within 
particularities of the movement. To present a clearer background of the movement, the 
following discussion will focus on the political conditions and practices in Independent 
Bangladesh.  
4. The Making of Bangladesh  
The context in which the liberation war took place suggests a ‘secular’ and ‘socialist’ 
nature of the nationalist movement. The post-independent government, led by Awami 
League Chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, showed its initial commitment to its pre-
independent ‘socialist’ inspirations. The constitution of the new country, adopted in 
December 1972, expressed this early commitment as it determined that basic needs of 
food, clothing, shelter, education, health care and social security would be the 
responsibility of the state91. In addition, it stated that ‘a socialist economic system’ 
would be the policy of the government where the state would ensure a just, egalitarian 
society, and the ‘peoples’ control over the means of production92. Policies were taken 
for the redistribution of land among the landless through land reforms93. 
Nationalization of industries was enforced by the policies of the new government.  
4.1 Shift towards new economic policies 
Much of these agendas, however, remained unrealised. After 1971, the policy for 
redistributive land reform was modified and large inefficient holdings became 
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‘efficient’ farms through the stressed use of modern agricultural technology94. 
Increased production from big landholdings for growth and development had replaced 
the early policy of land re-distribution. Whatever land distribution had taken place in 
the form of allocating government owned land, Khas land, to the landless, failed to 
decrease asset inequalities95. Much of the nationalized industries were affected by 
corrupt management related to the nepotistic government party and were incurring 
losses, so the system proved unsustainable96. Within three years of independence the 
country faced a famine that started in the summer of 1974 when rice prices rose sharply 
due to crop failures as a result of heavy floods in certain parts. Widespread starvation, 
particularly in Northern Bangladesh, forced many rural poor to migrate to Dhaka in 
search of work. The situation eased only when winter crops arrived along with foreign 
aid in November 1974.  
The policies that followed the 1974 famine were influenced by international aid 
agencies. In exchange for the promise of aid, the Sheikh Mujibur government, in the 
last year of its tenure, agreed to curb public sector investment and raise the ceilings for 
private investment during the years 1974-7597. This is not to suggest that the change in 
policy was a straightforward capitulation to the power of aid. As stated by a member of 
the planning commission, during a discussion regarding the devaluation of currency at 
the time, this had “been under discussion for some time…it would be misleading to see 
this largely as a result of [World] Bank pressure. It, however, seems to have helped to 
tilt the balance in an ongoing domestic debate”98. This reversal from the early 
nationalisation policies to one of private ventures, however, became a permanent 
feature in the policies of later governments in Bangladesh. The year 1975 saw a series 
of coups and counter-coups, and the intervention of leftist military groups during the 
process of the change of state power from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to General Ziaur 
Rahman. Ziaur Rahman was placed in power with support from a joint leftist-soldier 
group after Sheikh Mujibur was killed by another military group. General Ziaur 
Rahman, however, was not willing to accept the socialist aims of the leftist group that 
had given him the support to come into power within the chaos of the coup and 
counter-coup in 1975. Ziaur Rahman’s anti-left position and his military measures to 
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control the leftist group resulted in the fragmentation and dwindling of left parties99. 
Ziaur Rahman’s government further aligned the policies of Bangladesh with the 
suggestions of international development institutions, such as the World Bank. In 1975 
a revised industrial policy was approved which pressed for the implementation of the 
de-nationalisation of state-owned enterprises, private industry and investment 
promotion as advised by the World Bank. The constitution of Bangladesh was also 
amended in 1977 to move away from the previous government’s experiments with 
‘socialist’ agendas and the word ‘socialism’ was replaced by ‘economic and social 
justice’, and ‘secularism’ with ‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’100. 
The intended shift towards private investment and market-oriented policy was backed 
up by civil bureaucratic arrangements. Organising a pool of trained officers and 
administrators for the promotion of ‘liberalisation’ and setting up institutional 
mechanisms to create new civil bureaucrats was one of the agendas of Ziaur’s 
government. As part of this agenda a number of top ranking former civil servants, who 
were disfavoured by Mujibur for their loyalty to the Pakistani Government, were 
brought back to service by Ziaur101. These officers ‘were the lineal descendants of the 
civil service of Pakistan, with all the values and orientations implied’ who provided the 
government institutions with policy and management services for the development of a 
private-sector based economy102. These efforts were accompanied by political 
initiatives to make the Ziaur’s reign legitimised and popular. After a spell of economic 
crises and famine during Mujibur’s period, it was possible for Ziaur to create 
expectations for a better economy by means of new initiatives; a familiar scenario of 
economic reform to efforts elsewhere103. Rural population were informed about the 
new initiatives offered by the government through the promotion of the ‘green 
revolution’ by supplying irrigation machines to rural buyers (i.e. owners of medium 
and large landholdings) and appointing pesticide dealers in the villages. Peasants were 
connected to the agri-technology market created through increased production. To 
connect to the peasantry, Ziaur himself travelled throughout the country to promote 
high-yielding rice varieties and agricultural initiatives, such as building dams for 
irrigation. He gathered international support by resuming the multi-party system after 
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forming his own political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is one 
of two major political parties in present Bangladesh.  
The outlook of the new party was different from Mujibur’s Awami League as the BNP 
included professionals with little or no experience of party politics, such as lawyers, in 
its founding committee. Unlike the Awami League, the party was free of any left-
inspired groups and central leaders, and without their predisposed political stance, was 
directed towards economic reform. The BNP, in its first tenure, was motivated to 
legitimise its power by mobilising peoples’ support through bringing economic stability 
in order to avoid repetition of the 1974 famine. Ziaur’s reform activities were expressed 
as alternatives to, as Mujibur termed, ‘national socialism’. Having taking power during 
the post-famine years, the reforms were intended to be a workable solution offered by 
‘a new regime taking office after acute economic crisis’104. Though there were no large-
scale reforms, policy changes and bureaucratic set-ups in favour of privatisation and 
investment helped attract aid and development agencies to Bangladesh105. 
This new direction in economic policy continued during the period of General Ershad 
who took power in 1982 establishing a quasi-military government following the 
assassination of Ziaur Rahamn by a group within the military in 1981. Ershad’s 
government enacted the National Industrial Policy, with the encouragement of foreign 
and private investment as the key element. By the end of Ershad’s nine-year rule the 
‘liberal’ market policy was resolutely established without any apparent threat of 
reversal. “People (had) come to believe that a drastic reversal of the privatisation 
program was neither possible nor desirable”106. Ershad, however, faced strong 
opposition from the Awami League (AL) - BNP coalition throughout his entire tenure. 
A large part of his occupancy in state power was spent within the context of martial 
law, as the state constitution was made inactive in favour of martial law. Political and 
media activities were restricted. Then, in an effort to be part of party politics, he formed 
his own party, the Jatiya Party (JP), which did not have enough time to spread at the 
rural level as a result of the ban on party politics for a large part of his tenure. After a 
failed attempt to make a coalition with AL and BNP, Ershad finally resigned in 1990 in 
the face of mass protests that the AL-BNP coalition mobilised in collaboration with 
                                                           
104
 Franda, 1992. p. 54 
105
 Humphrey, 1990; Kochanek, 1993 
106
 Humphrey, 1990. p. 90  
93 
 
other small left, and a few pro-Islamic, parties. Bangladesh returned to a multi-party 
democracy with the election in 1991 when BNP won the election with AL and their 
allies as the main opposition, and vice versa for the subsequent tenures.  
In their policies both the BNP and AL continued to promote private enterprise and 
foreign investment and succeeded in efforts to speed up the process107 by taking new 
initiatives, such as establishing special economic zones with tax incentive facilities. 
Weakened and fragmented left parties were in no position to take up any organised 
anti-liberalisation political movement so some of them decided to form coalition 
governments with the AL. With the AL being relatively more accommodative to leftist 
parties they decided to continue the coalition that had been built during the pre-
independence movements and anti-Ershad protests, and signed up to liberal economic 
agendas to accept the inevitable. The BNP, on the other hand, built alliances with some 
pro-Islamic parties for a stronger political position. The left political parties, however, 
gathered themselves under the banner of a ‘nationalist’ citizen forum108 as larger 
foreign investments started to be attracted to the country’s natural resource sector. It 
was this forum that mobilized a movement against a global mining company aspiring to 
establish a coal mine in Phulbari in northern Bangladesh; the ‘site’ where this research 
was based. The nature and implication of this forum is discussed in Chapter Seven.  
4.2 Discourse of antagonism 
Since the resumption of parliamentary democracy in 1991 the field of party politics in 
Bangladesh has shown some patterns and traits. Politics revolve around two major 
political parties, the AL and BNP, and each of these parties lead an alliance of smaller 
parties that succumb to the agendas of the lead parties. The AL alliance is labelled as 
‘secular’ for its commitment to reverse a clause of the Bangladesh constitution from 
‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’ to ‘secularism’, as well as for its 
collaboration with some left parties and its recent refusal to form a coalition with pro-
Islamic parties, such as Jamat-e-Islami, that stand against their agenda of a 
constitutional amendment. The BNP alliance firmly opposes the proposal of omitting 
the word ‘faith in the Almighty Allah’ from the constitution as it symbolises the 
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Muslim country. The conflicting relation between these two parties spans across other 
areas of political concern, creating an ‘enemy discourse’ in the politics of 
Bangladesh109.  
The antagonism has developed historically throughout periods of conflict. AL 
organised the liberation war of Bangladesh, and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, led 
the nationalist movement during the pre-independence periods leading to the war of 
Independence. This is why this party claims to be the champion of nationalism, 
sovereignty and other signifiers associated with Bengali identity. The AL’s 
unchallenged legitimacy to power in an independent Bangladesh was disrupted by the 
emergence of BNP through its founder General Ziaur Rahman. Also a freedom fighter, 
Rahman emerged as a political leader with initial aid of the military, by enforcing 
martial law and using military means to control chaotic political situations and 
opposition forces. On the contrary, BNP claims to be the ‘saviour’ of the people and the 
economy of Bangladesh, as they came into power after a period of famine created by 
the nepotistic and incompetent post-independent AL government. BNP presents itself 
as the saviour of democracy as it brought the country back to a multi-party system to 
negate Mujibur’s socialist-type, like-minded, grand-alliance system that was 
implemented in the early 1970s by AL. The variable interpretations and numerous 
facets of these historical moments are used to legitimise and de-legitimise the 
respective party’s moral authority to lead Bangladesh. Credit to sovereignty is 
continuously disputed and moral authority to lead is constantly contested. This creates a 
discourse where “the essentialising of the other persists…(and) its stereotyping of the 
other continues, changes and gains density” according to political situations in hand110. 
4.3 Hartal Politics 
Resentment is expressed through means of political protests that have been patterned 
with a popular form called Hartal. It connotes a strike-like situation that involves a 
shutdown of offices and workspaces, shops, transport systems, businesses and 
educational institutions. Road blockages, forceful shutdown of shops and business 
centres, and marching through the streets are some familiar characteristics of present 
day Hartals in Bangladesh. Hartal is a popular practice employed by social and political 
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groups, such as those protesting the mine, for expressing resentment and frustration. 
Though Hartals expect that people will voluntarily enforce a strike situation, they are 
often enforced primarily through forceful means, such as blockages and marches. 
Hartal does not necessarily imply voluntary public support for the strike.  
 During the Pakistan period, the Bengali language movement for Bengali to be declared 
a state language was enacted through widespread agitation as well as a series of general 
strikes held by political parties and student organisations, which eventually forced the 
government to fulfil the demand in 1952. The nature of Hartal imposed by the AL 
during the 1969 movement against the Pakistan military government, seemed to be 
followed by political agitation in independent Bangladesh. The string of Hartals in 
1969 were observed by strikes, police action, police-activist street fights, and 
curfews111 that compelled President Ayub Khan to invite the military to take control of 
the state. The more forceful nature of these Hartals and the military response from the 
Pakistani government led to the radicalisation of the movement to take it to the 
Liberation War. After independence, the BNP oriented itself with Hartal during the 
movement against Ershad’s quasi-military government of the 1980s. The AL-BNP 
coalition was built for the purpose of the movement using Hartals as the main means of 
agitation, through which it became a familiar phenomenon in the political scenario of 
Bangladesh. Since then it has been used by opposition parties to press the government 
on particular issues or for the removal of the government. Hartals are a means to negate 
the legitimacy of the ruling party by mobilising politics, where response from police 
and courts towards the activists are seen as ‘political capital’ for the persecuted112. The 
senior party members of AL who were arrested by the last ‘caretaker government’113 
were awarded with ministerial positions after the party won the election and members 
who allegedly collaborated with the caretaker government were suspended from their 
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party positions by both the AL and BNP. Sufferings caused by political agitations are 
rewarded when the party attains the political victory.  
Hartals are also used to express voices, mobilise public support and promote particular 
agendas. Non-party and locally sustained Hartals are common in agitation scenarios of 
Bangladesh. Local social and political groups have enforced a number of hartals over 
the past few years to force the government to turn their sub-districts administrative 
setups into ones that attract government jobs and the allocation of development funds. 
The relatively small Islamist group, the Islami Ain Bastobayon Committee (Islamic 
Law Implementation Committee), uses Hartals to protest the ruling party’s ‘women 
development policy’ as the group observes the policy as being contradictory with the 
Islamic law of inheritance and women’s property rights. Hartal is a means of agitation 
for various political and social groups who promote their own agendas and seek public 
attention by enforcing interruption to everyday life through activities such as road 
blockages and street marches. The rationale of a particular group’s Hartal lies within 
the agenda they’re seeking to promote to the general population.  
4.4 ‘It’s now all Bangladeshis’? 
Bangladesh is imagined in the following saying – “We are now all Bangladeshis”114. Of 
course, Bangladeshis are not all the same and the following brief discussion explores 
the contradictions within this homogenous generalisation of the Bangladeshi people.  
Population information revealed by the government and other institutions expresses the 
existence of ethnic and linguistic similarities in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics census 1991 counts- 88.3 percent of the population was Muslim, 10.5 percent 
Hindu, .6 percent Buddhist, .3 percent Christian and .3 percent others115. Bengali is the 
‘ethnic’ language for the entire population except the small percentage of Indigenous 
population. 
Indeed, the result of the successful struggles to force out the ‘other’ people added to the 
credentials of the ‘we are all Bangladeshi’ expression.  Foreign rulers, such as the 
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British and Hindu landlords during the anti-British movement, and the non-Bengali 
Muslims and West-Pakistani government during the Pakistan period, composed this 
‘other’ category. In absence of the ‘foreign’ constituents, present Bangladeshi society 
stands on a perceived idea of ethnic and cultural similarities, forcing out the Hindus and 
other minority groups. In a statistics presented by a rights group called the Minority 
Rights Group International percentage of Hindu population was shown 16 percent of 
the total population. The group accused the government of deliberately undercounting 
the indigenous population of the country who were about one percent (1.3 million) of 
the total population116. 
The extent of the existence of caste and class elements has been a matter of debate. 
Though studies in Bangladesh generally rejected the existence of strict caste 
distinctions in Bangladeshi society remnants of caste-like divisions endure117. Although 
some early rural studies depicted a homogenous agrarian structure in Bangladesh, the 
majority of these early rural studies were conducted by the Bangladesh Academy for 
Rural Development (BARD) at Comilla, were carried out in this single district, and 
were mainly agro-economic surveys in nature118. These studies portrayed the agrarian 
structure through the generalisation of their survey results conducted in densely 
populated and fertile Comilla district119. More elaborate village studies of the 1970s 
challenged the assumptions of BARD studies and made efforts to reveal the ‘emergent 
and entrenched class structures’ within rural societies120. Reflecting on these studies 
Geoffrey Wood suggested that minor differences in asset ownership could translate into 
important elements of differential class power; and thus the existence of minor 
difference in asset ownership in rural Bangladesh could not be taken as ‘irrelevant’121. 
He also stated that the power struggle was usually limited to, and often expressed in, 
‘narrow forms’ of struggle characterised by local conditions such as disputes over crop 
share and wage122. “While class-type differences exist, they have not been especially 
acute.123” Further discussion on this topic will be presented in Chapter Five.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter starts with lively debates, presented by subaltern scholars and Marxist 
writers, of the nature of the organisation of agrarian struggles that Bangladesh’s 
Dinajpur region has historically witnessed.  In the analysis of the subaltern scholars, the 
agency and causes of local groups were stressed; the Marxist writers stressed the 
influence of external ideas in the development of these struggles. To understand the 
dynamics of the ongoing movement against the mine this research attempts to look at 
both sides.  
The context within which Independent Bangladesh emerged is characterised by diverse 
social and political inspirations.  The later part of the chapter has traced the emergence 
of the ‘political culture’ and political practices important for understanding the nature 
and practices of resistance. The urge for a Bengali identity within Muslim society 
forced the emergence of the Bangladeshi nationalism that led to the War of 
Independence and the formation of a Bangladesh state. The essence of the Bengali 
identity follows a history of interaction between different social, political and scholarly 
elements.  Intelligentsia played major role in forcing a Bengali linguistic identity 
through the Bengali language movement in the 1950s, which led to the emergence of an 
independent Bangladesh. In collaboration with activists of left political parties and 
other right wing parties, University students and the academia in Eastern Bengal led the 
language movement in demand of Bengali as state language. Through their literary 
practices, the East-Bengal literati expressed a desire for a ‘secular’ Muslim society in 
the eastern part of Pakistan.  
The history of independent Bangladesh is characterised by the desire of the intellectuals 
of a ‘secular’ Muslim society that, as we have seen, accommodated different 
inspirational elements. The struggles over land, the history of the ‘unrequited trade’ of 
the foreign company, the neoliberal reforms in post-independence Bangladesh, and the 
contradictions of the ‘homogenous’ portrayal of Bangladesh configure the background 
to Phulbari resistance where ‘nationalist’ discourses are central to the dissent. 
Intellectuals, as we will see, play important role in organising the protests against the 
Phulabri mine where protest is expressed through idioms of ‘nationalism’. A complex 
picture of how ‘nationalist’ discourses around the planned mine contain varying ideas 
is presented in the next part of the chapter. 
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         Chapter Four 
Idioms and sentiments of ‘nationalism’ in the Phulbari  
movement 
We have resources beneath our land 
We won’t let foreigners take them away 
We have manpower we will buy technology 
We will use the resources ourselves 
Brother, let us build our country 
(‘Anti-Asia Enery’ song1) 
Throughout my research I continuously observed the language of nationalism being 
used as a way of formulating resistance to the Phulbari mine.  In this chapter I explore 
the ideas of nationalism and nationalist discourses as they apply to the movement 
against Asia Energy’s proposed coal mining project in Phulbari.  
Leaflets, wall posters, banners, and newspapers articles all discuss national interests in 
relation to the Phulbari coal mine. Reading these documents, with their polemic facts 
and figures, gave me a sense of the terrain of claims and anti-claims where both pro-
mining and anti-mining groups manifest the ‘best interest of the nation’. The ways in 
which groups project the best interests of the nation are related to the way they 
characterise the agenda as ‘nationalists’. As we will see facts, figures and expert 
analyses are put into action to legitimise the respective ways in which action is seen as 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the nation. It is impossible to ascertain if one particular way is right 
or wrong /‘good or bad’, but everyone agrees that the interests of the nation are 
paramount. Truth is not always important in nationalist claims2 to characterise a 
particular kind of nationalism. I will examine to what extent the nationalist claims and 
ideas of the Phulbari movement draw on differential knowledge and observation.  
Writers and intellectuals opposed to mining in Bangladesh use imaginings of ‘the 
nation’ and ‘national interests’ to promote their cause. In doing so they would, 
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according to their line of activism/counter-activism, chalk out what type of nation 
Bangladesh should be. I will examine how these imaginings of ‘the nation’ are actually 
played out in the Phulbari protest movement; how ‘national interests’ are projected by 
different groups at the national level and how they are perceived at the actual mining 
‘site’. This will help to identify and understand where and how these ideas conflict or 
intersect.  
**    ** 
Proponents and opponents of mining have both increased in Bangladesh in recent years.  
Mining has been propagated as a wheel for economic growth and ‘development’ as 
much as exploitation of local resources, the communities and environmental destruction 
projects. Gas and coal are the natural resources in Bangladesh that have attracted a 
considerable amount of interest from foreign mining companies, many of who, in turn, 
have faced active protests in the form of open demonstrations or organised attacks on 
the mining establishments from local communities, and national and international 
campaign groups. The mining companies have been attacked and held accountable by 
campaigners on a wide range of issues, for example, the declared amount of mineral 
deposits, details of financial and legal deals between the government and the 
companies, promised compensation to people affected by the mining activities, possible 
environmental impacts etc. On the other hand, mining companies have engaged their 
respective governments to lobby the Bangladesh government. 
Natural gas is the leading natural resource in Bangladesh, which, until 1992, was 
primarily dealt with by state-owned companies. To attract foreign investment the 
natural gas sector was opened to foreign companies in 1993. The US based 
multinational corporation Chevron, UK’s Cairn Energy and Canada’s Niko were 
awarded exploration and production contracts in the new scenario of investment in the 
gas sector. During this period the government formed a new National Energy Policy 
under which territory and offshore sites of Bangladesh were divided into 23 blocks and 
opened to foreign bidding for oil and gas exploration and production. Out of 23 blocks 
eight were awarded to foreign companies up until 20063. This trend of foreign 
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investment in mining coal continued with the coal mine deal in Phulbari and the 
subsequent protests, as previously discussed.  
The Bangladesh Government’s policy on natural resources has been influenced by 
international institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Policy advice by 
ADB in many cases stood in sharp contrast to left-aligned national activist groups and 
national and international campaigners who were scrutinizing natural resource 
extraction processes in terms of ‘the interests of the nation’. Gas export is a hotly 
debated issue in Bangladesh. ADB had long suggested that the government export of 
natural gas to India would strengthen Bangladesh’s volatile finance sector. Though 
ADB suggested that Bangladesh has an exportable amount of surplus natural gas, the 
presence of widely varying estimates of natural gas reserves puts the export suggestion 
in question.  ADB has also been a strong supporter of a recent investment proposal of 
the India based international corporation TATA. TATA submitted an investment 
proposal to establish an export oriented steel and fertilizer manufacturing factory which 
required the use of the country’s natural gas for 20 years. This proposal was viewed by 
national activist groups as a gas export plan in another form, and criticized TATA and 
ADB’s proposals as being a project to satisfy the international capital markets but 
ignore domestic demand.  ADB also considered offering a loan to the Phulbari coal 
mine project proposed by UK based mining company Asia Energy, which they 
withdrew following criticism from national activist groups4. In criticising ADB’s 
consideration for a loan for the Phulbari project Anu Muhammad, a central leader of 
the Dhaka-based activist group National Committee, writes: 
“Global agencies systematically worked to grab the resources in favour of 
global corporate. [….]. Why is profit for a company preferable to agencies like 
ADB even if it costs peoples lives and livelihood? [..] The ADB is generally 
known as the 'World Bank of Asia', that always goes hand in hand with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in pursuing neoliberal 
policies that put corporate profit as the supreme objective. Along with the 
World Bank, the ADB projects helped multinational companies to grab natural 
resources on terms and conditions that are very unfavourable for the people. 
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This is a roadmap to ensure gravitation of businesses to big corporate bodies 
and yet creating and trumpeting a myth that these are for development and 
poverty reduction. People in Phulbari gave their lives to stop the open pit 
mining project, making clear that they will not accept any foreign direct 
investment that goes against national interest.”5 
This demonstrates that western donors were constructed as securing the interests of  
multinational, as opposed to national, interests and shows how nationalist discourse is 
shaped in oppositional relation to donors, and foreign and multinational corporations.  
The Bangladeshi government’s approach towards mining development favours foreign 
investment and this extends to the proposed Phulbari coal mine project. But the 
government’s claim to economic growth through foreign investment in the Phulbari 
mine had to be legitimised by representing it as in the national interest. For example, 
the Daily Star quoted a central leader of the present government, the AL, as saying:  
“What is the point in keeping coal beneath the ground? The government should 
go for the extraction of coal as it will allow us to use the coal for the generation 
of electricity for the country. If coal is extracted from the mine, there will be 
environmental problems in one or two places in the country, not all over the 
country.”6 
The reason the government wanted to achieve general consensus about the claim to 
economic benefit through the implementation of Asia Energy’s proposed mine was 
related to electoral politics. There has been an understanding in government in recent 
times that, without the general support of people, foreign mining initiatives in Phulbari 
could have a negative impact on the party during national elections. Although 
Phulbari’s electoral constituency has been held by the Awami League for the last three 
consecutive national elections, they lost the last local government election7 to a 
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candidate supported by the National Committee. It is generally believed that public 
support for the National Committee’s anti-mining movement helped the Committee’s 
candidate to win Phulbari’s local government election. As a leader of the Awami 
League in Phulbari put it, 
“He wouldn’t have won the election if there was no movement against mining. 
People thought they would be displaced by mining so they voted for the 
candidate who campaigns against mining8.” 
On taking their seat in December 2008 after winning in the parliamentary election, this 
understanding led the Awami League to mobilise public support in favour of mining as 
expressed by their party member in Phulbari: 
“Actually those protesters misinformed the people. If mining really brings that 
bad of an impact we would definitely go against mining as we are always with 
people. Now we need to give the people right information.”9  
The Awami League initially opposed the proposal when the mining exploration deal 
between the government (BNP) and Asia Energy was conducted; the chief of the 
Awami League vowed support for the movement during a party meeting in Phulbari in 
2006 and called for anti-government movement to stop mining. The Daily Star, a 
national daily, quoted the party chief as saying that the deal with Asia Energy meant 
selling the country’s resources.10 The BNP government later stalled the deal with Asia 
Energy and its field activities following public protest, death and casualties in August 
2006.  When the Awami League came into power in 2008 they changed their stance 
and did not cancel the deal with Asia Energy. The BNP, on the other hand, shifted from 
their pro-mining stance when they became the opposition party after loosing the 
election to the Awami League and shifted their support for the National Committee’s 
protest against the mine. The BNP voiced their support for the Phulbari movement 
when the National Committee called for a countrywide ‘hartal’ protesting against a 
police attack on their central leaders during a protest in the capital, on September 14, 
2009. Earning general consensus over mining matters, whether in support or 
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opposition, is central to political processes, and one of the inspirations for earning such 
support lies in electoral politics. The testimony below from an incumbent party (Awami 
League) member in Phulbari illustrates this, 
“It is easy to say anything when you are not in power. It is easy to oppose 
government to earn peoples’ vote. We cannot dance with others who are 
jumping against mining without any knowledge on it. It’s a cheap way to attract 
popularity and vote. We need to make people understand where our national 
benefit lies. As an elected government this is our duty because they have voted 
for us.”11 
The shift in the party stance as it applies to the Phulbari coal mine is accompanied by a 
shift in ideas about national benefits as propagated by the parties. The opposition party 
(Awami League) provided support for the anti-mining campaign in a 2006 public 
meeting at Phulbari with its view that the mining proposed by Asia Energy would be 
destructive for Phulbari and the nation. Open-pit mining by the foreign company Asia 
Energy, it said, would not bring any benefit for the nation. These statements were 
published in the national dailies. Now the Awami League is in power and a shift in 
ideas about what is in the national interest is clearly identifiable. Different government 
personnel, including ministers and high ranking officials have been advocating the 
implementation of Asia Energy’s proposed coal mine to enhance the national economy. 
These ideas are frequently expressed in TV talk shows and public meetings. ‘The 
Phulbari coal mine is a necessity for the nation,’ said a senior leader of the government 
party stressing the necessity of the mine for economic benefits during a meeting in 
Phulbari12.  
This is not to say that this shift in ideas as propagated by the government machineries is 
simply to cover the fact that they have to deal with state obligations which lie in the 
bureaucratic and legal aspects of the contracts made between the Government and Asia 
Energy. Some mining experts have voiced the opinion that Asia Energy’s proposed 
mine is indeed beneficial for the nation’s interests given that local people are provided 
with adequate compensation. They debated in favour of the open-pit mining method 
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proposed by Asia Energy, which involves the displacement of people to allow for 
digging large pits for coal extraction. 
When asked about the ongoing resistance to Asia Energy a manager of the Boropukuria 
coal mine, which is adjacent to Phulbari, expressed his opinion as follows:  
“See an open-pit mine is beneficial for our country as 90% of the coal is 
extractable in this method. We need to understand that there is no point of 
keeping coal under earth. We have to extract it and open-pit method is the best 
method to benefit most from it. If we can extract 80 to 90% coal from Phulbari 
project we will be a nation with surplus electricity as there will be enough coal 
to generate electricity. Open-pit method is a highly expensive and complicated 
process. We need a company like Asia Energy.”  
National dailies also publish articles about how the nation could benefit from the coal 
that would be extracted from the mine. Often facts, figures and success cases are 
publicized to negate the anti-mining group’s concerns. One of the articles in a national 
daily stated:  
“Electricity is our national problem. Boa electricity plant in Germany is 
producing 11 thousand MWs electricity from coal that has only one third heat 
value of our high quality coal in Phulbari.  They have done it in very 
environment friendly way. It is quite possible to set up an environmentally 
friendly coal-fired electricity plant. Boa plant is a prime example” (translated 
from Bengali. Ajker Kagoj. 18th August 2007).  
Newspapers bring the commentary and claims of the pro-mining group to the attention 
of the nation. The country’s most highly circulated national English daily, The Daily 
Star,13 reported: 
“Business leaders of different chamber bodies of northern districts at a 
discussion at a city hotel yesterday urged the government to move to develop 
the Phulbari coal mine without any further delay. ‘We can easily produce 
3,500MW of electricity from the coal to be extracted from the Phulbari mine,’ 
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said Chamber President, adding that as the country's gas reserve is depleting 
fast, coal is becoming the only option for power generation.”  
The report adds: 
“They saw the huge coal reserve at the Phulbari coal mine as the only option 
now to deal with a future energy crisis, particularly in power generation” (The 
Daily Star, August 27, 2008). 
Newspapers and publications also feature in the spread of claims and propagations put 
forward by the groups involved in anti-mining campaigns. The National Committee 
(NC), the group that initiated the protests, has made the protection of national interest 
its rallying cry14. NC operates at the national level and has increasing numbers of local 
committees at district and sub-district levels in several regions of the country. Members 
of NC include influential intellectuals, university academicians, writers, engineers and 
left wing political leaders. Their voices are heard regularly in local newspapers and TV 
talk shows. Some publishing houses regularly publish books and articles written by 
scholars involved with NC. One such book written by Anu Muhammad, a University 
Professor and central leader of NC, entitled ‘Phulbari koila khoni - kar lav kar khoti’ 
(Phulbari Coal Mine - Whose Profit Whose Loss), was distributed at a nominal price or 
for free, amongst the educated community of Phulbari. For the NC it has become an 
intellectual project to provide the anti-mining campaign with the necessary equipment, 
such as books and articles, to make this a part of the national agenda. For example, 
Samhati, a publisher in the capital, has been highlighting the destructive impact of 
open-pit coal mining as interpreted by NC oriented social scientists, economists and 
engineers. Often these publications, in booklet format, provide facts and figures, as 
provided in pro-mining claims, about how the Phulbari open-pit coal mine project 
would go against the national interest: 
“Asia Energy Corporation will sell its extracted coal to domestic and 
international markets for a nominal 6% royalty per annum which is 45 million 
USD per annum along with an additional 200 million USD as corporate tax. 
That is 1500 crore Bangladehsi taka. The company on the other hand will earn 
1,50,000 crore taka per year from the coal they will extract with a total 
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investment of  9,100 crore taka in 30 years.”(Phulbari koilakhoni. Translated 
form Bengali)15 
NC activists distributed this booklet at the national level and in Phulbari, and provided 
it to me when I wanted to learn about the Phulbari movement. The author of this 
booklet writes for the Daily Star, the national daily that also reports a pro-mining 
lobby. The highest circulated daily (Prothom Alo) reported this anti-mining story with 
the headline: “Open-pit mining for lifting coal in massive scale will be disastrous for 
the country”. In the article, movement activists are reported as saying, "Giving away 
the resource means giving away the soil" (Prothom Alo; June 26, 2006). With these 
contradicting stories, the country’s most circulated newspaper becomes a platform for 
competing nationalist ideas. The spread of nationalist discourses does not rely or have 
to rely on ‘unified fields of communication’16 or unified elements of ‘print 
capitalism’17. 
  
**      ** 
Nationalist discourse as propagated by the NC is internally diverse. As previously 
discussed, within the manifestation of NC’s protests national interests are often set as 
being opposed to a global force, i.e. the mining company. NC has declared itself a 
national alliance to protect national interests from profit seeking multinationals. Asia 
Energy has been marked as a global force that has entered the country to loot its natural 
resources while destroying local livelihoods and the environment. NC’s political 
project is publicized in documents and leaflets where national interest is opposed to 
foreign and global power; as illustrated by the following points found in a NC leaflet18: 
1. No foreign company will be allowed to extract coal from Phulbari 
2. No coal will be exported.  
3. Asia Energy proposed open-pit method will not be allowed to be implemented 
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4. Foreign companies are profit seeking, and their main goal is to loot our 
resources.  
5. Foreign companies will destroy our environment and the local livelihood for 
their profit. 
6. To protect our coal we have to press imperialist multinational force Asia Energy 
out of our country.  
 (Similar demands were made in numerous newspaper articles, for example, 
Shomakal. Dec. 18, 2008) 
There are, however, ‘cleavages’ in the nationalism spouted by different NC activists. 
To understand the nationalist discourses as propagated by NC, we need to look at their 
formation and ideological background19. The formation of NC has a background in the 
ideological conflicts between some left-leaning political leaders. There are differences 
in the ways that various left-oriented political parties in Bangladesh conceive the 
ideologies of socialism. Some of them form alliances to participate in the national 
election and believe winning national elections should be the way to capture power and 
serve the poor. Others follow orthodox Marxism and believe in capturing power 
through class struggle. During the 1990’s some leaders and activists from this second 
group started to raise theoretical questions about the applicability of orthodox Marxism 
to organise masses of people to fight for their rights and contemporary national issues. 
This group called for the necessity of a revision of theoretical orthodoxy according to 
the demands of present time. It was during this time that the government was making 
deals with several foreign companies to explore oil and gas. This group felt the 
necessity of organising people of all segments to protect the natural resources from 
foreign companies as they felt foreign companies had only come to exploit the 
country’s natural resources. Other leaders in the party felt that a class struggle by the 
masses would be the only way to protect the interests of the poor. In the name of 
national interests, a revision to the party ideology would be considered as a betrayal to 
the party. With this background, some leaders and activists resigned from the party and 
later formed a national forum that mainly included representatives from other left 
parties willing to work with all segments of society, as well as intellectuals and 
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professionals. This national forum was later named the National Committee to Protect 
Oil Gas Electricity Natural Resources and Port, popularly known as the National 
Committee, or NC.  
In a broad sense, the committee consists of two types of people who can be loosely 
categorised as people who have a lineage in left politics and those who don’t. The 
supporters and activists of the NC consist of all kinds of people coming from different 
ways of thought and socio-political backgrounds. This mix of ideas and other internal 
‘cleavages’ puts the dominant ideas of national interest (manifested by NC) under 
constant revision. If the NC’s movement is dominated by idioms of an anti-
Multinational and ‘anti-foreign company’ framed within ‘culture of nationalism’20, then 
that culture is subject to negotiation depending on the situation. Maintaining cohesion 
within the committee is one such situation. Some actors would challenge the dominant 
ideas if they feel them inappropriate. Collaborating with national and international 
NGOs and multinational campaign groups presented a challenge for some of the NC 
member’s pre-defined position about NGOs as there was a general consensus amongst 
left politicians that NGOs were the collaborators of the imperialist West and they didn’t 
do any good for the people.  
“Resist the neo-imperialist agent – NGOs and their exploitation” (written in a 
leaflet distributed by Jatio Krishok Khet Majur Shamity. A grassroots, leftist 
political party. April 17, 2005) 
But some other members felt the need to collaborate with NGOs and other campaign 
groups who were willing to work against the mine project. They felt it would 
strengthen the force of the protest and take it to larger audiences. Eventually this 
prompted NC to change its previous position and engage with national and 
international NGOs.  
“We have to make lot of negotiations and revisions of our strategy for the larger 
goal of the group’s cohesion. We had to debate a lot within the group to agree 
on the decision of working with NGOs.” (a leader of NC; January 14, 2009 ). 
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Some people within the movement have different ideas about how the nation could best 
benefit, however, expert knowledge and popular views often contradict those points. 
One such example is regarding the use of a foreign company for coal extraction in 
Phulbari where two opposing views are held by the members of the same protest 
groups The benchmark slogan for the movement is – “No foreign company, no open-pit 
method, no export”, however, varying articles published at different times by some 
activists of NC, who are experts on mining and the national economy, state that foreign 
companies and expatriates can extract the coal if the state has full ownership of the 
company21.  
Certain categories of people find themselves in a ‘grey zone’ between the dominant 
ideas of the movement and pro-mining ideas22. While supporting the NC movement 
they also sympathize with some claims of pro-mining groups. The question of the 
appropriate method for coal mining is one such issue that has created heated debates 
among people who generally support the anti-Asia Energy movement; which method of 
mining, open pit or underground, would be most beneficial for the nation’s economy? 
Where the open pit mining method would displace a large number of people in the 
mining areas and extract most of the coal deposited, an underground method would 
extract far less coal without displacing people from the surface. While the demand of 
the NC movement is to resist the open-pit method in favour of an underground mine 
with national ownership, opposing views on the mining method to be employed exist 
within the people generally supportive of the movement. I, along with some NC local 
activists in Phulbari, went to meet with an employee of Boropukuria coal mine who, as 
I had been informed by local activists, was sympathetic to the movement. When asked 
what he thought about Asia Energy’s proposal of an open-pit mining method he 
answered— 
“I am a supporter of the anti-mining Phulbari movement as we need to protect 
our coal for our own use. But we are seeing Boropukuria underground mine that 
hardly feeds any profit to the country. It’s because we cannot extract even 5% 
of total the deposit with this method. Coal is our nation’s valuable 
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resource...before wasting it with the underground method we need to think 
carefully. (Interview in January, 2010)”.  
While the open-pit method is viewed as destructive for the nation due to perceived 
negative impacts, such as pollution of water bodies by contaminated water extracted 
from the underground coal pits, a completely opposing view about this mining method 
can also be identified within the movement using the same reasoning of national 
interest, thereby finding itself in a ‘grey zone’.  
The nation’s interest, as projected in the claims and demands of the movement, is 
sometimes contradicted as it applies to the interests of a particular group within the 
movement. Particular groups within the movement sometimes challenge the general or 
‘dominant’ formulation of national claims and demands, or conversely, simply 
withdraw their commitment to certain nationalist demands when they contradict the 
interests of their own/local community.  A classic example of this kind of contradiction 
derives from Borogram village in Phulbari, the village where the majority of my 
research was conducted. Before I started my work in the village, local NC activists in 
Phulbari City told me that they receive strong and continuous collaboration from 
Borogram village. One NC activist stated, “It would be dangerous for anyone to even 
name Asia Energy there – people would be furious.” NC activists who visited the 
village for periodical meetings and discussions about the movement made such 
comments to me on a consistent basis; they considered the village as the stronghold of 
their movement. However, long-term participant observation later revealed that while 
people did indeed have anti-Asia Energy sentiment it was not consistent with what the 
Phulbari activists had told me. Instead ‘anti-Asia Energy’ sentiment meant anti-mining 
in any form, regardless of method and ownership, foreign or national, yet coalesced 
under a banner of ‘anti-Asia Energy’. Such a banner proliferates into documents. For 
example, the letter sent to the ADB, signed by NC activists and local actors, in 
opposition to its plan to provide financial support to Asia Energy, states: 
“The long struggle of the people of Phulbari and the sacrifices made for this 
cause firmly state that open pit coal mining in a densely populated region like 
Bangladesh will not be accepted by the local people. Coal extracted from this 
country should only be used for the benefit of this country. No percentage of the 
coal will be exported. Therefore, we, the people of this potential mining area, 
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request the ADB to remove its financial support from the Phulbari project. 
[Failing to do so] it would become obvious that the ADB is taking a position 
against national interest, the environment and the people of Bangladesh by 
prioritizing the business interests of a company like Asia Energy”23 - on behalf 
of the people of Phulabri 
The ‘anti-Asia Energy’ sentiments in this letter reflect the inconsistency of opinions of 
the national interest and allows them to conflate as the groups and actors use opposition 
to Asia Energy a common political project.  
Opposition to mining of any form is related to a number of socio-political factors and 
people’s experiences of the impact of neighbouring Boropukuria’s underground coal 
mine; an elaborate discussion on this will be presented in Chapter Six (Part One).  
Experiences of landslides and other impacts felt in Boropukuria, which is only a couple 
of miles away, created a situation where the national movement’s endorsement for 
underground mining method has been challenged, as is expressed in the following 
testimony of one resident in Borogram village:  
“If we are to move away from our land for the underground method as well then 
there would be no mine here. Who is the mine for? What would I do with 
national interest if we lose everything anyway? What is our gain if we are 
displaced and the country gets coal and electricity from it? National interest and 
our local interests both have to be secured. ” 
National interests in these statements are contested by particularistic concerns. 
Although protests against Asia Energy’s open-pit mine have always been there, 
opposition to an underground mine developed only after Boropukuria’s underground 
mine caused landslides and the loss of agricultural land. Boropukuria coal mine is an 
underground mine where coal is extracted without displacing the people on the surface. 
The mine is owned and managed by a state owned company and operated by Chinese 
contractors. The mine areas are located about five miles from Borogram village. Parts 
of the mine areas have recently been affected by landslides caused by underground pits 
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made for coal extraction; these landslides have resulted in the loss of agricultural land 
for many villagers.   
The contestation is essentially between national and local interests. Following growing 
tensions around underground mines, activists in Phulbari City discussed how to address 
this contradiction. The result was the decision to leave the proposal of underground 
mining at the local level for discussion while continuing to oppose Asia Energy’s open-
pit method. The best method for mining without displacing people from their land was 
left to be decided later. Though the decision was not a written one, efforts have been 
made to look for alternative mining methods that do not threaten local peoples land. 
Recently a solution has been proposed involving an innovative method where coal will 
be fired underground to generate gas to be used for electricity and other purposes. In 
this way, coal will not be extracted from underground thereby minimising the threat of 
landslides to the local communities. Revised movement ideas are, thus, being 
formulated to create cohesion between the national and particular.  
Conclusion 
I have discussed how opposition to and compliance with the mining project is 
expressed through idioms and sentiments of nationalism. Both the pro-mining and anti-
mining position uses the natural resources (e.g. coal, gas) as foci for wider concerns of 
how Bangladesh’s future should look. “What does our country mean to me”24- this 
question shapes discourses of national interests as they apply to the mine. Groups find 
the meaning of mining in their own analysis of national interests, which, in turn, inform 
their position towards the mine.  
As Mushtaq Khan25 notes, competing perceptions of economic interest characterises the 
political conflicts in present-day Bangladesh. The NC’s Dhaka-based Phulbari 
movement’s nationalist language is characterised by the country’s economic and social 
interests. Drawing from the same nationalist sentiment, pro-mining groups argue their 
case as expressed here: “Asia Energy’s investment will help industrialization in the 
country. This project will have long-term positive impacts on the country’s 
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development. The high quality coal from this project will generate our much needed 
electricity” (North Bengal People’s Welfare Association in The Daily Inquilab, August 
9, 2006). In response to the anti-mining movement’s concern about the environment, 
one local journalist who is working for a pro-mining bulletin Uttorbanga Khanij Barta 
commented, “…see your shoes will not remain new if you wear them. For the benefit 
of country’s economy we have to sacrifice the environment a bit”26. Rather than a 
unified ‘print capitalism’ a contested print language features the nationalist propagation 
in the movement. Thus, we do not find idioms of nationalism in the Phulbari movement 
in the context of what Molly Doane27 called a ‘homogenized ideological construct’. 
Factors such as electoral politics define on which side of the movement two major 
political parties will stand. A change of government means a change in the way the 
national interest is articulated. While the articulation of national interests is contested 
between pro-mining and anti-mining groups, it is also challenged by elements within 
the movement. A general formulation of claims and demands are questioned by 
particular kinds of members within the movement who agree with some of its proposals 
and doubt others. Yet, they coalesce under a banner of anti-Asia energy as a way to 
think about nationalism. Metaphors of national interests cover the ‘cleavages’28 in the 
forms of nationalism.  
We have discussed that the particular interests of Borogram village contradict dominant 
ideas of national interest resulting in a rescaling of movement agendas. Anti-mining 
takes a very different form at the local level, which will be explored further in the 
context of Borogram village. To facilitate that discussion the next chapter lays out the 
social context of the village. 
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          Chapter Five 
      (Re)building a ‘Chapai’ village: 
                          Social organisations and relations in Borogram 
Outline 
As we have seen, Dinajpur district had a history of peasant resistance1 during colonial 
rule. The land relations in which these resistances emerged have undergone various 
changes since independence. Thus, the social relations inherent in present-day 
resistance to the Asia Energy project in Phulbari need to be understood within the 
context of this changed scenario.  As such, this chapter is primarily concerned with the 
village of Borogram, where a larger part of my research was conducted. This will 
provide an understanding of the context of the social relations in which resistance in 
Borogram operates. The history of Borogram village, as explored in parts of this 
chapter, will show how particular histories of land dispossession and the social cost it 
incurred informs the spheres of resistance; this is elaborated on in the following 
chapter. 
To establish the background of present-day resistance in this predominantly 
agriculture-based rural society, this chapter starts with a brief discussion of the changes 
in land relations that have taken place since independence from the colonial system 
under which the peasant’s resistance spread. The main body of the chapter is focused 
on more context-specific discussions about aspects of social and political relations 
pertinent to the resistance movement in Borogram village. 
1. Introduction: towards present day resistance  
James Scott2 chose the term ‘moral economy’ in his analysis of the nature of a 
peasant’s rebellion in South-east Asia during the 1930s. Using the Saya San rebellion 
in Burma and the Nghe-Tinh Soviets in central Vietnam during the 1930s as an 
example, he argues that peasants seek secure subsistence rather than higher-risk 
maximum returns. He called this the moral economy of the subsistence ethic, which, 
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for Scott, characterises the theme of peasant protest throughout this period. He stressed 
the presence of two themes; “First, claims on peasant incomes by landlords, money 
lenders, or the state were never legitimate when they infringed on what was judged to 
be the minimal culturally defined subsistence level; and second, the product of the land 
should be distributed in such a way that all were guaranteed a subsistence niche.”3  
For Scott, two major transformations during the colonial period in South-east Asia 
undermined pre-existing ‘social insurance’ in the form of social networks and patron-
client relations in feudal societies, and the moral economy of subsistence ethic. One 
transformation was the penetration of capitalism, which made the land a commodity 
and took it away from peasants, resulting in a loss of ‘free usufruct’ rights and turning 
them into tenants or agrarian wage labourers. The other transformation was the related 
development of modern states under colonial auspices where the machineries of new 
state institutions not only ensured this transformation, but the state emerged as 
‘claimant’ of the peasant’s resources in the form of tax and revenues, which provoked 
resistance and rebellion in peasant societies. In this sense, peasant resistance during 
capitalist transformation arose from a lack of the socially and culturally perceived 
‘minimum income’ that is necessary for a household to observe certain social and 
ceremonial obligations, to feed it adequately, and to continue to cultivate. In this way, 
Scott connected the states and agrarian structures with more micro-level issues of 
household budgets and peasant - family relations in his understanding of peasant 
resistance.  Factors, such as alliances with other classes and the capacity of the 
collective organisation of the peasants, determined whether or not the exploited 
situation would turn into rebellion.  
When looking at the premises of agrarian resistance in colonial Bengal, I find myself 
compelled by Scott’s analysis.  As discussed in the first chapter, during colonial rule 
Bengal’s land management system underwent a series of changes that detracted from 
traditional land relations of patron-client(ism), where the latter had flexible tax and 
revenue payment options with landlords, and sometimes directly with state officials. 
Under British rule, the land system was thoroughly changed with the introduction of 
‘permanent settlement’4, where revenue was collected from the cultivators through 
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various new classes of intermediaries. The possession of large land-holdings, 
Zamindari, was made a commodity of the market where anyone with purchasing 
capacity could buy in exchange for yearly fixed revenue. As land became a commodity 
of the market, a new breed of landlords, Zamindars, mostly coming from the class of 
businessmen or officials, emerged with no hereditary connections or relations with the 
rural cultivators. Holding the authority to fix the revenue for whatever amount they 
wished, these landlords often charged the cultivators much higher rates than those to be 
paid to the government (for the different forms of hidden and open charges, see Guha, 
19965). Coming from a city background, these landlords often assigned or sublet their 
land to various categories of middlemen to manage the revenue and/or crop collection, 
thereby further distancing traditional landlord-cultivator relations. Under the 
circumstances, cultivator and sharecropper feelings of exploitation came to a pinnacle 
with the organisational facilitation of communist activists from the cities in the form of 
the sharecroppers’ rebellion.  
It would be misleading to see the present-day rural resistance to the proposed 
destruction of agricultural land and displacement as simply an extension of 
sharecroppers’ resistance as structured in the colonial era. Land relations under colonial 
rule went through several reform attempts since independence in 1947. During the 
Pakistan period, The East Bengal State Acquisition Act of 19506 was enacted to direct 
the abolition of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 and the colonial system of 
revenue collections through Zamindars and intermediaries. Designed to put an end to 
the right of Zamindars to act as agents of the State, the Act was meant to put “the state 
into direct de jure relationship with rent-paying cultivators of land.”7  This part of 
reform was interpreted by some writers as going back to Bengal’s traditional system as 
it had existed during the Muslim period, prior to colonial rule.8 However, many have 
disagreed as to what extent this Act actually eliminated property rights of big landlords. 
Barkat, as well as others9, presented land data to show that the Zamindars used their 
connections in administration to retain ownership of large land holdings under their kin 
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under the new status of Maliks, i.e. land-holding tenants of the State10. Nevertheless, 
the Act did officially invalidate the authority of land-holding intermediaries to control 
the revenue amounts charged to cultivators.11  
Since the emergence of an independent Bangladesh in 1971 there have been additional 
attempts at land reform. The 1970’s saw the ceiling on the size of private landholdings 
lowered to 33.3 acres, with the intention of preventing Zamindar-type landlords from 
emerging12. Redistribution of unused government-owned land, also known as Khas 
land, among the landless poor was stressed in land legislation of the 1980s13. While 
these reform attempts did not completely diminish the presence of big landlords, who 
continued to possess more land than the official ceiling through disguised ownership, 
they did detract from the land-holders authority to control revenue collection systems. 
On the other hand, the Act of 1950 finally implemented the colonial ruler’s promise to 
provide individual ownership rights to land that they had cultivated for over one 
decade. With the official right to sell these lands, these cultivator-owners emerged as a 
new category of landowner-peasant in the agrarian structures14. This was a category 
that had been previously absent under the colonial land system where cultivators 
remained tenants without any permanent ownership rights over the land. As such, 
present rural Bangladesh does not merely consist of small peasants and landless poor 
whose subsistence is uniformly in danger. Though over eighty percent of Bangladeshi 
people live in rural areas, the majority of whom are involved agricultural subsistence, 
and it is true that agricultural labourers and landless people make up the highest 
proportion of rural residents, the patterns of land ownership, notions of land relations, 
and the nature of social structures are distinct throughout the different regions of 
Bangladesh15. What follows, is an attempt, based on my ethnographic observations, to 
present aspects of social structure and relations within Borogram, close to Phulbari 
town. As we shall see, this has had a direct effect on localised perception of, and 
resistance to, mining.  
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2. Borogram Village 
“Remain cautious when you go to the village. People don’t like any outsider in the 
village. They might think you are one of those survey people trying to gather 
information on behalf of the mining company.” These were some early words of 
caution provided by the activists in Dhaka as I was preparing to go to Borgram village 
for the first time. I was told outsiders in the villages are seen as suspicious because the 
villagers do not want Asia Energy’s people gaining access to the villages. 
Earlier I described the context within which my access to Borogram had to be won 
through my contacts among Phulbari town activists that maintained connections with 
the village actors. During my early stay in the village an activist from the town and one 
of his friends from the village served as my guides to avoid any misunderstandings 
about my purpose. Throughout my fieldwork I was assisted by town activists and their 
village contacts to negotiate access to particular members of the village. Though I was 
able to secure my stay in the village and participate in daily events, access to individual 
informants remained a challenge throughout my stay. It was simply not possible for my 
early contacts in the village to negotiate access everywhere I went and with everyone I 
talked to. In addition, not everyone in the village was convinced by the assurance of my 
contacts. This restricted my ability to collect stories and narratives through elaborate 
discussions with the village actors. Even those people who I was introduced to as a 
University student doing research for academic purposes were generally uninterested in 
engaging in extensive discussions or in-depth interviews.  I consistently observed a 
degree of discomfort on the part of the villagers to speak with an outsider, particularly 
when it came to the issues around mining. I negotiated these limitations by 
participating in daily events, observing village life, and through informal discussions 
and interviews, and collecting oral histories where possible. Through these activities I 
developed my understanding of the context and complexities of the protests in the 
village. This is reflected in the way the material is often presented in the third person, 
rather than through narratives and life histories.   
2.1 The setting 
From my past experiences of short-term field research in parts of rural Bangladesh, I 
have learned that it is courteous to first approach gatekeepers. As such, when an activist 
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from Phulbari town, who guided me into the village, placed me before the village 
activist leaders, I assumed they were leaders, particularly as they promised me 
cooperation from the village during my stay. Over time, as my understating matured, I 
found that the category ‘leader’ and its accompanying qualities had multiple facets 
depending on the processes of specific social events. This is elaborated on within 
discussions about social and political relations in the village later on in the chapter.  
The village is located approximately five kilometres from Phulbari Town, the centre of 
organised protest activities. The total population of Borogram lives in over five 
hundred different households. According to documents from the Phulbari Coal Mine 
Project, published by Asia Energy, it is projected that over the thirty five-year lifetime 
of the mine it will gradually span over 5,933 hectares of land, roughly sixty square 
kilometres. Along with parts of Phulbari Town, the total area of Borogram Village is to 
be acquired during the initial stages of the project, as this is where the first part of coal 
extraction activities are planned16. The total land acquired is to be used for two 
activities; one, the removal of soil of up to 270 meters in order to make pits for the 
extraction of coal, and two, to build associated establishments for dumping coal and 
constructing offices, employee quarters and roads. According to the project plans and 
mine maps presented in the Company’s project publications, most of Borogram and the 
surrounding areas are planned sites for digging pits and dumping coal17.  
In the late 1990s a muddy road, kacha, that connected the village to Phulbari Town was 
developed by Asia Energy to ease the movement of their vehicles during exploration 
surveys. This new Paka Road provided a thirty-minute one-way commute between the 
Town and the Village by human-paddled three wheelers, rickshaws and vans. Those 
with bicycles were able to use the road with a slightly quicker result, and the few well-
off villagers with motorcycles were able to make an even quicker commute and did so 
more often to stock up on household needs. Walking commuters avoided taking the 
longer zigzagging road and were able to make it to Town in roughly forty minutes by 
travelling through the edges of paddy fields. Phulbari Town is conveniently linked to 
the capital, and other parts of North and North-west Bengal, by coach and rail services. 
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This convenient rail connection was considered a favourable element to the initial 
settlers of Borogram Village as rail connections meant the prospect of an easy link 
between their old home and their ‘new’ village of Borogram. In addition, it allowed for 
the possibility of attracting more people to the ‘new place’ during the initial periods of 
migration. Unfortunately, parts of the road between the Village and Phulbari Town are 
now scattered with ditches creating significant obstacles for rickshaws, vans and 
motorcycles. The developed parts of the road that once provided the villagers with 
smoother faster access to the Town only lasted a couple of years. This quick 
disintegration of the Paka Road has given villagers the sense that, “They [Asia Energy] 
do nothing for the local people. They built roads for their survey purpose; the survey is 
finished and the road is also broken-down,” (as remarked by one regular commuter).   
The image of South Asian villages as separated, ‘sealed’, and stable from the outside 
world has long been refuted in scholarly debates. Ron Inden criticised Occidental 
scholars for portraying South Asian villages as being ancient essences, static and 
separate18. He argues that the realities are “far from embodying simple unchanging 
essences”19. Social elements and agents are more complex and “they make and remake 
each other through a dialectic process in changing situations”20. In the case of 
Borogram Village, its connectedness can be observed through the presence of various 
forms of contemporary communication technologies. Mobile phones have become a 
popular means of communication within the village and beyond. Televisions have been 
installed in tea stalls and shops to attract customers and in the evening people gather 
there to watch recreational programs, news and talk shows regarding matters of 
national and global interest. Radios are frequently seen in the villages where news and 
other programs can be heard playing around the hour. However, this is not to suggest 
that the possession of TVs and radios are a common feature in the villages. In fact, the 
majority of households do not own TVs, mobile phones or radios. Furthermore, the 
absence of electricity only enables the local village market to run TVs in the evening 
for a few hours using a generator. Nevertheless, access to these communications helps 
spread shared knowledge and meanings regarding matters that concern the villagers.  
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Certain village settings compel this process; mobile phone owners have to gather at the 
market in the evening to charge their phone batteries. People also come to the market to 
recharge their Chinese-made torch-lights that can be purchased from Phulbari Town 
with 100 taka, which is equivalent to less than one pound. Other people come to buy 
their daily food items, such as vegetables, or to watch TV over a cup of tea and snacks. 
Sellers of small quantities of locally produced vegetables prefer to do so in the village 
market to avoid the transport costs of travelling to Phulbari Town. Therefore this 
evening market becomes a meeting point for people from different social categories 
and a platform for sharing the latest new; including discussions about the mining deal 
between the Company and the government, information about protest activities, and 
stories from neighbouring Boropukuria. I became a regular part of this platform during 
my stay in the village, in part due to the importance of this place for my research and 
methodological purposes, and partly for the same reasons as the others, to charge my 
mobile phone and laptop. Through the shared stories, knowledge takes on differential 
meanings as it undergoes processes of distribution and disbursement throughout the 
village. This social setting of Borogram Village market acts as a forum for forming 
shared knowledge of “particular patterns”21. Anti-mining protests in Borogram, and the 
knowledge that stems from the protests, is an example of this.  
The establishment of Borogram Village evolved through the migration from a few 
neighbouring areas in the district of Chapainawabganj in Northern Bangladesh. A 
group of approximately twenty people, forced by repeated river erosion and consequent 
land loss, first migrated to the flat forest area around Phulbari Rail Station in, according 
to some of the members of the group, 1968.  
The first group of migrants found a flat forest area in the vicinity of Phulbari Township 
that promised to be fertile for agricultural activities once the forest was cleared. The 
forest was gradually cleared into land where crops could be produced and cattle raised. 
Initial efforts to clear the forest were hindered by interventions from forest officials, as, 
according to state laws, destruction of such lands were illegal. On several occasions 
arrest warrants were issued against male members of the group on charges of illegal 
destruction of natural forest, but the village continued to grow through the migration of 
families, landless relatives and neighbours. In turn, a large area was gradually cleared 
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to accommodate a population that now exceeds 2500 individuals living in 
approximately 500 houses. Over the last four decades the people have asserted their 
rights to the land through their presence, despite legal action from the forest authority 
supported by the Government. The first group’s initial success in securing land by 
clearing forest attracted more people from the river-erosion affected areas to migrate to 
this ‘new place’. 
Having located an area of flat forest-land in a relatively higher area meant that residents 
of Borogram needed to develop the means for large quantities of irrigation needed for 
cultivation. Underground water levels remain low in the village, making irrigation 
through a petroleum-run shallow-tube well difficult, particularly during the dry season. 
These difficulties with irrigation resulted in an increased popularity of crops that 
require lesser water, such as corn. Lower lands are preferred for rice production where 
shallow-tube wells can be set in a hollow in the ground to reach the water level 
throughout the production season. Irrigation machines are owned by those villagers 
who have invested money in setting up mechanisms to meet their own irrigation needs 
and who simultaneously earn rental income by providing water to other land. Machine 
owners and their clients are engaged in longer-term seasonal deals based on trust and 
the faith that both will do their committed part. Rental fees are usually paid after crops 
are harvested, and a good harvest is contingent on regular and adequate irrigation 
service from the machine owners. The longer-term relations of trust between these two 
groups, among many others, feature in the dynamics of Borogram community. 
2.2 Building a ‘community’ 
This sub-section describes observations concerning how the boundaries of Borogram as 
a community are experienced by its members through their shared history of migration 
from a common area and settlement in a ‘new place’. Coming from the district of 
Chapainawabganj, the Chapai identity was coined to create “community”22.  
The name of the village Borogram translates into English as ‘big-village’, as it is 
perceived as being larger in both area and population than other surrounding villages. 
However, administrative arrangements and the spatial segregation of the electoral units 
of the government of Bangladesh do not consider Borogram as one village. Formal 
                                                           
22
 Cohen, 1985 
124 
 
statistical surveys by the Bureau of Statistics of the Government of Bangladesh do not 
present any statistical information identifying Borogram as one village23. The statistics 
are gathered and presented based on the area administrative units of Bangladesh, 
according to which the total area of Borogram falls under two different Unions24. 
Despite its formal designations, its residents, and those of the surrounding villages, 
establish Borogram as a single village or ‘community’ in their references of daily social 
interactions. However, this is not to say that Borogram village forms one single 
‘community’ without any internal divisions.  
Writers have analysed the ‘symbolic’ nature of community to suggest that the 
boundaries and meanings of community are constructed by its member’s perceptions of 
their own community25. While approaching Borogram for my ethnographic endeavour, 
I was neither guided by the formal administrative demarcation of the areas that do not 
present the existence of Borogram as one village, nor by the public reference of 
Borogram as one community. As Cohen noted ‘community is one of those 
words…bandied around in ordinary, everyday speech, apparently readily intelligible to 
speaker and listener, which, when imported into the discourses of social science, 
however, causes immense difficulty’26.  
Cohen roots his analysis in the idea of what ‘community’ means to people. In effect, he 
sets out to reconsider and bring to the forefront the study of the notion of ‘community’, 
by exploring how the idea is used, defined, classified, spoken of and lived by those who 
invest terms and its organic reality with symbolic importance. He contends that the 
classic use of a theoretical construct of ‘community’ was to generate reasons for social 
change and development to structural determinism, whereby a loss of ‘community’ was 
considered to have occurred along a continuum. This scaled a notion of community 
strength, which ranged from a small-scale homogenous folk model of social 
organisation towards a fragmented ‘urban’ model, synonymous with a simple/complex 
duality largely based on a quantitative dimension. In turn, this assumed that social 
complexity is proportionately related to the scale and number of institutions in the 
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urban situation. This whole discourse is a mythology simply because it ‘pays scant 
regard to the qualitative dimension of social life’27 and to the perceptions and meaning 
held by the members regarding their own community.   
Cohen argues that a reasonable interpretation of the word’s use would seem to imply 
two related suggestions; that the members of a group have something in common with 
one another and that the thing held in common distinguishes them in a significant way 
from the members of other possible groups28. Community, thus, implies both similarity 
and difference. It is a relational idea: the opposition of one community to others or to 
other social entities. Boundaries of community may be perceived and, as such, they 
may be seen in very different ways. This is the symbolic aspect of community, or 
communion, boundary and is fundamental to gaining an appreciation of how people 
experience communities and communion. Cohen tries to understand ‘community’ by 
seeking to capture members’ experiences of it. Instead of asking, what does it look like 
to us? He asks what does it appear to mean to its members? Member’s perception of the 
vitality of their culture, he argues, forms the reality of community29. Cohen’s work 
emphasizes belonging and connection, which are significant elements in what is called 
‘Social Capital’, as previously discussed.  
Longer-term observations and participatory explorations of daily life helped capture 
how people experience communities. As previously mentioned, the residents of 
Borogram share a common migratory history from the district of Chapainawabganj in 
Northern Bangladesh. The initial flows of migration occurred through the family links 
and social connections of those first twenty people who arrived in the ‘new place’. As 
such, the earliest residents of Borogram, who established their presence by clearing 
forest, were all somehow related or known to one another and came from a few 
neighbouring villages within one sub-district in Chapainawabganj. With time, attracted 
by the availability of Khas (government-owned) land, an increasing number of people 
migrated to the ‘new place’ through their secondary and tertiary social connections. In 
turn, these migrated people attracted their kin, relatives and friends, not only from their 
own villages, but also from other parts of the district. As a result, the village expanded 
with people who had migrated largely from three or four pockets of one district in 
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Chapainawabganj. Their common origin in the Chapainawabganj district assigned them 
the Chapai identity in the eyes of surrounding villages. This resulted in Borogram being 
known as Chapai village, and its residents commonly termed Chapai people. The 
people of Borogram also identify themselves as Chapai people in matters relating to 
transactions and interactions with other local villages. It is accepted ‘truth’ that people 
of the Chapai community are more laborious than other local residents, as they have to 
work hard to produce crops in the dry and relatively higher previously uncultivated 
land. The local rickshaw puller driving me to Borogram advised me, “No one in the 
village spends time being lazy. When small peasants don’t have to work on their land 
between harvesting seasons they go out to the cities to work as wage labourers. That’s 
why Chapai people earn more than us.”   
Borogram was commonly portrayed as a cohesive group in cases of conflict with other 
villagers and in protecting their presence on the land. “If someone from the village is 
harassed by someone from another village the entire village would stand for our people. 
We, Chapai people, are united and we form one unit,” said a Borogram resident. The 
boundary of Borogram is marked as having the qualities of a community as it is 
experienced “not only by people on either side, but also by people on the same side”30. 
At another level, the Borogram ‘community’ is characterised by internal sub-divisions. 
As the village expanded it soon became difficult to arrange certain social events 
commonly held for the entire village. Events such as inviting everyone to marriage 
ceremonies, commonly held as an individual’s social obligation, mitigating increasing 
numbers of social conflict for the village leaders and providing motivation to people 
living in the corners of the village to contribute to building a mosque or madrasa 
(religious school), are examples of incidents that created tension and conflict within the 
village groups. Within this background, several new village leaders, or 
‘Mondols’/‘Dewans’, were nominated, with the consent of elderly ‘Mondols’, to 
represent different parts of the village as social arbiters. Now the village households are 
verbally divided into eight parts and assigned to eight of the newly appointed Mondols 
forming their own community groups and dealing with everyday social matters 
amongst themselves. Borogram remains an overarching community forum to which 
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everyone belongs and issues that are not solved within the sub-community are dealt 
with in an open village court, Bichar, involving several Mondols.  
2.3 Samaj 
These sub-communities are often referred to as ‘Samaj’ as much as Borogram is. The 
functioning of Samaj appears complex, as it is not simply dependent on the spatial 
divisions of Borogram; other marks of connection cross cut in the operation of the 
concept of Samaj.  
Anxieties derived from the threat of the loss of Samaj, along with the good qualities 
nurtured by its residents, plays a role in the formation of anti-mining sentiments in 
Borogram; this is discussed elaborately in the next chapter. The discussion is aided by 
the following exploration into the characteristics of Samaj and the context within which 
it operates in Borogram.  
An analysis of how Samaj is formed and how it works is not new in Bangladesh. Adnan 
notes, “A Samaj typically consists of the household belonging to one or more 
patrilineages with their homesteads in close proximity, led by the most senior or 
influential patriarchs among them”31. Some of the earlier ethnographic attempts in 
Bangladeshi villages described Samaj as a mutual social group which is based on 
reciprocal obligations32 that “act[s] out what is morally and ritually meaningful as a 
community---reinforcing when necessary the normative standards to which all are 
supposed to adhere”33. Bertocci goes deeper into the functioning of Samaj in a 
Bangladeshi village in Comilla district, showing it as a multi-village social group that 
works as a larger social structure. For him, the multi-village community feeling that is 
formed through the linkages of kinship and other lines of social connection, such as 
entitlement to common mosque work, is “a structural unit of larger social groupings, of 
which the Samaj is one of the most important”34.  
For me, the concept of Samaj and its dynamics in a particular context cannot be 
completely grasped without looking at the particulars of history. Residents of 
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Borogram, as we have discussed, share a common history of migration and settlement 
in a place away from their original ‘home’. Settlement in an unknown locality, which 
was generally forest-land, was accompanied by possible conflicts with local villagers in 
the surrounding areas. Early efforts to protect their presence and maintain their rights to 
the land demanded that they remain united and act as a group in cases of conflict. 
Borogram Village as a social group was further enhanced by the Chapai identity 
assigned to everyone in the village. Although their presence and rights to the land has 
become further established over time, the earlier necessity of acting as a group still 
remains as they continuously work to protect their perceived rights to the land through 
their presence. The ability to work together in cases of conflict with surrounding local 
villagers employs a stronger strategy to protect their presence. In this context, the idea 
of a Borogram Samaj comes into operation as a solidarity group. Borogram is located 
in close proximity to other villages and its residents have occasional social interactions 
with the local villagers. Nevertheless, the particular historical realities of Borogram 
mean there is no multi-village Samaj that involves both Chapai and non-Chapai 
villages. Rather, the idea of Borogram Samaj embodies a ‘separateness’ from 
surrounding villages, despite the presence of interactions that formed the basis of multi-
village Samaj in the cases presented by Bertocci.  
The structure of a Samaj has some organisational features that clarify its functioning. 
Leaders of the village called Mondols, or Dewanis, encompass the roles and functions 
that create a Samaj. What makes one a Mondol is also contingent on the specificities of 
the context. I found some variations from some earlier ethnographic observations in 
this regard. For example, Jansen observed the leaders of a Samaj, Matbars, as it was 
called in his case, are those who are economically well-off and are often the product of 
inherited leadership35. Both Bertocci and Jansen found lineage to be significant for 
becoming a leader of Samaj36. In addition, both observed that a combination of better 
economic conditions and membership to a lineage established as one of higher status 
determines, to a variable extent, the qualities of a Samaj leader. In some cases, 
hereditary members of a particular lineage historically regarded as having a high status 
enjoy the status of Samaj leader despite having a degraded economic condition. In 
cases presented by Bertocci and Jansen, Samaj leaders are generally qualified through 
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their possession of a wealthier economic status and/or membership to particular 
lineages or high status ‘titles’ where the former often results in the latter37.  
Leadership of Samaj in Borogram was determined by social realities and accompanied 
by a history of migration and settlement in a new land. The initial group of twenty 
people who migrated to this ‘new place’ were led by one individual called Rahim38 
who had previously visited the area while trading jewellery. Attracted by the 
availability of unoccupied government-owned land and its convenient communication 
lines between the old and ‘new place’, Rahim motivated some of the other affected 
villagers to migrate to the ‘new place’ and acquire available land. Rahim travelled to 
different places for his petty trading, which gave him exposure to the world outside the 
village. The group of twenty people were confident in Rahim’s knowledge and 
followed him to the ‘new place’ where they built their temporary houses and cleared 
their area of flat forest-land. To retain their presence on the land, the group engaged in 
negotiations with forest officials using a variety of methods, including bribery. Through 
his previous experiences of travelling to the cities, Rahim had knowledge of the 
location of government offices. He promised the group he would manage official 
matters using a group fund created to meet the required expenses. As a result of his 
experience, Rahim fell into the role of leader and the people followed him. This was 
despite his education and economic condition not being any better than those who had 
migrated with him. Neither heritage nor lineage played any role in differentiating social 
positions in the newly established village. Rahim’s role in a conjuncture of 
landlessness, migration and insecurity in the ‘new place’ earned him the status of 
Mondol, or Dewani, of Samaj- soon he was called Rahim Dewani.  
Whilst this is the story of the first generation of migrants to Borogram; the social 
realities of later periods demanded some reforms in the structure of Samaj. As 
previously mentioned, the village expanded over time, which brought the problem of 
observing social obligations and mitigating conflict within the context of an 
increasingly large village spread over one thousand acres. Samaj is expressed through 
certain social and religious rituals and ceremonies where everyone has an obligation to 
subscribe to the norms of the social event. For example, an individual father has to 
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invite all the members of his Samaj to the marriage ceremony of his daughter or son. 
Conflict between members of a Samaj is to be mitigated through the judgment of the 
Mondol. Everyone has to contribute, according to an individual’s economic ability, to 
the establishment and maintenance of certain religious establishments such as the 
Mosque and Madrasa. The observation of these obligations and norms within the 
context of an expanded village with a large population became problematic for one 
Mondol to oversee. During the 1990s the senior members of Borogram conferred with 
representatives from different corners of the village on numerous occasions to address 
this matter; consequently the village was clustered into six Samaj, each with their own 
Mondol. This new group of Mondols mostly came from the younger generation who 
had migrated to Borogram with their parents as children. Though none of the new 
Mondols came from what would be considered poor families, it would be misleading to 
see their relatively wealthier condition as a determinant of their leadership. In fact, 
most of them did not come from the wealthiest families in the village, and none of them 
subscribe to any wealthier lineage.  Instead, other qualities, such as a history of 
involvement and effort in Samaj affairs, a history of willingness to spend time on 
community initiatives, of mobilising money for the maintenance of the local mosque, 
the knowledge and skills to provide judgment in conflict management, and a reputation 
of impartiality, played a role in determining the new Mondols. Although a relatively 
well-off condition was a feature of each of them, which enabled them to channel their 
efforts towards community affairs as opposed to spending all of their time engaging in 
livelihood activities, a better economic condition was not necessarily the sole 
determinant of their leadership. This is evident in the fact that some of the wealthiest 
individuals, such as those who own the largest amounts of land, did not become 
Mondols. Rather than lineage and economic condition becoming criterion of Samaj 
leadership, roles played by individuals in particular realities shape the qualities of a 
Mondol. Sometimes new kinds of Samaj leaders emerge through experiences of 
specific events. The protest movement against the proposed mining and the leadership 
of these protests in the village is one example of this.  
The role of a Samaj can be seen in two broad aspects, enabling functions and restricting 
functions. Perceptions of Samaj depend on the idea of solidarity amongst its members, 
which enables them to benefit from aspects of cohesiveness.  Elements of what is called 
‘social capital’, such as social connections, relations of trust and faith built through 
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longer-term interactions, and aspects of patron-client relations, are the enabling aspects 
of a Samaj. Samaj also works as a cognitive idea through which traditional, social and 
religious norms are administered by restricting individuals from breaking the norms.  
Bichar is the most important element of the restricting aspect of a Samaj. Bichar is a 
system of judging any particular misdeed, act of violence, or conflict between two 
individuals, households or groups, by setting up a village court led by the Mondol and 
involving other members of Samaj. The court hears a case and the Mondol, in 
collaboration with other members of Samaj, delivers a verdict to mitigate the conflict or 
to punish a guilty party. Any member of Samaj can ask for Bichar if he/she is a victim 
of conflict and/or violence, and it is the duty of the members of a Samaj to arrange for 
Bichar with the leadership of the Mondol. In this sense, Bichar is enabling or 
empowering for a victim. Occasionally individuals are brought to Bichar forcefully in 
cases where there has been a violation of religious and/or social norms, such as 
adultery. Objectives of the Bichar system are usually mediatory so that events of 
perceived misdeeds are mitigated internally and the parties involved can remain 
integrated in the Samaj. To reach mediation, judgments are brought against the guilty, 
and punishments can involve public verbal harassment, minor physical punishments, 
such as slapping, and/or monetary penalties to be paid to the victims. Issues that are not 
solved internally in the Bichar of newly formed small Samajs, and that require wider 
attention, are passed through to a broader Bichar involving other Mondols and 
representatives of the entirety of Borogram village. Bichar as a village institution is an 
inseparable element of the idea of Samaj and acts as a platform for the connection 
between small Samajs in Borogram.  
This connection between small Samajs exists in various lines of social interaction and 
in the sense of belonging to a common Chapai identity. One of the factors that defined 
the clustering of households in the formation of new Samajs was the location of 
people’s old homes in Chapainawabganj district. Though not obvious, there already 
exists a clustering of households in Borogram according to the location the migrants 
originally came from. While people from Shibganj sub-district tend to live in one 
pocket of Borogram, people from a neighbouring sub-district live in another. This 
clustering of households according to people’s original homes historically developed 
during the process of gradual migration through family and other links. Migrants 
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tended to build homes and live close to their friends and relatives who had migrated 
earlier, thus, avoiding being alone in a new place. Some people simply built their 
houses where they found people from their original villages or places closest to their 
original home. The close proximity to the original home was used as a reference for 
building household clusters and developing groups in the new place. Those household 
groups already existing in certain pockets of Borogram were the determinants of the 
marking of small Samajs. It is this vagueness in the markers of new Samaj that makes 
them pervasive. Though location of original home played an important role in 
determining the positions of new homes, some other considerations also directed the 
spread of households. For example, the availability of agricultural land was the most 
important determinant of the site of new houses. People preferred to live in close 
proximity to their agricultural lands in order to have a better ability to monitor their 
production and irrigation processes. The first settlers in Borogram had some 
agricultural land around their houses. This pattern evolved through the process 
necessary for clearing forest in order to make it arable land, which required living near 
the land in order to protect crops and land rights. For these reasons, when agricultural 
land was unavailable close to their primary associates, the migrants that followed the 
early settlers built their houses and dispersed throughout different pockets of 
Borogram. A larger amount of available land also took people to different parts the 
village. As the early settlers had already occupied the larger pieces of land, later 
migrants settled wherever they found a piece of land for their homestead.  As such, 
although there is a general tendency to live in clusters based on associations from their 
previous village, the household distribution pattern is not necessarily determined by 
this. Nevertheless, the primary factor in the making of new Samajs was the existing 
cluster of households, which are not necessarily made of people from a common desher 
bari, original home. 
In matters concerning Samaj, people often associate themselves with those who have 
come from their village or who they are related to, even though they now belong to a 
different Samaj. Bichar is the most visible element of Samaj and does not show any 
rigid territorial boundary. All members living in a particular cluster are considered 
members of a Samaj. However, in the case of Bichar, people who are living in different 
clusters and who are previously known to the majority of the organising cluster, or who 
migrated from a common area, would also be invited to participate, as they are 
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considered a member of that Samaj. A person living in a different household cluster 
would always be considered as part of the Samaj home to the majority of his kin. In this 
way, individuals sometime possess membership of multiple Samajs.  
Religious institutions, such as Mosques and Madrasas, are an important part of a Samaj 
as they signify religious duties and foster religious education. Members of a particular 
Samaj will mobilise funds to establish a mosque thereby promoting member and Samaj 
visibility. For example, members of a particular Samaj will be charged a particular 
amount of money, in cash or kind, for the establishment of a mosque. The amount is 
fixed by the Mondol according to the observed economic condition of that household. It 
then becomes a moral obligation for the household to pay the amount subscribed to the 
Samaj and its religious institution. People who are not considered part of that particular 
Samaj are not obliged to contribute to building that particular mosque. This is how new 
mosques were built by the newly formed Samajs.  
However, not all of the six new Samajs have been able to build their own mosques due 
to the small number of households in some of the clusters, in conjunction with a crisis 
of collective funds. Thus, more than one Samaj share mosques, as they are, in religious 
principle, open to all. People who regularly go to a particular mosque become members 
of associations built around mosque-based activities, such as the organisation of 
evening prayer sessions. It becomes a moral duty for the members of these associations 
to contribute in order to meet small expenses involved, such as buying sweets for 
participants, in organising these sessions. This moral duty often extends to contributing 
to the installation of a tube-well or the expansion, or further development, of the 
mosque. This kind of involvement with mosque-based activities brings the members of 
different Samaj together, including when it is necessary to deal with individuals 
unwilling to contribute to the development and maintenance of the mosque. In these 
aspects the boundaries between Samajs become blurred. This is further evidenced by 
the people’s subscription to a common mosque for the entire village Borogram. Aside 
from the presence of mosques in pockets of the village, there is a mosque at the village 
entrance called Borogram Mosque. This was built with brick and concrete through the 
contributions of people from all parts of the village. The mosque was conveniently built 
just beside the local market so that people from all parts who gather in the market in the 
evening could attend evening prayers. Like Borogram local market, the mosque is also 
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a platform for social interaction between different groups where the idea of an 
overarching Chapai Samaj strengthens.  
The leadership of Samaj and the judgment provided in Bichar does not always go 
unchallenged. A Mondol has to legitimise his position by gaining acceptance as a 
leader. Judgment provided in Bichar has to be accepted as fair by the people. This tends 
to occur through discussions involving senior members and other interested parties. 
This does not, however, ensure an unchallenged quality and undisputed jurisdiction of 
Mondols. Mondols do not necessarily possess links to high status lineages or wealth, 
thus, they do not emerge from any historical relations of hierarchy. Instead, their role as 
leader requires time and commitment to Samaj activities, and their leadership is 
sometimes refuted. One of the wealthiest individuals in Borogram, who is believed to 
possess the largest amount of land in the village, acquired over time through hard work 
clearing forest-land with the assistance of his family, lamented, “Generally bekar 
(people without business) were made Mondols. They have enough lazy time to give all 
those Samaj activities. I am busy person; I can’t go for all these things”. Other well-off 
people who did not become Mondol expressed resentment towards the quality of the 
Mondols; “I am the Mondol of my own house. I don’t get to go to these Bichars any 
more. They don’t call me either. Why should they? I don’t go to Phulbari town; I don’t 
go outside; I can’t read or write. They have new young people who always go to towns 
and probably know better than us. They don’t have to respect me any more. Let them 
run their Samaj. I don’t have to go there. I am happy to be Mondol of my own 
household,” stated Sharif Bepari, resident of Borogram.  
Disapproval of Mondols is often expressed in non-participation or the overtaking of the 
Bichar system in dealing with social or family conflicts.  Instead of requesting a formal 
Bichar those who disapprove of the Mondols seek help in dealing with social and 
family conflicts from their kin and relatives in the village. Additionally, people 
passively reject the decisions or judgment provided in Bichar. Individuals suspicious of 
the impartiality of the Mondol and his supporters often disobey any judgment made 
against themselves and will instead bring the matter to the attention of other Mondols 
and their links with other Samajs. Sometimes they will take the matter even further, for 
the consideration of an elected member of the Union parishad, the lowest tier of the 
local government. These issues are then dealt with within the larger forum of Borogram 
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Samaj involving all the Mondols, senior residents, people regarded as knowledgeable 
for their education or exposure to outside world, and others who are interested. Samaj 
operates through the process of both subscription and periodic denial of people to 
specific events and elements that shape it.  
2.4 Social hierarchy and power 
In order to better understand the social realities in Borogram I had to trace the source of 
hierarchy and power in Borogram. Contrary to some earlier observations, my research 
shows that rather than lineage or previous high status of homesteads, histories and 
realities of settling in a ‘new place’ demanded other qualities in determining social 
leadership. In a changing scenario people assert certain kinds of power through the 
acquisition of alternate livelihoods, such as agricultural technology, which they then 
use to renegotiate their position within social hierarchies. In this context, as we will see, 
it becomes difficult to identify one particular group as uniformly powerless or 
absolutely controlling.  
Some early attempts to present rural Bangladesh as an undifferentiated peasant society 
were later criticised by a more insightful analysis that uncovered a pre-occupation with 
homogeneity and bias to a particular region’s agro-economic data attached with those 
attempts39. Driven by the need for policy formulation for rural development, most of 
the attempts to generate aggregate data about landholding and tenure avoided the 
variations in different regions, and the differences in the histories of social and land 
relations through which they pressed for a uniform landholding picture40. This 
continued in the early official surveys of an independent Bangladesh (1977-78) 
conducted by the Bureau of Statistics of Government of Bangladesh with the financial 
and technical cooperation of USAID where regional breakdown of land occupancy data 
was absent41. Wood finds that agro-economic studies in the densely populated and 
fertile region of Comilla, conducted by the Bangladesh Academy for Rural 
Development (BARD), became the popular reference for much of these generalisations 
in early rural studies. These findings of Comilla district “formed the basis of 
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extrapolations for Bangladesh as a whole, providing an image of an homogenous 
agrarian structure described in terms of small holding farmers”42.  
If rural Bangladesh is not merely an undifferentiated peasant society, then to what 
extent does the social differentiation take the nature of social class? This question 
provoked intense discussion among scholars and political activists in Bangladesh. 
Looking at the large body of debate around the relevance of social class in analysing 
rural socio-economic dynamics in Bangladesh, I intend to present the principal 
premises of their arguments to set the background as we move into a discussion about 
the dynamics of social conditions in Borogram Village. I do not intend to present yet 
another elaborate discussion about these arguments, but a brief introduction to the main 
themes. Scholars such as Jahangir and Rahman, throughout their entire academic and 
scholarly careers, argued that without the concept of social class it would not be 
possible to understand rural relations in Bangladesh43. Though rural masses, as a class, 
remain immobilised, they form a group aware of the exploitations directed towards 
them by the local and non-local influential groups, the local rich, and their ‘corruptive 
practices’44. Class relations in rural communities appear ‘less real’ to outsiders as the 
rural rich intimidate the masses through their control over the land and local institutions 
and the caricature of the state’s development policies hide the repressive situation45.  
Some of the early anthropological works on the Bangladeshi rural structure have 
suggested that the idea of economic class is a ‘blunt’ instrument to understand the 
actual dynamics of social relations as it becomes insufficient to capture the ‘structural 
fragmentation’ that make up rural society in Bangladesh46. Peter Bertocci, for example, 
proposed viewing the social differentiation in rural Bangladesh in terms of 
stratification, i.e. categories of income, status and wealth, all of which determine social 
position. Bertocci’s analysis is based on a distinction between the economic basis of 
social structure (class) and status, a distinction proposed by Max Weber, through which 
he “correlate[d] economic indicators of class with non-economic, culturally significant 
markers of relative prestige or social rank”47. Bertocci explains his conceptual and 
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empirical position by referring to Weber, “Class distinctions are linked in the most 
varied ways with status distinctions. Property as such is not always recognised as a 
status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity.48” In two 
Bangladeshi villages, Bertocci found the relevance of this statement where class, 
wealth, power and status all move upward and downward through an interlinked 
process. Accumulation of land forms the basis of wealth, and key base for power, that 
goes through a regular pattern of rise and fall depending on various factors, such as 
seasonal adversity and the ability to accumulate money through lending activities. The 
upward and downward movement of wealth is accompanied by the assignment of status 
to a particular household, as is captured in this proverb, “Last year I was a jolaha 
(weaver), this year I have become sheikh, and if next year’s crops are good, I shall be 
syed”49, where jolaha, sheikh and sayed are progressively higher status titles. On the 
other hand, an economically degraded household, who previously belonged to higher 
status titles, are still readily recognised by the people as ‘real’, ashol, high status people 
and, thus, may enjoy the status of an arbiter. Alternatively, those who newly acquire an 
increased status title are often categorised as ‘so-called’, dak50. Other literature 
maintains Bertocci’s analysis arguing that affiliations of kinship and class cross-cut, 
and patron-client relations form a kind of ‘vertical’ solidarity that undermines the 
possibilities of solidarities on horizontal class lines51. For these writers, rural social 
relations in Bangladesh are structurally fragmented in a framework of status that 
“allows for the possibility of individual households occupying asymmetrical positions 
in different hierarchies – economic, lineage, ritual, education52.”  
In explaining the social relations of rural Bangladesh, Geoffrey Wood, who has had a 
long engagement with research and writings on Bangladesh, brings in a different 
analysis than the one presented by Bertocci. Wood differs first from the Webarian pre-
occupation with the concept of Bertocci’s structural fragmentation that prohibits any 
necessity of economic class position; and second, he found the perception of Marxian 
class in Bertocci’s analysis superficial as it assumed that a class position always and 
inevitably corresponds to a subjective awareness, or consciousness, of their exploited 
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condition. However, Wood maintained that the Marxian class concept was still relevant 
in understanding Bangladeshi rural society by arguing that class, as a concept, did not 
necessarily involve a state of collective action or consciousness that features in the 
conditions of more developed capitalism. He proposed looking for different forms and 
expressions of class relations in different regions of Bangladesh without taking 
consciousness and collective action as a necessary condition of class. In that way, class 
becomes a legitimate concept in understanding structural fragmentation, and this 
vertical relation becomes the form of class relations in specific realities, not an 
alternative. Considering the specific history of Bangladesh that constrained the 
development and proliferation of capital in the agricultural sector, Wood draws 
attention to the role of “unproductive capital” in understanding the realms of social 
relations. He observes that the colonial domination of West Pakistan during the 
Pakistan period restricted the capital accumulation process in East Pakistan, present 
Bangladesh, which equally defied the rural areas to draw capital in agricultural 
production. Other forms of unproductive capital, such as usurious money lending, 
different forms of land mortgages and leasing, sharecropping without capital 
investment, and shops and petty trading, characterised the history of rural economy. 
Social relations determined by these forms of capital feature in the rural social structure 
of Bangladesh. As Wood does not totally deny the presence of structural fragmentation 
or vertical solidarities, some later observations on the specific conditions of rural 
Bangladesh found that patron-client type solidarities are more prevalent than the 
solidarities that build along the lines of economic class53.  “Adaptation to, strategies 
for, coping with specific class position”54 are determined by the particularities of 
vertical connectedness.  
The other difference between the earlier and later analyses of agrarian relations in 
Bangladesh is that the former, in most cases, interpreted the social politics in terms of a 
rigid structure where the poor were caught in a varying extent within the power ‘net’ of 
the rural elite and where power was inflexibly deduced to the accumulation of, and 
control over, land. For example, Arens and Van Beurden, Jahangir, and Hartman and 
Boyce all consistently presented the agrarian structure in a rigid sense where the poor 
were always caught in the power of rural elite derived from unequal land ownership 
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and accompanying ‘pervasive’ patron-client relations55. While not disputing the evident 
presence of unequal and constraining land ownership patterns, and the obvious 
importance of this to analyse the local structure of relations, some later analyses 
indicated the emergence of alternative means for the rural player to negotiate within the 
established unequal social structure, thus, making the structure more flexible. 
“Agricultural reformation” initiatives in some rural areas during the 1980s and 1990s 
brought new opportunities for some to take on new livelihood strategies in a traditional 
land-based agricultural setting, as noted by Wood56. The range of new technologies, 
such as shallow tube-well irrigation, provided the means for some villagers to embark 
on alternative income sources thereby negotiating their dependency on land-based 
relations57.  
Lewis58, in the same line of analysis, showed how these new technologies often brought 
the rural poor, or the less powerful, into social and economic roles that challenged the 
land-based social relations. New opportunities were accompanied by new ‘rural roles 
and transactions’ that were injected into the processes of broader agrarian change 
towards a non-static social structure59. Bode60 presented evidence of this changing 
nature of the rural rich. He argues that from the 1980s onwards land is not the only 
defining factor in the composition of rural elite; instead a new wave of privatised 
venture for agricultural technologies took to the scene in the process of the 
accumulation of wealth creating a new group of rural business households. The socio-
political relations of villages are renegotiated by the introduction of these new 
households who involve themselves in the realms of political actions and networks, and 
matters involving philanthropic value. Some studies search for possibilities of 
solidarities between the elites and poor, pointing at the inadequacy of some of the 
earlier analyses to give attention to the conditions under which cooperation and 
collectivity occurs. Hossain61 invites exploration into this process “under which 
solidarity with poor become possible”.  
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The later analyses of the rural hierarchy as being more diverse and multi-linear have 
provided me with significant insights into the exploratory efforts in Borogram.  The 
history of land loss, subsequent migration, and the settling of a ‘new place’, particularly 
influenced the functioning of certain elements of the social structure, as is discussed in 
the previous section. These realities also affected aspects of the social hierarchy. In 
recalling his experiences of migration, one elderly resident of the village stated, “None 
of the people who were not affected by the river migrated here. Why would they? Its 
only us who lost everything came to this place. Most of us came here empty handed”. 
This testimony provides a picture of the economic condition of those early residents of 
the village. Indeed, it is a generally established fact that the people who migrated to this 
‘new place’ were either poor or plunged into poverty as a result of land loss. People 
whose land or livelihood were not shattered and had adequate means to make a living 
did not leave their homes; as such, the village was primarily established by people in a 
poor economic condition. This situation conditioned the limits of the roles of economic 
indicators in the establishment of hierarchical relations that express differential power 
and status, at least in the early days of settlement. A sense of solidarity between these 
people, who shared the loss of their livelihood, was emphasised in the protection of 
their presence in this ‘new place’ and their rights to the land. Apparent similarities in 
the economic situations of the people who established the village hindered the 
development of an economic-based social hierarchy in early days of the village. 
However, the economics of the village changed with time as people embarked on 
various livelihood initiatives and as the village expanded to accommodate an increased 
number of river-affected poor people. The motivation for migrating to this place was 
the availability of land, as was repeatedly mentioned during my stay in the village; “We 
didn’t know this place; we were hesitant to move to an unknown place, but we came 
here because of the possibility of having some land so that we could change our 
condition,” noted an early settler.  
People aspired to change their condition by acquiring agricultural land through clearing 
forests. A notion of landownership based on longer-term presence on the cleared forest-
land emerged, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.  Rather than wealth 
the amount obtained was dependent on a particular household’s workforce. Households 
with greater numbers of male members had a greater workforce and were therefore able 
to gradually clear larger forest area and produce more crops. Hard working individuals 
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were better equipped to establish their rights on larger amounts of land, as they were 
able to clear and cultivate larger areas. As a result, some households acquired more 
land than others and the crops produced there enhanced their ability to buy more land, 
thus, gradually improving their economic condition. Eventually landownership and 
disparities in economic abilities became a feature of Borogram. Households who had 
previously been poor soon possessed large amounts of land and became some of the 
biggest landholders in the village. While the possession of land was accompanied by 
power derived from associate premises based on land relations and the ability to 
employ wage labour, such as patron-client(ism), this did not automatically transform 
into power attached to social leadership. The functioning of Samaj and its leadership 
pattern, as discussed earlier, is one example of this. A range of factors has interfered 
with the structure of hierarchy and power relations.   
Though acquisition of land initially formed the basis of differential wealth and 
associated power, other forms of livelihood ventures later emerged bringing alternate 
means to assert power based on new lines of social relations. Observations on 
agricultural technologies and the associated social relations present in Borogram 
Village exemplify how different socio-economic groups express various types of 
power. Similar to the observations presented by Wood and Lewis on rural societies of 
Bangladesh, Borogram shows the presence of agri-technology based ventures that 
necessitate particular social relations. As previously mentioned, the village is located 
on a relatively higher land that requires a greater amount of irrigation for farming.  
Technologies for irrigation thus play an important role in the production process. If a 
landowner does not gain access to one of the shallow irrigation machines during the dry 
season his land will simply go uncultivated.  Those with large land holdings 
accumulate surplus money from the sale of their crops; this is then invested in the 
installation of irrigation machines used primarily to irrigate their own land. Some 
others install such machines as a business venture, providing irrigation services to 
peasants with small pieces of land and to those whose land is too far from the 
landowner’s own machines. This second group of machine owners do not come from 
the surplus land-owning group, rather they come from the group of medium or small 
landowners who mobilise money with the help of loans from credit service providers 
(NGOs). To overcome the issue of obtaining the initial capital required, two or three 
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people form a small group to install a machine with joint ownership. Relations between 
machine-owners and water-receivers are generally long-term relationships with 
seasonal agreements for payment and services. In addition, because a piece of land 
needs to be covered by a machine installed within a close proximity in order to be 
connected to the water channel and reduce water loss, certain lands are covered by 
certain machine owners for longer terms. This forms a basis of dependency for the 
water-receivers, as their access to water is fundamental to production, and, therefore, to 
their livelihood. In the process, machine owners acquire power to control the 
dimensions of the machine-owner - water-receiver relation. Allowing the exemption or 
delay of payment in the cases of crop loss due to seasonal calamities is subject to the 
machine-owners. The newly acquired power of the machine-owner’s to control the 
irrigation process is also articulated in their transactions with more affluent landowners 
who require irrigation services due to the location of their land. The machine-owners 
accumulate the money they have earned from their irrigation services to pay back any 
loans borrowed for their initial investment, as well as to strengthen their economic 
ability and invest in larger agricultural technologies, such as a tiller or mini-tractor.  
The story of Zakir Hossain62 of Borogram illustrates how lines of social 
relations emerge around irrigation technologies. Zakir is his father’s only son. 
He was only two when his father migrated to Borogram some forty years ago. 
Since his father was the only male in the family, he was unable to acquire much 
land, as clearing forest and farming require a workforce. His family possess a 
small amount of land close to his house where his father produces rice and 
vegetables for their own consumption. After meeting the food demands of the 
family there is hardly any surplus. Zakir was unable to go to school because he 
had to work with his father on their land. Ten years ago Zakir married and 
within three years he became the father of a girl and boy. The amount of land 
they possessed was never enough to make a living and after getting married and 
having children his situation worsened.  
To add to his struggles he had to give a portion of their produce as payment for 
the irrigation service they get during the dry season. The irrigation service, 
provided by a wealthy neighbour, was crucial for their food production because, 
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without adequate water during the dry season, their crops failed. In an incident a 
few years ago, the machine owner stopped providing water in the middle of the 
dry season after Zakir had a conflict with him over the payment. Zakir managed 
to get water from another machine, but with much higher payments due to the 
distance. After giving over the payment portion of their produce Zakir’s family 
was left without much for the rest of the year. Zakir was frustrated; he had to do 
something to overcome this situation. He always thought of buying an irrigation 
machine so that he could irrigate their land and earn extra money providing 
irrigation services to others, like his wealthy neighbour, but he never had 
surplus money to buy a machine. One of his friends in the village spoke about 
jointly buying a machine with a loan from Proshika, an NGO that provided a 
credit facility in the village. Zakir was unsure about taking a loan from this 
NGO because he was afraid of falling into debt. However, he was desperate to 
buy a machine as he no longer wanted to get water from another machine and 
wanted to try his luck to see if he could make a profit. He thought, since others 
in the village were making a good profit from the machine, why couldn’t he? 
He requested that his father sell his four cows, used to till the land, and give him 
the money to buy a machine jointly with his friend who would take loan from 
Proshika. He promised his father that he would hire a tiller to till the land with 
profit he gets from investing in the machine. 
He managed to get twelve thousand taka for selling the cows and installed a 
machine which they used to irrigate their own land, as well as for providing 
water services to others at a cost, including to Rahman Ali, one of the wealthier 
individuals in the village. Rahman Ali’s land was previously left uncultivated 
due to its distance from Rahman’s own irrigation system, but this land is located 
close to Zakir’s machine and thus conveniently irrigated. Rahman is now 
dependent of Zakir’s machine to be able to farm these lands.  
Control over irrigation technologies, as illustrated in Zakir’s story, results in the power 
to influence the relations built around them. Alternate means of livelihood 
opportunities, such as agricultural technology, signifies the dispersed nature of power 
in the social relations of Borogram.  
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Though a portion of individuals from a lower/middle economic category benefited from 
alternate livelihood strategies provided by investment in agricultural technology, the 
poorer individuals, such as agricultural labourers, did not seem to own these 
technologies. While there were a few cases where poor people joined together to install 
a machine, these need to be considered within the context of the general trend, as 
several factors influence poorer peoples ability to own agricultural technology. Those 
who make their living primarily as agricultural labourers go to the cities to work during 
the periods between harvesting seasons when there is a scarcity of work in the village. 
Phulbari Town is the closest place to find work without having to migrate from the 
village, allowing simultaneous cultivation of any land they may have. Through their 
experiences of periodic work in the town, they build relations with town people, which 
they then use to access facilities provided by the machine dealers to the buyers. For 
example, a person who works in a dealer’s shop as a labourer builds upon that relation 
to acquire a machine partially on loan. Similarly, someone who works periodically as a 
construction labourer in the town can use the recommendation of his friend who works 
for the dealer’s shop to get a machine on partial loan. The isolated incidences of 
irrigation machines installed by a group of peasants or agricultural labourers in 
Borogram were the result of the successful use of these kinds of links. Generally, in 
Borogram, the ownership of agricultural technology is beyond the ability of poor 
peasants whose access to water remains dependent on the machines installed by a few 
emerging agri-entrepreneurs.  
However, this does not mean that these new entrepreneurs posses such control and 
power over the production process that small producers become passive agents. Rather, 
because these are often business ventures on loans, a good number of clients, or water-
receivers, are essential for the success of the venture. A new machine installed nearby 
makes the situation highly competitive for machine-owners as they both try to attract as 
many as clients as possible. In these situations, the water-receivers gain power, as it is 
they who determine their preferences for a particular service-provider, thereby 
lessening their dependency on a particular machine and its owner. This is why affluent 
machine-owners do not form a class-type solidarity group, as they often must compete 
with one another in providing irrigation services.   
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2.5 Marriage relations  
Other village ethnographies in Bangladesh have elaborately described the role of 
lineage and status of the homestead, bongsho, and patrilineal kin groups, gusti, as 
important qualities in marriage relations63. As discussed earlier, historically, lineage 
and previous homestead status do not play a main role in the arrangements of 
differential social status in Borogram as the realities of migrating to a ‘new place’ 
introduced other influencing factors in this regard. Migration also fragmented kin 
groups and people had to rebuild their kin relations through marriage, in the absence of 
their kin members. The qualities of parties involved in marriage relations are 
considered on the basis of re-built socio-economic status. Rather than repeating the 
roles of different status as the qualities of marriage, I intend to present a changing 
scenario of marriage relations in Borogram.  
‘Why do you think I brought a bride for my sons from outside? People never used to do 
that. Now it’s becoming common. Do you know why?’ Kabir Bepari64, a senior 
resident of the village, rhetorically asked this question, not expecting an answer from 
an outsider with little or no knowledge of the ‘hidden’ realms in village social relations. 
He went on to explain that marriage in Borogram was traditionally arranged within the 
Chapai community. This was because of perceived socio-cultural differences between 
the migrated Chapai people and local people, who are seen as non-compliant for 
marriage relations. Migrated Chapai people are seen as coming from a different culture 
with cultural differences, such as accents and food preparation methods. For example, it 
was generally acknowledged that Chapai people used a greater amount of chillies in 
their curries and food when compared to those of the local people. Differences in 
dialects made the Chapai people unfamiliar to the locals. Also, because they migrated 
from a different district and settled on land considered government-owned, Chapai 
people were seen as temporary in the area and, thus, not suitable for marriage.  Having 
lived in the area for decades, Chapai people have now established their presence on the 
land and engaged in various social interactions with the local people, such as sharing 
the same mosque or gathering at a common hat, village market. In some cases, other 
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realities stimulated longer-term social relations such as marriage; this is exemplified in 
the case of Kabir Bepari.  
 Like many others, Kabir Bepari migrated to Borogram after losing his land and home 
to the river. Before being affected by the river, he had owned just enough agricultural 
land to make a living. However, after migrating to Borogram, he, assisted by the labour 
of his sons, gradually became one of the largest landholders in the village. Kabir Bepari 
and his three sons invested all of their efforts and time into the maintenance and 
cultivation of their land, and, as a result, illiterate Kabir was unable to send his sons to 
the schools located in Phulbari Town. This became problematic for Kabir and his sons, 
as communication with city offices was often required in dealing with the complexities 
of maintaining possession of the land. For example, access to land offices is vital in the 
case of any land ownership dispute and communication with the electricity department 
is essential for connecting an irrigation machine to an electricity line. With little or no 
knowledge about these offices, or as to how things worked, Kabir Bepari looked to gain 
relatives who could provide his family with help and suggestions in dealing these 
matters. In pursuit of this strategy, Bepari decided to make relatives out of the local 
people and/or people of Phulbari in order to use their knowledge of town affairs and 
their local connections. As a well-off land owner Kabir acquired a higher economic 
status, which enabled him to arrange his son’s marriages with brides from local 
households. These changing marriage patterns are an expression of the people of 
Borogram’s continuing efforts to strengthen their presence. Marriage relations with 
local people are seen as a strategy to expand social networks and strengthen social 
relations that can be used to negotiate difficulties.  
Conclusion  
The discussion in this chapter has focused on some of the salient features of social 
relations in Borogram. I have discussed how people, forced by the river erosions and 
subsequent land loss from another northern district of Bangladesh, migrated to the new 
place and established their ‘new’ village. The residents of Borogram were popularly 
known as the Chapai people in the surrounding village as they came from the 
Chapainawabganj district. Migrating from the same district and the shared Chapai 
identity formed the basis of building a ‘community’, which the people Borogram called 
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the Chapai Samaj. The essence of Samaj is the collective membership of the 
community. It works as a cognitive idea with its enabling and restricting functions. 
While the functioning of Samaj depends on the mutual cooperation and the relations of 
trust and faith, it also work as a cognitive idea to restrict people from breaking 
traditional, social and religious norms. Social events such as Bichar are administered in 
cases of a breach of the norms or in mitigating social conflicts. The social institutions, 
such as the Mosque, maintain social networks. Despite internal divisions of various 
kinds, people of Borogram form a social network in the form of the Chapai Samaj.  
Social networks of this kind are emphasized in discussions of social capital in rural 
Bangladesh65. In these discussions, the multi-transactional ties that feature in the 
‘communities’ have been connected to the discourse of social capital. As they suggest, 
social capital works around various lines of ‘personalised networks’66, a feature of 
Chapai Samaj.  
The social hierarchies in Borogram are diverse and multi-linear in that no particular 
group possesses absolute power over the others. Rather then lineage or wealth, social 
leadership is determined by other factors, such as knowledge about the out side world 
or the role played and time committed by one to Samaj activities. The particular history 
of Borogram means that the people who migrated to the ‘new place’ came, as stated by 
one elderly resident, ‘empty handed’. The degree of the workforce of a family to clear 
forest land made a difference in the amount of land accumulated by that family, which 
resulted in differential wealth and associated power.  People also acquired alternate 
means of livelihood, such as irrigation technology, to assert power based on new lines 
of social relations. Within the multiple lines of social relations people assert certain 
amounts of power from their own position. Marriage relations are an example of how 
people extend their social networks. The threat of displacement from the mining 
company adds value to the importance of social relations; this is discussed further in 
the next chapter. 
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          Chapter Six 
   Part One 
           Rootedness, place and Social Politics 
Outline  
Following the last chapter’s explanation of the social features and history of Borogram, 
Part One of this chapter deals with the socio-political complexities that are attached to 
the notion of resistance in the village. The first section discusses how patterns and local 
notions of land ownership play a significant role in forming denials to proposals of 
displacement as a result of the development plan of the mine. The second section 
presents ethnographic evidence that shows how some ‘inner’1 aspects of everyday 
social relations and unexpressed anxieties of a ‘private nature’2 characterise resistance 
to mining.  The last section shifts focus to Phulbari town, the centre of organised 
protests in the area, to discuss how differential, and sometimes conflicting, aspirations 
and interests of different groups feature in the development of the movement.    
1. Claims over land  
This section is focused primarily on land ownership patterns in Borogram and how the 
local notion of land rights and official procedures of identifying land owners for any 
possible compensation led to tension and conflict where negotiations for the mine were 
originally taking place.  
“Por khaoa goru shidure megh dekhle dorai” (a cow which has been through/in a house 
fire is frightened by the sight of a red cloud/sunset) — this is the expression used by 
one of the older residents of Borogram village to voice his reason for resisting the 
proposed mine project in the area.  
The village and agricultural lands gradually expand over two main types of land, 
popularly categorized as ‘Kagojer jomi’ and ‘Khas jomi’. The meaning behind these 
two types of land takes multiple lines in regards to who is talking about the land, from 
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what socio-political experience, and for what purpose. The movement against mining is 
greatly intensified by the perceived ownership character of these lands and its 
implications on the people who are to be displaced. In ‘local’ terms, ‘Kagojer jomi’ 
refers to land whose owner has a deed in their possession, while ‘Khas jomi’ are those 
lands possessed without an ownership document; ownership that is established by the 
value of efforts put into the land over the years to transform it from a forest to 
cultivable land.  The local terms “Kagojer jomi’ and an insider’s’ assertion of ‘Khas 
jomi’ becomes much more complicated as the village embarks on the movement 
against mining. Contestation between the rights that the village people have established 
over the land and the possibility that these rights may be denied by the State’s legal 
system or the Company’s compensation mechanism, plays a significant role in the 
spread of the movement in Borogram village.   
In Bangladesh, Khas land generally connotes government-owned land; thus, all 
government-owned agricultural and non-agricultural land, including forest, is Khas 
land. This also applies to common bodies of water, such as rivers. The Ministry of 
Land of the Government of Bangladesh is the authority to manage these lands as per 
state legislation. The policy of the Independent Bangladeshi government recognised 
that Khas land was to be used by the poor, and declared that people who were landless 
and affected by factors such as river erosions, had the right to be allocated Khas land. 
The Land Reforms Action Programme of 1987, implemented by the Bangladeshi 
government, is one such example where landless people’s right to be allocated Khas 
land was prioritized. The propagation of these initiatives created a public discourse that 
supported the relocation of people affected by river erosions, and/or landless people on 
Khas land. In fact, there were some government projects in Phulbari sub-district where 
landless people were resettled in the area and provided with Khas land and ‘tiner 
ghor’3. People in Borogram Village, who were forced from their earlier homes due to 
repeated river erosions, resettled in the new place; land which they perceived as Khas 
land, and where they assume and assert their rights on the land. The public discourse of 
Khas land created an expectation that the landless and displaced people could relocate 
to these government owned lands. While searching for an appropriate area to be 
relocated to, the elderly members of the village were looking for an area where they 
could find Khas land; the availability of forest land, which is perceived as Khas Land, 
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attracted them to Phulbari. One of the elderly villagers who were part of the group that 
first migrated to Borogram states,  
“The Government has given Phulbari land to other landless people. Why can’t 
we live on the government’s forest land? River erosions made us landless. Why 
is the government’s land left idle and we can’t use it? Lots of other people from 
our home district have moved to Dinajpur area and they are living in the 
government land. We have heard that government gives away Khas land to the 
poor. So why can’t we get land?” 
He challenges the idea of keeping forest-land in the hands of the forest department 
when they are using crops from this land to feed the country. He continued: 
“The corrupt forest officials eat up all the benefits that the country could get 
from this forest land. They collaborate with local wood thieves and sell all the 
trees, and they lease out the forest land in breach of the law and destroy the 
forests any way.”  
He rationalized their possession and rights on the land as he recollected: 
“During our initial migration forest officials threatened to sue us. One day I told 
a forest officer who came to visit the area that we were producing crops for the 
country in this infertile land. I told him that if he could prove that the 
government earned more from this forest than what we were producing we 
would leave this land. The officer couldn’t answer me.”  
The long and arduous efforts put into this land by people who have turned this 
apparently uncultivable area into cultivable land add to their assertion of their rights to 
the land: 
“I proposed to my neighbours that I knew a place where we could find land to 
live. Initially I brought 20 to 25 people in Borogram to clear forests for building 
houses and for agriculture. Some of them went back as they found it very hard 
to clear forests and prepare it for agriculture. It was tough because the land was 
high and hard and needed a lot of irrigation for agriculture. At that time there 
were no irrigation machines. We all worked very hard for some years on each 
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piece of land that you see fertile today. No one thought of cultivating here until 
we came and worked so hard. It is no more government’s forest land; it is now 
our agricultural land.” [An elderly dewani (social leader) who took the initiative 
to first establish Borogram village] 
The suffering and harassment faced by the elderly villagers to protect their possession 
of the land during the initial period of establishment enhances their claim over the land. 
Dewani continued: 
“…Look, there were hardly any nights we could sleep without fear of police in 
the early days of the village. Forest officials sued us and filed cases against a 
number of village people. I, along with many others, was arrested and harassed. 
I spent more than one year in the prison. We suffered but we didn’t leave this 
land. The land you see today didn’t come to us easy.”  
These testimonies describe the ways in which people assume and assert their rights 
over an area of land and how they make it their own, even though it was originally 
government land. However, the threat of displacement as a result of the development of 
the proposed mine forced people to re-think their strategies to claim and protect their 
rights over the land. This was followed by their observations of how state land 
legislation, and official and/or ‘unofficial’ elements, could proceed in formal 
procedures of settling land ownership and compensation. These observations were 
frightening and the stories of displacement were worrisome for the people.  
The experiences of land and compensation issues in an on-going coal mine in 
Baropukuria, a neighbouring coal mining area, caused the people of Borogram to feel 
threatened by the possibility of displacement without receiving much compensation for 
land which they feel they have ‘owned’ for years. The Boropukuria coal mine is located 
in Chowhati village under Parbatiur sub-district in Dinajpur district of Bangladesh4 and 
is about six kilometres from Borogram village, and roughly five kilometres from 
Phulbari town centre. Boropukuria coal mine is an underground coal mine, where coal 
is extracted from underground without displacing surface soils. It is fully owned by a 
state owned company and operated by Chinese contractors with a consultancy from a 
British consulting firm. The coal was first discovered in 1985 and the operation started 
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in 1998. The development of the mine affected the land and livelihood of the local 
people. The life stories and miseries experienced by affected people are shared and 
discussed in everyday village life. One of the many stories is of Nasimon Khatun,   
Nasimon Khatun lived with her husband, seven sons and three daughters of 
different ages in an area where the offices and other structures of Boropukuria 
coal mine were constructed. Her husband owned enough agricultural land in the 
present mine office complex to meet their expenditure and save money for the 
future by selling crops. They never had to buy their main food, which was rice, 
from the market, as their land produced adequate rice to meet their family 
needs. In addition, they cultivated vegetables in between the rice seasons to sell 
in the market in order to accumulate money for a crisis period or to manage a 
financial crisis in case of rice production failure due to natural calamities. 
Seasonal fruits from the trees were also sold in the village market to add to their 
savings for a crisis period. They had a pond that was used to raise chickens and 
ducks, which fed them and their family guests with eggs and meat. Cows were 
raised on the homestead to plough the agricultural land, along with goats, to 
raise and sell to earn extra money. Overall, Nasimon’s family was considered 
by the village to be well off. 
The discovery of coal and the development of the Baropukuria mine followed a 
series of soil drilling and other geological survey activities in Chowhati and 
surrounding villages. Several national and foreign groups of surveyors started 
soil drilling work and other survey activities on Nasimon’s land and other land 
in the village well before the actual mine established itself in the early 1990’s. 
There were rumours in the village that coal was discovered and they would be 
given lots of money if they were to be displaced from their land due to the mine 
development, but no one knew for sure what was going on. Then one day a 
survey group came to Nasimon’s house and took some information about their 
land and assets, and promised that the family would be given good 
compensation if the mine company had to take their land. They believed them. 
Meanwhile, Mrs. Nasimon’s husband died of an illness before the mine was 
established leaving her with the seven children. Then, one day, after some time 
had passed, a group of labourers from the mine arrived at her home and, in the 
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presence of police, started to cut trees from their land. Nasimon and her sons 
rushed to try to stop them as they hadn’t received any compensation for the 
land. They were told that the company had acquired the land and they would be 
given proper compensation following the official procedures. The police took 
Nasimon and her eldest son to the police station where Nasimon denied giving 
permission for the company people clear that piece of land. Nasimon and her 
son were released the next day under the promise that they would not try to 
hinder the process of land acquisition. They were assured that the government 
would pay proper compensation for all the land to be acquired. After this 
incident they didn’t try to stop the acquisition of land for fear of getting taken 
away by the police. A few months later they had to leave their house and all of 
their land and move to a small piece of land in the village owned by one of their 
relatives. Because they didn’t have space to keep and raise their cows, goats, 
chickens, and ducks in the new land, they had to sell their animals.  
Then began the ‘official’ process of getting compensation, which neither 
Nasimon nor her illiterate sons were familiar with. Nasimon couldn’t read or 
write and never went to the district town where the land office, which was 
responsible for settling land compensation issues, was located. It was no 
different for her sons. Soon after they were displaced, a high-up official from 
the district administration office came to the village and asked for a bribe with a 
promise of giving proper compensation quickly. Nasimon was living on her tiny 
savings that her husband had left and didn’t have money to bribe the officer. 
After this, her eldest son with a few other affected villagers went to the district 
land office to claim their compensation. There, they were asked for a 500 taka 
(£5) bribe in order to get the list of documents required to submit a 
compensation application; this was on top of the 200 taka (£2) they had incurred 
to get there. In this one visit half of the family’s total monthly grocery 
expenditure was gone. It was only the first of many visits that her son had to 
make for settling compensation matters.  
The ownership and legal documents required by the land office were unfamiliar 
for Nasimon and her son. When Nasimon’s husband originally acquired the 
land, it was equally verbally divided by him and his brother after the death of 
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their father without making any legal documents; a normal practice in the 
village. The land office requested proof that Nasimon was actually the wife of 
the landowner in addition to a recommendation from an elected representative 
of the local government, the Union Chairman, to prove it. Further complicating 
matters, they required that Nasimon’s husband’s brother be present in front of 
the land officer to prove land ownership. These are some of the complexities 
that kept arising while they were trying to get their compensation, without much 
success. The land office was settling the case by the official land holding 
numbers where Nasimon’s lands were dispersed in different holding numbers. 
Thus, each full procedure had to be followed for every field in each of the 
holding numbers.  Nasimon and her son ran out of money for lobbying for the 
compensation forcing them to give up after receiving a couple of instalments. 
Whatever money they did get, was received in instalments at a rate determined 
by the land office, which was much lower than the usual market prices. The 
land office determined the price according to the average price mentioned in the 
land registration document from that village, which was always lower than the 
actual price at which lands are bought/sold in practice. Mentioning lower prices 
in the registration document to evade registration tax payable to the government 
was a normal practice in the village. Moreover, getting compensation in 
instalments didn’t create enough capital to buy land elsewhere. Money was 
spent in lobbying the land office and on other everyday purposes.  All of 
Nasimon’s seven sons are now married with a total of twelve grandchildren, all 
of who live together with separate ‘Chula’5 in a one decimal land.  Her illiterate 
sons turned to agricultural labour and the family now belongs to the poor 
segment of the village.  
I have collected this story through repeated discussions, interviews, and informal chats 
with Nasimon and her family, as well as other village members. The impossibility of 
acquiring compensation for their land and the denial of rights over land by the ‘formal’ 
procedures are blowing in the wind of Borogram village in the form of evening chats at 
the village tea stalls, in the local market, and in village meetings organised by Phulbari 
activists of the NC. Formal procedures of settling land acquisition and ownership cases, 
as demonstrated in Nasimon’s life history, threaten the Borogram peoples’ rights over 
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Khas land. These rights over this land have been acquired via physical labour, and is 
perceived, and acknowledged, by the people in surrounding areas who have observed 
the occupant’s long-standing efforts and struggles with the land. Their relatively secure 
land possession has now become volatile and “insecure”6 by the possibility of 
displacement by another mining company. They are now always under threat of the 
similar ‘procedures’ that Nasimon had to follow to prove her right over her land. 
 “….if owner of ‘Kagojer jomi’ can’t claim their rights over their land and get proper 
compensation how would people living in Khas jomi claim their rights? We just cannot 
allow mining to take place in our land.” - Karim in Borogram village, ‘owner’ of two 
acres of Khas land.  Resistance to mining is evident as Barrington Moore notes, “what 
infuriates peasants (and not just peasants) is a new and sudden imposition or 
demand…that is a break with accepted rules”7 
Kagojer jomi, on the other hand, also has various ownership patterns depending on the 
ways in which they were owned. Generally the term ‘Kagojer jomi’, or ‘documented 
land’, is used to indicate land that was not acquired by clearing the forest and whose 
ownership was documented. A stronger sense of ownership rights over these types of 
land are asserted as these lands are either bought from previous owners or made 
socially ‘legal’. The process that makes a land Kagojer jomi is attached to the means 
and ways the lands are transferred, sold and exchanged, and the ways that the new 
ownership is legitimized in the village. Several forms of land transfer processes are 
practiced in Borogram, none of which necessarily involve the official land transfer 
processes of the State. Regardless of ownership history, a land becomes Kagojer jomi if 
the seller and the buyer sign a paper that indicates the selling terms and price. The 
presence of witnesses during the deal makes it stronger in the face of any possible 
disputes, which are usually dealt with in the village Bichar, an informal village court. 
The ‘legality’ of ownership is defined by the socially legitimate rights of an individual 
owner of the land in line with factors such as inheritance. Land owned by a 
neighbouring villager that has a socially accepted history of official ownership is often 
not challenged by the new buyers. It is common practice in the village to transfer land 
ownership with verbal and/or written terms set between the buyers and the sellers, 
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where the Bichar guards the deals and settles the cases of disputes. New buyers carry a 
particular land’s socially established history of legality. The land is, thus, always called 
Kagojer jomi regardless of the number of times the ownership has changed. This notion 
of land ownership builds on the internalities of long-standing land relations, which are, 
people believe, beyond the scope of the official procedures of identifying a landowner 
for any possible compensation. “I bought this land with my hard earned money. 
Everyone knows it. But how will I prove it to the officers? I never went to the land 
office” - Local landowner.  
2.  
“In a new place I will have to live with my head down”:  
Anxiety breaks out  
This section will discuss how local resistance is inspired by some concerns and 
anxieties of a ‘private’ nature that often remain unexpressed in public forums of 
protests in the village. I examine how the lived experiences within social groups, such 
as the ‘Samaj’, and the observed ‘good’ qualities of the ‘community’ plays a role in 
forming the resistance to the threat of displacement.  
While land, assets, and a house all were noted as quantifiable units by which an amount 
of money could be fixed as compensation by the impact assessment team of the Asia 
Energy, these also carry other meanings to the people of Borogram in unquantifiable 
terms. These aspects are not readily open to the ‘outsider’ surveyor, and are much more 
complicated than something that can be compensated.  In the realms of village life, 
ownership of land represents ‘Samman’ which brings people social leadership and 
pride. A house is more than just a living place; it is a ‘home’ built upon generational 
community relations. Displacement from land and house means the loss of ‘home’ and 
community. Loss of community means loss of ‘Samman’ that was earned over years. 
Previous experiences of migration compound the trepidations of losing a ‘home’.  
Within rural Bangladesh, ‘home’ is represented, as Gardner8 shows, with a kind of 
spiritual relation that is based on cherished social connections along with economic 
insecurity and struggles in everyday life. ‘Away’ is viewed as a place of opportunities 
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and economic prosperity. Despite the presence of a pull factor for the spiritual bondage 
at ‘home’, migrating ‘away’, to Britain for example, is seen as a strategy to bring 
material success. The process of migration accompanies a continuous exchange 
between, and an uneasy coexistence of, images of ‘home’ and ‘away’. As Gardner 
perfectly quotes the words of a village women’s song: “How can I accept that my 
husband has gone to London? When my brother goes to London…He will make a 
blouse for me”9. Arguments presented by Gardner are based on the cases of 
international migration and migration processes that have a long history of bringing 
material fortunes. Enhanced land buying power has been brought to family members 
back home through the supply of remittances from the migrants who have gone away10, 
while land-loss remains a common phenomenon for others in similar areas and 
elsewhere in Bangladesh11. Aspiration for material fortunes acts as a pull factor for this 
kind migration, but past experiences and factors that characterised the migration 
process of Borogram people from their earlier home is different in many ways from this 
kind of migration12.  
This is expressed in some way by the testimony of an elderly village resident as stated 
at the beginning of this chapter. Stories of migration are of losing homes, land, 
‘Samman’, ‘protipotti’ (pride), and the struggle of making a new home. Repeated river 
erosions resulted in total land loss, forcing migration, and causing homelessness and 
economic insecurities. The life story of Dewani is one such example. 
Dewani was a mobile trader and supplier of ornaments and stones during the 
1960’s before the independence of Bangladesh. He travelled the entire north-
Bengal area often for his business and earned enough money to buy over 20 
acres of land in his village in Chapainawabgang in north-Bengal. His brothers 
also had a considerable amount of land, some of which was owned hereditarily. 
He and his brothers enjoyed social leadership and gave final verdicts in 
mitigating village conflicts. Having earned knowledge about the outside world 
from his small business, he enjoyed the respect of other villagers.  
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migration is associated with uncertainties of livelihood options in the new place.  
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The River Padma was five kilometres from their village, but it made its way to 
the village in just a few months. Most of Dewani’s agricultural land, including 
his house, like many others in the village, sunk into the river. In just a few 
months time he became homeless with his five children and wife. He moved to 
his brother’s land whose land was further away from the river and built a 
makeshift house to live in. Having lost almost all of his land, Dewani lost his 
ability to hire people to work on his land. Hit by river erosions landless people 
were desperately looking for work and Dewani was busy looking for additional 
work outside the village to maintain his family. He was no longer a leader of the 
village that had been hit by food and work crises due to the river erosions. 
People started to move to neighbouring districts in search of work. Many left 
for cities to pull rickshaws, which was considered disgraceful work. While 
travelling for his business Dewani started to look for a place to migrate as living 
on his brother’s land was also considered shameful. He chose to migrate to what 
is now Borogram village.  He initially came with twenty-five other villagers 
affected by the river. Many others of a similar economic condition followed 
them in order to build a new village. He left his mother with his brothers in 
Chapainawabganj, his former village, as she didn’t want to move from her 
home village. 
The case of Dewani would be best described as forced displacement, which resulted in 
a degraded socio-economic status and the loss of the ‘forms of social capital’13. The 
separation from ‘home’ and land loss implies not only the loss of physical capital but 
also the loss of social capital such as ‘Samman’. The process that followed was of 
regaining his socio-economic position in a new place. Though he left his brothers and 
mother in his former village, a new sense of home was built through a long process that 
was “related and intertwined” in the process of collective struggles and cooperation, as 
well as events of conflicts14.  People of Borogram migrated from a couple of 
neighbouring villages in Chapainawabganj, some of whom are known or related to each 
other, while some are not, but they share the experiences of trauma and rupture of river 
erosions, which shape the ‘collective memories’ of displacement in Borogram and add 
value to the ‘new place’.  
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, the hardships of the early days in the ‘new’ 
forest land demanded that the people work together and co-operate with each other. 
People helped each other to clear their pieces of land, as it was impossible to do it 
alone. Building new houses also required the help of others. Working together helped 
to bring previously unknown people together to form a society. Visits from forest 
officials and arrests by the police were regular events which were handled by bribing 
officials with money raised proportionately from all residents according to the amount 
of land cleared. Members of the village who were considered clever and/or relatively 
educated conducted negotiations with officials and were then regarded as ‘Dewans’, or 
social leaders.  
They also needed to act together in order to guard their crops and cattle from thieves 
from neighbouring localities as they were, being outsiders and thus vulnerable, targets. 
Lacking social connections with other local villages around them, the people of 
Borogram had to help each other to protect their crops and assets. They formed a group 
to patrol in the night to prevent thefts and new family relations were built through 
marriages between families. As the village expanded and the number of people 
increased, disputes and conflicts within the village also increased. Land disputes, 
family conflicts, and competition for control of resources, such as irrigation systems, 
are some examples of the social tensions in Borogram village. To manage the 
increasing differences between groups, a group of new ‘Dewans’ were declared by the 
elderly Dewans to mange conflicts and disputes for their respective clusters of people 
living in different corners of the village. All these social processes continue to build a 
feeling of ‘samaj’ (home, society and societal relations) in Borogram, which were 
expressed again and again whenever the issues of displacement came up during my stay 
in the village.     
While a house can be built overnight and replaced by another one, a home cannot be. It 
is this social and cultural dimension that is inseparable from a sense of home15 and 
cannot be compensated in the case of displacement by the development of a mine. As 
one village shopkeeper questioned, “…say they will give us a new house…but how will 
they give us our Samaj that we have built here?”  
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More than a home, new social capital built through shared experiences of displacement, 
struggle over land and cooperation in the ‘new place’ plays a role in forming the 
extreme anxiety experienced by the possibility of dislocation by the mining company. 
Though away from their original home village, this ‘new place’ brought them what 
they lost in Chapainawabganj; land and Samaj. It ended the homelessness that was 
characterised by the disgrace of living on others land, creating “new experiences and 
ways of thinking”16 about the value of Samaj. The early experiences of living in a ‘new 
place’ away from the original ‘home’ accompanied anxieties of being ‘new’ to the 
place. Stories are told by the elderly generation of Borogram of how, in the early days, 
they felt frightened by the neighbouring villagers in cases of conflicts over land, as they 
were isolated in the ‘new place’ and did not have much support from other villages. 
Stories are also common of how the muggers from the neighbouring villages kept the 
early residents of Borogram in fear of theft and robbery, as the group was too small to 
resist and did not have much help from outside the village. These stories influence the 
way people anticipate the effect of dislocation and the loss of Samaj, as is evidenced by 
the worries of one Borogram resident, “If I am displaced to a place where I don’t know 
anyone I will have to live with my head down.” 
How will I fit into a new place? This question expresses a “more private, personalized, 
or idiosyncratic”17 worry in contrast to public concerns that are discussed and talked 
about openly. The concerns expressed in the previous quotes are of a more public 
nature and are talked about more openly, while male anxieties about the security of the 
female members of their family are of private nature. Living within their own village 
where people are either related or known to each other for a long time provides a sense 
of security for the women and girls. In the absence of the male members of the family, 
relatives or friends next door are there to make the women feel secure. It is common for 
poor male members of Borogram to work outside of the village and Phulbari town 
between harvesting seasons when there is scarcity of work in the village, leaving the 
women and girls at home. Some go to other districts and towns to work for weeks at a 
time, leaving their family in the village. Any cases of harassment towards women are 
dealt with through the Bichar, and persons responsible are punished verbally, 
physically, or/and with fines, according to the degree of the harassment. Living in a 
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Samaj provides people with security for the female members of their family and allows 
them to work outside of the village during crisis periods.  
There are other concerns of a private nature that are not expressed explicitly in regular 
public forums, such as village meetings organised by the local activists. It is only 
through longer interactions with the people that more subtle concerns are revealed. One 
aspect of this concerns the informal financial institutions in the village. Access to 
informal and semi-formal credit facilities is an integral part of village life in Borogram, 
like elsewhere in Bangladesh18. Started during the 1970s with the innovations of 
Grameen Bank and its founder Professor Younus, the collateral free village group-
based semi-formal small loans and savings facility has become the main financial 
service system in all of rural Bangladesh. Along with big national social developments, 
non-governmental organisations and hundreds of small local NGOs provide small 
credit facilities in the villages. Village solidarity groups are formed to guarantee the 
repayment of loans taken by any individual and to create peer pressure in cases of 
default. It is now well established that this system of credit has become extremely 
popular in all villages in Bangladesh, as is evident by annual reports produced by some 
of the big players of credit providers19. Borogram is no exception, with a number of 
local and national NGOs providing small loans to villagers. However, a closer look at 
the financial behaviours of Borogram’s people reveals a contrasting picture of how and 
why people in the village, in certain cases, prefer other forms of credit that are more 
informal in nature and attached to the realms of social relations, despite the presence of 
numerous credit providers.  
Moneylenders still play a role in Borogram’s financial market even where NGOs 
provide credit at a relatively lower interest rate. Some aspects of the financial 
behaviours of poor people are visible to moneylenders, and are thus better 
communicated than by the financial institutions. The need for money for the poor in 
Borogram is related to the specificities of the village. As the village is a high land area, 
its timing and pattern of agricultural production is a little different than that of flat land 
areas. As we have seen it needs more irrigation than flatter land for rice production in 
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the dry seasons creating a high demand of loans among the poor during the month prior 
to irrigation. Since rice production is costly due to extensive irrigation, alternative 
crops, such as corn, are widely produced in the village. The timing of corn production 
is different than rice production, which is generally the main crop in the area, and so is 
the need for loans to meet the cost of production. Local moneylenders have local 
knowledge about the trends of loans needed in the village, in addition to the experience 
of when to provide loans and to ask the money back.  
With these needs, and the trends of poor borrowers, local moneylenders provide 
flexible loans before production and require repayment right after harvesting when 
people do not mind paying higher interest. The generic criteria for acquiring a loan and 
the setting of schedules to maintain repayment disciplines fixed by the NGOs cannot 
meet the specific financial needs and repayment behaviours of the borrowers of 
Borogram. In addition, membership of the same Samaj plays the role of collateral for 
moneylenders and borrowers where default cases are negotiated using long term social 
relations. The membership of Samaj also provides the borrower with the facility of 
getting a loan without following any fixed procedures and time criteria, which are set 
by credit organisations during emergency need. Moneylenders often live next door to 
the borrowers and are related to the borrowers through secondary or tertiary lines of 
kinship which can be used to convince moneylenders to lend money to people with bad 
repayment histories. Moreover, it is common in Borogram to repay a loan and interest 
with the equivalent portion of the crops produced in the land, creating an option for the 
borrowers who do not want the hassle of going to Phulbari town to sell their crops, or 
who do not feel confident of getting the proper price for their crops in an unknown 
town market. They have enough helping hands in the village to weigh their crops 
properly and give the lender his portion back. Loans often come in kind and take very 
tiny forms such as a bowl of rice on a day when the main earner is not working due to 
sickness, or few eggs to treat relatives making a sudden visit. The entire financial life in 
the village revolves around a mechanism that is rooted in the qualities of Borogram 
Samaj. A breakdown of that Samaj poses a particular threat to the poor in need of 
credit, as one of the poorest farmers in the village noted, 
“People who have money will buy new land and build new houses in the 
cities…but where will we go…. In a new place who will lend us money in an 
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emergency, say, if I need to take my wife to hospital? No one trusts the poor. 
Here, people know that I will not run away with their money. I can at least ask 
for some rice from next door when I don’t have food in the house. I will at least 
not die from hunger here...I go to protest meetings regularly” 
Newly developed economic abilities and social statuses, for some, through the 
acquisition of land in Borogram, also plays a role in forming resistance to the possible 
displacement from mining. A few members of the village acquired large amounts of 
land, as the result of being early settlers to the village when there was more land 
available to clear and establish rights to. Possession of such land provided them with 
the capacity to employ poor villagers to work on their land, thus gaining them a higher 
social status in the village. Increased economic capacity allowed some to invest money 
into better institutions in the cities for their children’s education thereby further 
enhancing their social status. One such villager states: 
“I might be illiterate but my sons are educated… people respect my sons, they 
come for suggestions and help for different matters. People respect me.”  
This enhanced socio-economic status, which has been attained over the years, is now 
under threat due to the proposed mining; money will not buy the status he has gained. 
He continues, 
“… I will just be another person in a new place! There would be lot of other 
people with a lot more money than me. Who would give me so much land in a 
new place? People won’t give a damn if I can’t employ a person or two. What 
will I do with the money? I am not going anywhere from this place…they can 
do whatever they want.”  
What will I do with the money? This question builds on other ‘inner’ and unexpressed 
areas of disquiet. Bangladesh is a country with more than eighty percent of its total 
household engaged in agricultural activities20 and numerically dominated by its 
peasantry21. Historically, agriculture is the main occupation for people in Bangladesh22 
and Borogram is no exception with most of its resident’s dependant on generational 
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skills of agriculture for their livelihood. From wage labour to petty landowners, all 
members invest and re-invest their labour, skills, and money into land-related 
production activities. Whatever surplus money is earned from other seasonal 
occupations, such as short-term migration to the cities, tends to be invested back into 
the village to better equip themselves for production, such as buying cows to plough the 
land. Savings accumulated by selling the surplus crops of larger landowners is usually 
re-invested into buying more land or production equipment, such as an irrigation 
machine. Small amounts of money accumulated from petty trading in the village 
market, along with some credit taken from lenders, are used to attain a piece of land on 
a fixed yearly or seasonal rent from a neighbour in order to maximize savings by 
producing cash crops. Money use patterns revolve around land and production-related 
activities. Promises by the company and the government for equivalent money for land 
and assets are received with uneasy anxiety because of people’s relative inexperience of 
using compensation money with good effect in the case of displacement, as is 
expressed by one participant, 
“… money doesn’t stay in your pocket. A king’s treasury would be finished if 
you can’t use it properly.  Agriculture is all I know. There is no readymade land 
waiting for me to be bought. The money they will give me for my assets will go 
out of pocket quickly”   
Even when people actually believe that they would get a sum of money for their land 
and assets, the specific patterns and experiences, or inexperiences, of money-use forms 
this subtle denial to the proposals of mining. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen land rights have been a key factor in the history of struggles. The 
particular notion of land ownership in Borogram also plays a critical role in forming the 
local movement against mining. While the local land category of Kagojer jomi is 
owned through the socially defined ‘legal’ means, Khas land, on the other hand, is 
possessed through the presence of the occupier and the value of the long hard work that 
has been invested in the land to make it cultivable. Rights to Khas land are acquired 
and earned over periods of struggle to protect and nurture the land. The owners of these 
lands find their moral authority to possess the land in the government’s declared 
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commitment to landless people. The proposal of displacement by the mining 
development plan, as experiences from a neighbouring mine field have shown, means 
that the unfamiliar official procedures of identifying land ownership would defy their 
acquired land rights. Their past experiences of becoming landless add to their resistance 
to the mine.  
On a more private level, anxieties related to the loss of Samaj, characterised by 
generational social relations, act to form resistance to the mine. Conflicts for the control 
of and access to resources and the desire for ‘Samman’ are negotiated, while 
cooperation to protect the crops from thieves and unity to win land disputes with other 
villagers are enforced by the “good qualities”23 of Samaj. “Personal and 
idiosyncratic”24 aspects of individuals, which are not expressed and talked about 
openly, such as the concern for the security of the female members of the family in a 
new place, enforce the importance of not losing Samaj. Contrary to the apparent 
success of the rural credit facility programme of the non-governmental organisations, 
people’s specific credit needs and repayment behaviours are better served by local 
village moneylenders. A particular pattern and timing of crop production in the village 
presents specific credit needs for the poor which are understood better by relatives or 
friends in the village who are involved in moneylending.  
The multi-transactional ties in Chapai Samaj produces certain ‘social resources’ for the 
individuals in the form of “kin, status and inclusion in networks, comprising 
obligations and entitlements”25. The anxieties of losing these social resources provoke 
resistance to the mine in Borogram.  The possibility of losing Samaj, created by the 
proposals of mine development, poses a particular threat to the poor, “We would rather 
die here than move out”, said a resident of Borogram. People resist for different 
reasons based on their particular experiences; it is a terrain of social politics. 
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 Part Two 
    ‘Localised’ politics and Strategic opposition  
On another level, conflict around the mining proposals builds upon the ‘moral 
commitment’26 or desire for the control of tangible and intangible benefits that result 
from both mine development activity, and the opposition to it. Collier & Hoeffler 
relates this conflict for mining benefits with ‘greed, not grievance’27; that is, the battle 
for control of rent resources is the main causal element of a conflict. The discussion in 
this section intends to establish that the nature of the desires attached to the protests is 
related to the socio-political positions that are beyond the scope of the simple accounts 
of “greed/grievances”. Shifting our attention to the organisation of the movement in 
Phulbari town, the centre of more elaborate protest activities in the sub-district, will 
contextualise this discussion. 
**   ** 
 “Come to the office. Did you forget? Today is rally day. We will have tea and join the 
rally.” Mahmud, an activist in Phulbari, reminded me over the phone to join the weekly 
protest rally organised by the Phulbari branch of NC. It had been two weeks since I 
arrived to live in Borogram and I had been making almost daily visits to the NC office 
in the town, like many other activists do. I observed that the activists came here not 
only to discuss protest issues, but the office had also become a kind of social space to 
chat and share daily life events over a cup of tea. Over the subsequent months of my 
stay in Borogram I became a regular part of this socio-political place. This is where I 
was able to identify the background and politics of the organised protest in Phulbari.   
Phulbari town is situated within the proposed mining areas, which encompasses a larger 
area, including surrounding villages. Phulbari is a small town surrounded by paddy 
fields and villages and should open-pit mining take place, Phulbari town and some 
adjacent villages would have to be resettled28. The local NC office is situated in a shop 
in Nimtali, the market place in the centre of the town, along the road that connects 
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Phulbari to Dhaka. Shops selling groceries, clothes, electronics and mobile phones, and 
restaurants and tea stalls lined along the road make Nimtali a busy place. The weekly 
rice market is held in front of the town’s cinema hall Urbashi, close to Nimtali, where 
people from the surrounding villages come to buy and sell rice. People from the 
surrounding villages also make regular visits to the shops in Nimtali selling fertilizers 
and fuel for irrigation machines. As such, the NC is situated in a place that is visited 
daily by people from the surrounding villages for their shopping needs, making the 
office a convenient place for interactions between town activists and village actors.   
One way that activism in the town is manifested is through the weekly protest rally held 
every Friday, the Haatbar, or the day of the weekly market.  People from the 
surrounding villages gather in the town in larger numbers on the Haatbar to buy and 
sell vegetables, rice and cattle so this day is chosen for the weekly rally by the town 
activists to draw the people to participate in the rally. Protest activities, such as the 
weekly rally, are facilitated by a general committee of about fifty one members, called 
the Phulbari branch of NC, and its sub-committees, who mobilise people against the 
mine in the town, as well as in the villages.  
The general committee and sub-committees consist mainly of local leaders, activists of 
left wing political parties and sympathetic locals. Members of the general committee 
are responsible for decision-making regarding the overall organisation of the protests. 
An executive committee of 15-20 members, headed by a president, makes decisions in 
consensus with the other members. The sub-committees, each headed by a member 
secretary, are based in different clusters of the town. Members of the sub-committees 
are responsible for mobilising people in their respective areas for a particular protest 
activity and they regularly participate in meetings organised by the general committee.  
The general committee is the first point of contact for the Dhaka-based activists who 
regularly visit Phulbari as part of their organisational activities and in the event of 
periodic large-scale protests.  The president of the Phulbari general committee is 
elected by consensus of its members and in discussion with the leaders of the central 
committee in Dhaka. The general committee selects the member secretary of the sub-
committees in Phulbari. Thus, the NC in Phulbari consists of the town-based people 
with regular connections and organisational support from Dhaka activists.  
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The members of the Phulbari NC and its sub-committees consist mainly of middle-
class educated people, such as local business owners, lecturers from local higher-
secondary colleges and managers of local NGOs, as well as educated young people 
from local well-off families. The general committee also includes an elected 
representative of the local government who attributed his success in the election to 
public support he gained as an anti-mining activist. The majority of the members, 
including the president of the general committee, has had involvement, or a history of 
involvement, in left-liberal politics. They have mobilised worker’s associations, such as 
the association of wage labourers in restaurants and the rickshaw-puller’s association, 
in favour of the anti-mining protests and included a few leaders of these associations in 
the committees. But, it is the people of educated and middle class backgrounds who 
have the strongest presence in the committees.  
The members of these committees interact with village actors to disseminate protest 
agendas and inform people of events, such as the weekly protest rally, through periodic 
village discussions. The activists also make efforts to gather participants to the rally 
from the town by invoking their associations with respective political parties. Efforts 
are made to promote interaction between the town activists and the village actors 
through the organisation of protest activities  
These efforts are strengthened when larger processions for particular events, such as the 
observation of Phulbari Day on August 26th, are planned. The weeks leading up to an 
event are observed to generate a higher frequency of town activist visits to the villages 
to discuss and mobilise participation. Organising such events requires expenditure for 
hiring sound systems and/or printing banners and leaflets. The funds are mobilised 
locally from sympathetic individuals, shopkeepers, traders in the town and local 
members of left political parties participating in NC, as well as from village people who 
are willing to contribute. While a sympathetic shop owner in Nimatali contributes two 
hundred taka (about two pounds), a poor but interested resident in Borogram 
contributes as little as five taka (about five pence). “We even welcome one taka (one 
penny), whatever people are willing to contribute. The amount is not important; the 
participation is.” said an activist visiting Borogram to raise funds for the upcoming 
events of Phulbari Day 2009. Through village discussions and fund raising activities 
local NC activists mobilise participation for protest events, such as the Phulbari Day 
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observance, and seek to turn resistance into action. However, mobilisation activities do 
not always mean a smooth integration of the town activists and village actors. The 
context within which such activities take place involves certain elements of difference 
between the two groups. The following description of an encounter between the town 
activists and some village people will provide an example of this: 
Shaheen Kibria and Billal are waiting in the village market beside Shaheen’s 
motorcycle for people to come out of the adjacent mosque after finishing their 
afternoon prayer. Shaheen is a college teacher in a higher-secondary college in 
the town and Billal has finished his BA from a college in Dinajpur. Both 
Shaheen and Billal have been visiting the village for the last few days informing 
people of the upcoming Phulbari Day, which is just a week away. The day will 
be observed through a large protest rally in the town and a large number of 
participants from the village are expected to attend. ‘Lets go. The prayer is 
finished,’ said Shaheen. Addressing the fifteen people coming out of the 
mosque Shaheen said, ‘Assalamualaikum (greetings). Many of you know us. 
We come regularly to this village. I am from Phulabri Jatio Committee 
(Phulbari NC).’ 
29RB1: Yes brother I have seen you before. You have come to talk about 
Phulbari Day, isn’t it? 
Shaheen: Yes brother. We all have to attend the rally. We have come to remind 
you about this. Will you all come? 
RB2: We must go. If we don’t go how will the protest be organised.  
RB3: Vaijan (elder brother), tell us what is going on about the mine. Are they 
really going to cancel the mining plan?  
            Billal: They have to cancel. That’s why we all need to attend the protests we   
organise.  
RB3: But we hear that our MP (member of parliament from the ruling Awami 
League) has said in a meeting in Phulbari that Jatio Committee people are doing 
these protests for their own political gain and to gain popularity for the next 
election? 
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Billal: This is propaganda from those who want to negate the anti-mining 
protests. 
RB3: We hear that people in the town have started to buy land on the other side 
of Phulbari (the area outside of the mining site) in case mining takes place in the 
end. They have the money; they can buy land in other places. Would they 
understand our misery? (With smile) You are from the town as well? You live 
in the comfort of an electric fan. Would you understand our suffering? 
Shaheen: Jatio Committee has always been with you, no? We are promoting 
your demands. 
RB4: I went to the town the other day and met one of the supporters of Awami 
League (AL); he said that only AL can bring the best for the village people.  
Shaheen: Do you believe them? You all know that they are not protesting 
against the mine. 
RB4: Well, many of us voted for AL in the last election but we are now 
confused who really feels for us. You all live in the town; you are dhoni manush 
(well-off people); how will you understand what will happen to us if the mine 
takes place?  
Billal: We are with you brother. Don’t worry; together with you we will force 
Asia Energy to flee this country.  
RB3: We don’t understand AL or BNP or Jatio Committee; whoever is against 
the mine, we are with them. 
RB4: Yes, yes. We just don’t want the mine. We will go to the rally.  
Encounters of this kind reveal the way that connections between the town activists and 
the village actors takes place through the negotiation of uneasy relationships between 
these two groups. The uneasiness may arise from the difference in socio-economic 
backgrounds, as the village people remain suspicious about the extent to which the 
well-off town activists understand their situation and stand by their side. It also arises 
from the unfamiliarity of the village people with the town activists and their ultimate 
motives. Finally, the support base of the two major right wing political parties, AL and 
BNP, at the village level interferes with the way the town activists and village actors 
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negotiate their engagement with the protests. The “moral purpose”30 of these protests 
entails “a significant local dynamic”31, as is further discussed when looking into the 
development of the movement in Phulbari town.   
**                 ** 
The Australian mining company BHP-Billiton32 attained their exploration survey 
contract from the Government of Bangladesh and started their exploration survey in 
Phulbari in the 1990s. In 1998, the company handed over their entire project to Asia 
Energy PLC33 who started their work in Phulbari with the same field team that had 
worked for BHP-Billiton. Initial surveys and office infrastructure development 
activities of these companies showed promise for the local contractors, suppliers, elites, 
and politicians to earn good money. Lessons learned from underground coal mining 
development activities in adjacent Boropukuria, roughly six kilometres from Phulbari, 
showed that local elites could earn a lot of money by providing human labour and other 
supplies. Indeed, Asia Energy did need contractors to build and develop roads, to hire 
labourers for survey drilling and road development, and to employ people for its 
Phulbari offices. To win people’s consent for the mine, Asia Energy’s Phulbari officials 
employed local people and awarded supply contracts to local elites and politicians; a 
manipulative tactic according to a local former employee of the company. In fact, 
employing local people for mining activities is a strategy declared in the ‘community 
development’ section of Asia Energy’s printed documents.  It is this promise of supply 
contracts from company officials that started conflicts between the company and some 
local elites and politicians, as some were not getting the contracts they were promised 
or had expected. As a local activist recalled, “Some local powerful elites started to 
criticize Asia Energy’s project in public meetings only to press them to get supply 
contracts from them…I asked one of my friends, who was an elected ward 
commissioner in the town, why he was criticizing Asia Energy in public places while he 
was trying to get a contract from them. He said if he didn’t push them he wouldn’t get 
anything from them.” 
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With extensive development work in the first part of the year 2004, such as building a 
soil test laboratory, the company’s project began to be discussed to a greater extent at 
the national level. As the company proposed to adopt an open-pit method for the mine, 
the national dailies published regular articles about the issues surrounding the project 
by people from both pro- and anti-mining quarters. The NC presented their own 
analysis on the impact of this project in national newspapers and on television 
channels.  
In line with these analyses, left political party representatives of the NC in Phulbari 
decided to organise protests against the open-pit mining method. As left wing political 
activists openly discussed the potential destructive impact of the open-pit method, 
public opinion in Phulbari began to mount against this method. In this atmosphere, a 
group of local politicians, primarily from two major mainstream political parties, took 
the initiative and formed a local committee to protest against Asia Energy. The 
committee, called ‘Phulbari rakhkha committee’ was the first declared forum in 
Phulbari to protest against mining, and included representatives from both the left and 
mainstream parties, as well as local elites. However, the objectives of the leaders of that 
committee have been contested and questioned by other activists who do not associate 
themselves with leaders of mainstream political parties, as is evidenced by the 
comments of one activist, “Local leaders of the mainstream political parties initiated 
that committee partly to get public support for elections and partly to press Asia 
Energy to get supply contracts.” These sentiments were further confirmed by another 
activist, “Some engaged themselves in that committee because of their anger for not 
getting any financial benefits from the company.” For the purpose of this research it 
was irrelevant to inquire as to the authenticity of these allegations. However, it was 
important to reveal that, against the background of these accusations, a competing 
group of protesters was developing within a different set of aspirations.  
The left-oriented members of the committee wanted to take on different protest 
strategies than the leaders of the Phulbari rakhkha committee. “The mainstream 
political party leaders of the Phulbari rakhkha committee never wanted to undertake 
any aggressive protest activities as some of them were part of the government,” said a 
local left party activist.  It was this difference of opinion in regards to strategy that 
caused the left party members of the Phulbari rakhkha committee to have a conflict 
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with the committee leader who wanted to protest mostly through small public meetings 
and rallies. In contrast to the leaders of the committee, left party activists began to have 
regular communication with NC leaders in Dhaka to form the Phulbari branch of NC. 
Under the banner of the NC, local left party activists started to take on more aggressive 
protests activities, such as a blockade of Asian Energy’s offices and barring local 
people from working with the company or renting out their houses to people associated 
with the company.  
After the formation of an alliance between some local elements and the Phulbari branch 
of NC, the NC decided to stage its biggest protest rally in Phulbari on August 26, 2006; 
their one demand was that Asia Energy leave Phulbari by the end of the day. Leaders of 
the Phulbari rakhkha committee wanted to stop this protest and distributed leaflets 
asking people not to attend. “They wanted to stop this protest because they were losing 
local public leadership. Local NC leaders had taken over public leadership by then”, 
said a local resident involved in the protest. Now organised protests in Phulbari were 
more or less led by the NC. As we have seen the electoral politics of Bangladesh are 
mainly centred on two major political parties, the Awami League and BNP. Though the 
left parties had achieved little or no success in previous elections in Bangladesh, the 
mining protests have brought left leaders into important positions during local elections 
in Phulbari. For example, in 2008 a member of the left party of the Phulbari NC was 
elected the chairman of the local government of Phulbari sub-district. Aspirations for 
public leadership and election success are evident among members of Phulbari NC, as 
they are actively planning to participate in all other upcoming local and national 
elections. It is well established in the area that the movement against mining brought 
election success for the leader of Phulbari NC. This past success, and the promise of 
future success, in electoral politics acts as an incentive for the leaders of the Phulbari 
movement. A more naïve purpose of the left ideology, inspired by the NC activists, has 
become entangled with aspirations to, and the promise of, becoming an elected 
representative of the state system. Such aspirations can be sensed in the story of Hamid 
Akhter. 
I was in Dhaka doing my Bachelors degree when Asia Energy proposed the 
open-pit mining in Phulbari in 2005. I couldn’t just live in Dhaka when the 
people of Phulbari needed guidance for their struggle against Asia Energy. 
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More than anything people needed leadership and we formed the Phulbari 
branch of NC to provide that leadership to the people. I came to Phulbari and 
worked days and nights to mobilize people against the mine. During those days 
I spent most of my time on a motorcycle travelling from village to village 
talking to people and giving them information about how destructive the mine 
would be. I knew Phulbari lacked people who could lead. People needed 
someone like me to mobilize them against the mine. I did exactly that. And you 
see the result? Asia Energy had to flee Phulbari.  
I now have to live in Phulbari as Asia Energy is still there trying to make a 
comeback, and you know our mainstream political leaders are good for nothing. 
People don’t want them. My dream now is becoming a leader of Phulbari one 
day so that I can work for the people and give them proper guidance. If you get 
elected in the parliamentary election you can do more for the people. If you are 
honest if you are with the people protesting against Asia Energy people will 
vote for you. We worked day and night for the movement and you see we won 
in the local election. We now have a better voice in local politics; this is just the 
start you know.  
Hamid has thrived in opposing Asia Energy. The success of the NC supported-
candidate in the local election and the movement against the mine inspired him to be a 
voice for the   affected people by using the state machineries to his favour. However, 
Hamid’s story does not fit neatly together with the testimony of one local resident, who 
obtained a contract from the company and states,  
“No one will give you anything if you don’t ask for it loudly. If we get some 
contracts some local people will be employed. There is nothing wrong in 
pressing the company.” 
Incompatible stories of these kinds and the recognition of discrepancies between them 
enable us to identify the dynamics of resistance in Phulbari. Through these testimonies 
we see that the protests against mining are specific to particular rationale and purpose. 
The simple standards of assessment through ideas of greed versus grievance are too 
simplistic to understand these ‘local dynamics’. What one group alleges to be greed is 
termed legitimate rights by the other. Benefiting from the mining activities in the area 
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in obtaining contracts for supplies and labourers, as well as gaining employment for 
local people, are seen as the legitimate rights of the leaders. Strategies are formulated, 
whether hidden or open, to maximise opportunities and benefits. An apparent “greed” 
protester invokes on his “own moral framework”34 to rationalise his resistance as much 
more than “just opposition”35.  
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      Chapter Seven 
  Its not that we cuddled them: 
                                  Collaboration of differences 
As the material presented so far in this thesis suggests, it is important to understand the 
specificities of resistance movements within particular contexts. The ethnographic 
evidence of the last chapter demonstrates how socially entrenched, and sometime less 
visible, aspects of local realities characterise local resistance to planned mining. Yet, 
we would be mistaken to see the localised and national movements and experiences as 
bounded and disconnected. This chapter focuses on how the Phulbari movement moves 
through contingent collaborations between disparate groups and experiences. I will 
explore how the possibilities of wider linkages and connections are formed through the 
‘friction’1 of incompatible ideas and observation. In doing so, I attend to the group 
character of the National Committee, the forum that organises the protests at the 
national scale, and the nature of collaboration it entails. I explore the aspects of 
collaboration in the Phulbari movement further by looking at the nature of the 
interaction of ideas and observations held within an environmental NGO and the 
Borogram ‘community’.  
Before moving to a context-specific discussion, I will present relevant theoretical 
discussions around the processes of the spread of knowledge and experiences across 
loci. Drawing insight from these discussions this chapter explores the organisation and 
spread of the Phulbari movement. I draw on particular examples of connections 
between the villagers, national activists and an environmental organisation engaged in 
the Phulbari movement.  
 
**    ** 
Tsing suggests a critical exploration of how different locations are in interaction 
regardless of ‘whether we place ourselves inside or outside the West’2. In this, Tsing 
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notes that dialogue between cultures gives rise to global aspirations for elements of 
global politics, i.e. liberal politics, and global economy, i.e. neo-liberalism, that have 
spread around the world; global connections ‘give grip’ to these universal aspirations. 
She does not mean that the claims and acts of universal aspirations ‘make everything 
everywhere the same”3, rather she suggests that this connection is a pathway or 
‘channel’ that is moving forward and which, on its way, accommodates different ideas 
only to widen this channel. The act of universalising creates a means of connecting 
different ideas that make the circulation of knowledge possible across localities. 
Experiences gained from interactions in particular localities infuse into these universal 
channels expanding, rather than disrupting, them.  
This channel does not, however, operates like a ‘well-oiled machine’ but expands 
through a process of tension between, and resistance from, different socio-political and 
cultural groups. Tsing argues that the processes of tension and resistance do not make 
the universal processes weak; they present avenues for connections between different 
groups that strengthen the workings of the process. Tsing presents her ideas of 
‘friction’ to explain how the universal channel expands through the process of friction 
to strengthen the connection between different locations and ideas. Her ideas of friction 
are not synonymous to resistance, as she shows that the impact of encounters between 
differing groups can be compromising or empowering. Friction does not necessarily 
slow things down; it gets in the way to make global connections happen and to keep the 
universal channel in motion. For her, friction works like roads. Roads provide a means 
to travel and make travelling easier and efficient, however, roads simultaneously limit 
our choices of movement and travel. In other words, roads are the structure for 
movement while at the same time constraining movement. Friction, similarly, 
facilitates the universal channel through the historical processes of ‘enabling, excluding 
and particularising’4. Differences between groups sometimes inspire ‘insurrection’ and 
insurrection makes connections possible. The act of friction is to make a connection 
stronger.  
As evidenced in Chapter Four, dominated by left-oriented political leaders, the 
members of the National Committee promoted their views of the movement against 
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Asia Energy in Phulbari as a protest against the power that enforces global capital in 
the name of ‘globalisation’. My ethnographic exploration of the realities of the Phulbari 
movement revealed more complex reasons for resistance within villages surrounding 
the proposed site. Rather than being a resistance contingent uniformly on anti-global 
logics, the material presented so far shows that resistance at the local level is 
determined by socio-political complexities between both groups. Building on this, this 
chapter will discuss how the movement and strategies of encounters build on frictional 
alliances at different levels5; in this case collaboration between ‘local’ villagers and an 
environmental organisation with a commitment to global ideas.  
1. Dilemma of alliances  
Contemporary resistances and movements develop and operate, as Tsing suggests, 
through negotiations between different groups, a process that is characterised by 
particular spheres of connections that are not so tidy and coherent. To explore such 
spheres in the Phulbari movement I will concentrate to a greater extent on the 
development and internal organisation of the National Committee who facilitated the 
movement at the national and local levels. I will explore the making of the Phulbari 
movement as a general idea that attended to certain differences in views between the 
participants of the National Committee. Lastly, I will examine how the processes of 
becoming ‘general’ are characterised by the friction of disparate experiences and 
observations.    
Protests against the coal project proposed by the Asia Energy Corporation followed an 
emerging trend of organised demonstrations against foreign and multinational 
corporation’s interventions into the country’s natural resource field. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, independent Bangladesh’s economic policy had moved away from its 
early commitment to certain ideas of socialism, such as the nationalisation of the 
industries, to liberal economic principles of privatisation. As discussed, the post-1975 
economic policies of Bangladesh were largely shaped by suggestions from global 
institutions, such as the IMF. In line with these suggestions, private enterprise and 
foreign investment took a primary position in the policies of the new military-backed 
government who came into power following a series of political events, including 
                                                           
5
 Tsing, 2005 
179 
 
numerous coups, counter coups and famine. The policies of economic growth through 
privatised venture and foreign investment gained momentum in subsequent periods 
with the introduction of Special Economic Zones in the 1980s. In continued synergy 
between state policies and the interest of global capital, the country’s natural resources 
sector, which was managed by the state-owned company PetroBangla, was opened to a 
multinational resource extraction business in 1993. Within this background an 
organisational platform emerged in 1998 to protest against initiatives6 of foreign and 
multinational corporation gas extraction as this was considered against the national 
interest and as a profit-seeking scheme for multinational capital.  
With a pledge to protect oil and gas resources and national interest from the 
corporations, a platform was initiated by an alliance of eleven left political parties with 
the participation of left-leaning academicians, sympathetic intellectuals and 
professionals. A central committee was formed to expand the organisation across the 
country and get people involved with their cause. The agenda of the committee was 
expressed during deliberations in their opening meeting:  
7
“Multinational company’s project of exploring country’s oil gas is destroying 
the country’s interest. Dependency on foreign company has to be overcome” 
“Imperialist beasts want to intervene in our resource sector for their profit and 
the country’s ruling group is making their way. People have to stand against it” 
“Bangladesh’s oil gas resource is under international conspiracy. Multinational 
corporations are buying up resource contracts from the government departments 
destroying national interests. Our agenda is to mobilise people against these 
contracts designed to loot our natural resources”.  
“The stage is set to destroy our state institutions responsible for oil and gas 
exploration and extraction. State-owned institutions are not developing their 
technical capacities and experiences as all the potential extraction fields are 
being leased out to foreign companies. This will lead to a total dependency on 
the foreign company and destroy our state institutions capacity.” 
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However, another member of the committee, a senior lawyer without any political 
affiliation, took a slightly different position and expressed his agenda as follows: 
“The formulation of a national policy and work strategy for natural resource is a 
most important priority for us at the moment. To secure the country’s ever-
increasing gas demand it is a must to assess the gas reserve and future domestic 
demand base. The question of gas extraction conditions and whether it will be 
exported should be dealt based on the assessment.”8 
Another member, a geological expert, said, 
“There is no specific guideline for the use and extraction of gas. One group of 
corrupted officials is using this gap to betray the national interest by making 
contracts with companies that go against the national interest. We have to stand 
against them and press the government to be transparent about the oil and gas 
issues.” 
Clearly, the first set of reflections, dominated by left political expressions, takes a 
somewhat different position than the latter two in prioritising the agendas. While the 
first set relates overwhelmingly to perceived exploitation of the foreign and 
multinational corporations, the second stresses the formulation of effective state 
policies. Efficient work strategies, such as the assessment of the reserve of natural 
resources, are stressed in the opinions regarding whether foreign corporations should be 
allowed to export resources. The first set of statements, on the other hand, denies the 
foreign company’s ventures altogether. It is this kind of difference that characterises the 
make-up of NC.  
Let us return to the history of the NC. The alliance of the left political parties, who 
initiated the National Committee, was a coalition of eleven left parties that came to an 
agreement of forming a forum to mobilise people on the issues surrounding the 
country’s natural resource extraction. However, this did not mean that the parties 
shared the same ideas of foreign investment and economic progress. The historical 
accounts of Bangladesh presented in Chapter Three locate the political moments within 
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which several small factions of the left political party had emerged. The oldest of the 
parties, the Bangladesh Communist Party, has a history of close association with the 
Awami League, the party that organised and led the War of Independence. This 
association resulted in the Awami League’s post-independence government having an 
early commitment to socialist traditions of nationalised ventures. However, as I 
previously discussed, this did not last long as policies gradually moved towards the 
liberal tradition of privatisation. In the wake of the proliferation of privatisation 
policies, and the consequent alignment of the country’s political and administrative 
setup9, the communist party of Bangladesh and its associate organisations faced a 
crackdown from the (pseudo) military government during late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Faced with military interventions into party activities and the threat of arrest, the 
communist party fragmented into different lines of leadership and political strategies. 
Following the firm establishment of a parliamentary election process after a decade of 
military-backed government, initiatives were taken from an alliance of left parties 
during the late 1990s. Eleven of the parties came under a coalition group called “11 
Party Alliances” whose purpose was to participate in the parliamentary election as an 
alliance. Some ‘orthodox’ left parties didn’t come under the alliance, as they didn’t 
support the idea of participating in the electoral process.  
Within this background the 11 Party Alliances formed a national forum to deal with the 
emerging trend of multinational investment in the country’s natural resource sector. 
One central leader of the alliance expressed the character of the forum in the following 
way: 
“It’s a national forum of conscious people. It’s a forum to prevent multinational 
aggression into our natural resources. People of all quarters can come and join 
us to strengthen our causes. Our goal is to make people aware about what is 
going on with our resource sector and what should be done.10” 
When asked whether this was a movement of the left parties he replied, 
“Um…it’s a movement led by the left political parties. But our goal is to 
involve people of all quarters in the movement who can see our causes. We are 
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working to disseminate our agendas. People get involved in the movement once 
they comprehend our agendas”.  
Developing a national forum required dealing with differences of opinion regarding 
issues of foreign investment in domestic ventures to make a general cause for the 
movement. Though the National Committee was initiated by the 11 Party Alliance, 
other left political parties were invited to join the Committee in an effort to make it a 
broader political forum concerned with the impact of multinational interest in the 
natural resource sector. Left parties, both inside and outside the 11 Party Alliance 
gathered together under the platform of the National Committee to protect oil, gas and 
the national interest. Despite having a generally anti-multinational political manifesto, 
the left parties did not share positions on foreign investment in the country’s economy. 
Leaders of one of the major parties in the 11 Party Alliance explained his party’s 
position in the present political and economic setup; 
“We have seen foreign investments usually come through the channel of 
multinational corporations based in western countries. They use their 
international liaisons with institutions such as the IMF and World Bank to 
influence the government in making exploration and extraction contracts against 
the national interests. This has been the trend we have experienced which was 
supported by corrupt government officials. Our party position is against these 
initiatives of making bad contracts by these corporations that destroy our 
country’s economy.” 
Q. You said bad contract? Can a good contract be made by the corporations? 
What is your party’s position on such a question? 
A. We have formed an alliance to participate in the electoral process with an 
aim for social transformation from within. We seek to change the way foreign 
investors make bad contracts such as the one of Phulbari. Yes, good contracts 
can be done of course. Why not? If it comes for maximising the national interest 
and if it matches our need then foreign investment could be brought. 
Q. Can multinational corporations invest if they meet the criteria you said? 
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A. See, multinationals only see their profits. Their business and investments 
have to be scrutinized and monitored by specific and transparent national 
policies to prevent their profit seeking behaviour. Good investment can come.11 
Similarly, a cautious but affirmative nod to foreign investment is reflected in the 
published manifesto of the party: 
“…to foster the diversified and multi-linear industries it is essential to make the 
maximum utilisation of domestic resources and human capacities. Measures 
need to be taken for fostering the domestic capacities and skill for this purpose. 
First, internal resources need to be identified and accumulated for establishing 
new enterprises. Foreign funds can be brought and used based on proper need 
assessment and specific guidelines.12”   
Other left parties outside the 11 Party Alliance strongly differed in their position on 
foreign investment. These parties are generally affiliated with radical socialist ideology 
of social transformation through the mobilisation of the working class. Their political 
strategies contradict with those of the Alliance as they reject the process of attaining 
state power through the electoral system. Instead, they aspire to the orthodox Marxist 
way of altering the power group. To bring their differences into perspective, I followed 
the conflicting ideas in the sphere of their connection to the National Committee and, 
more generally, the Phulbari movement. The question of foreign investment is the 
locale for the dilemma in formulating a general agenda for the National Committee and 
the movement. Differences in views were expressed in the statement of one party 
leader as follows: 
“Resisting foreign investment and multinationals is our politics. That is what 
our politics is for. Isn’t it? Foreign investment in our country, in the present 
world system, comes through the channels of western controlled 
institutions…you know IMF, ADB, or multinational corporations. Foreign 
investment doesn’t do any good for us. They never did. They make us 
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dependent on the others. They hinder our own fund accumulation potentials and 
capacity.13”  
This difference in opinion was nothing new for the participating parties. However, 
through the collection of stories and involvement, I explored this predicament from the 
point of engagement that brought the pre-existing differences to a heightened level and 
set the table as to where any possible areas of collaboration could be sorted out. The 
National Committee provided a good opportunity for two groups of politicians to bring 
their ideas to the table in order to make them noticeable to one another. In its early days 
National Committee meetings were devoted to making agendas and holding 
discussions.  These discussions facilitated dialogue and tried to appease differences and 
identify possible ways out. What would the movement’s programme be? Are we 
completely opposed to any foreign investment? Are we only opposed to ‘bad 
investments’ such as the one proposed by Asia Energy for the Phulbari coal mine? On 
occasion these topics brought disputes to such heights that some parties signed off from 
the committee and relinquished their memberships. However, in the majority of these 
cases the parties were brought back following further discussion with their allies. While 
the questions posed relate to wider ideological ideas, discussions were not directed to 
resolve these disparities. Rather the committee provided a space where parties could 
explore the rungs of the ladder needed to cross over deep-seated disagreement. With its 
primary concern being destructive projects and ‘rigged’ interests of multinational 
corporations in the country’s natural resource sector, the parties were able to gather 
together and unify under this general cause and existing dilemma.  
It is this “empathy”14 to search for a general cause that runs through the organisation of 
the Phulbari movement; becoming ‘general’ requires travelling over the different 
locus15. Intellectuals played an important role in spreading the messages of the 
movement, leading to it becoming popularly called the movement of left parties and 
intellectuals. Although the connection between the left parties and the intellectuals is 
evidenced in this popular expression referring to the movement, this connection is not 
as straightforward as it seems.  
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Forming a solidarity group does not require homogeneity. Alliances between the left 
political parties, who themselves are fragmented, and the intellectuals involved does 
not mean that the association was built upon any pre-defined homogeneity. With the 
exception of academics with formal affiliations to the left parties, other intellectuals 
had quite different and contrasting political orientations. For example, one of the 
convenors of the National Committee’s founding meeting is a writer, lawyer, and 
famed leader of a right wing political party that promotes democratic rights. Another 
writer and National Committee central leader had this to say when asked his political 
affiliation, “I have my own political approach”. A university professor and writer who 
was part of the National Committee from its early days stated, “…do you think I have 
to be communist to participate in the movement? It’s not a communist movement, is it? 
No I was never a left politician.” Moving away from delving too far into individual 
political ideas, I explored stories of uncertainties as they grouped together within the 
platform of the National Committee that was initiated by left politicians; how has this 
collaboration worked?  
Members of the left parties in the National Committee were determined to promote a 
set of agendas for the movement that matched with left political ideas. Initiated by the 
left parties, and largely participated in by left political leaders and party representatives, 
the committee gained the general reputation of being a left-led forum. The leaflets and 
booklets disseminated by the committee to spread the message of the movement were 
generally characterised by anti-imperialist language. One of the most widely distributed 
leaflets, for example, read: 
“We know wherever oil, gas, coal or any natural resources are discovered 
imperialist countries get busy looting the resources. Imperialist powers are now 
plotting to loot our resources. Local corrupted officials and politicians are 
working to implement the order of those imperialist countries. Asia Energy is a 
hand of those countries that want to make contracts with the government and 
destroy our natural resources” 16 
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Individual political activists from the National Committee appeared on TV and wrote 
articles for the newspapers to describe Asia Energy’s project using similar language17. 
It was a general trend for the testimonies of left political activists published in the 
media to describe the project in relation to rigged interests of imperialist countries that 
own Asia Energy and to the corrupt government that cooperates with them. This made 
the National Committee a widely publicised forum against corrupt government and the 
policies of global power that control Asia Energy.  Such characterisations of the 
National Committee were publicised as the ‘ruling discourses’18, which became 
problematic for some sympathetic intellectuals involved with the committee as they did 
not individually share the same ideas in relation to government corruption and 
opposition to western countries, as evidenced by one participant I interviewed:  
“It’s true that this contract with Asia Energy is very bad. We have to pressurize 
the government so that they don’t go ahead with this contract. Some people in 
the government are corrupt, but not everyone. My position is not against the 
government but against the corrupt officials and the policies they endorse.”  
This testimony suggests a different meaning to the causes of the Phulbari movement; 
but through this dilemma of meaning an obvious connection to the cause is expressed. 
This is also exemplified in the case discussed below.  
An open anti-western position created a problem for people with affiliations to political 
parties without anti-western agendas. Publicity framing the National Committee as an 
anti-western forum resulted in some members distancing themselves from the 
organisation. For example, a famed writer and lawyer withdrew his membership from 
the committee due to his position as a senior leader of a right wing party known for 
promoting democratic rights. For him, as I was told by one of the members of the party, 
formal membership of the National Committee meant deviating from his own party’s 
position on relations with Western countries.  
In other cases, direct anti-government positions caused dilemmas for intellectuals in 
their other professional commitments as exemplified in the following case. From 
November 2006 through the end of 2008 Bangladesh experienced some political 
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dramas. It started with the military taking state control and facilitating a new interim 
government thereby forcing the present interim government to resign. Backed by the 
military, the new interim government took a somewhat different position on the 
question of the Phulbari coal mine. They initiated an advisory committee to review the 
existing policies in relation to the management of coal resources and recommended 
new policy guidelines based on discussions with different concerned parties and 
experts. The National Committee was indifferent towards these actions, as they did not 
result in the government cancelling the existing agreement with Asia Energy. However, 
a university professor and famed writer who was involved with the National Committee 
was appointed as a member of the government advisory committee for his expertise in 
geological matters. The Committee’s open anti-government position meant he had to 
choose between this new position and his affiliation with the National Committee. 
Instead of protesting against the government he decided he would do better by trying to 
influence coal policies through a government advisory position; he was therefore 
unable to continue his formal association with the National Committee.  
Coal policy19 is a government document that sets out specific policies and guidelines 
regarding matters related to coal explorations, extractions and its use. The Department 
of Energy and Mineral Sources is officially responsible for setting out the policy 
guidelines that direct the government’s decisions on coal resource management, 
including issues of extraction contracts with multinational corporations. The first draft 
of the coal policy was initiated in 2006 and was opposed by the National Committee as 
it was found to be against the national interest. The key areas of the coal policy that the 
Committee found particularly damaging for the country were the provisions of 
exporting coal, no bar for leasing out mines to foreign corporations, and the provision 
of the open-pit method20 for the mines. The National Committee put forward a three 
point core agenda which was proclaimed on the banners and leaflets on display at most 
Phulbari movement processions and protest meetings; “no to open-pit method, no to 
foreign, no to export”. As previously discussed, Asia Energy proposed an open-pit 
method for extracting coal involving the removal of soil and digging pits of up to 270 
meters.  Asia Energy estimated the total area needed for digging pits and dumping coal 
                                                           
19Source: Bangladesh Oil Gas and Mineral Recourse Corporation (Petrobangla) 
http://www.petrobangla.org.bd/ 
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at 5,933 hectares, or roughly 60 sq km. In addition, the use of the land for these 
purposes required the movement of all people living in the area.  This open pit method 
was chosen despite the availability of the underground method, where coal is extracted 
by digging tunnels underground, leaving the above land and its people unharmed.  
The National Committee opposed this project on the basis of its provision of exporting 
coal to other countries, as the exportation was seen as depriving the country of 
resources for much needed electricity production. The National Committee’s analysis 
of the Phulbari coal project depicted Asia Energy as a Western profit seeking entity. 
The committee continued to protest against Asia Energy and against the government 
who was putting the Phulbari project agenda forward. A new political scenario saw an 
interim government put into place at the end of 2006, and the newly formed advisory 
committee was given the responsibility to review and finalise the coal policy. The 
establishment of this kind of committee was nothing new; the draft of the coal policy 
was initiated after a number of reviews by several committees but in this new political 
setup, a professor was able to explore enabling areas of making connections with the 
movement agenda. In the reorganised government structure, such as the change in the 
ministerial positions, the advisory committee decided to hold a discussion with the 
National Committee regarding the revision of the coal policy. This presented an 
opportunity for the members of the committee and the professor to identify a point of 
solidarity within their two different practicalities.  
Reflecting on the agendas of the National Committee, the professor put his view into 
the coal policy revision process. The advisory committee accepted the idea of barring 
coal export leaving the other two provisions, foreign corporations and open-pit mining, 
unchanged. The revised draft also enacted the National Committee’s recommendation 
of setting up a national coal body for coal exploration and extraction. So, although the 
revised draft policy only partially responded to the demands of the National 
Committee, the process explored how solidarity could be generated and expressed 
between deviated positions within different practicalities. As one National Committee 
leader said of the professor, “He had done his best from his position. He knows how 
bad the Phulbari project is. He writes about it. He pressed the Phulbari movement 
agendas in the coal policy revisions. He might not agree on everything we say but he is 
with us.” 
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Solidarity does not mean that everyone has to stand on one line without any deviation. 
Rather, deviation may open up possibilities for new grounds of solidarities. The new 
role of the Professor in the interim government enabled him to explore areas where his 
government advisory position could connect to the agendas of the National Committee. 
Developing a revised coal management policy for the government provided the link 
where a connection could be made and solidarity could be expressed. It was an 
unexpected link, as the National Committee had the least optimism that the military-
backed interim government would do any better than the previous ones. However, the 
linkages worked as evidenced by the testimonies and stories of some intellectuals’ on 
the possible areas of connection leaving beside the discrepant elements of 
positionalities.  
This feature of linkages in the organisation of the Phulbari movement helps us to trace 
the frictional ways in which wider collaboration in the movement took place through 
negotiations between incongruent forms of knowledge in search of a ‘general’ one.  
The environment in the Phulbari movement has been a site of such processes, as is 
explored in the next part of this chapter. I attend to the process of how distinct 
experiences of environment get in the way of making the ideas of the movement 
stronger. I explore this by focusing on the particular case of collaboration between 
Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon, the Bangladesh Environment Movement, or BAPA, an 
environmental campaign and advocacy organisation based in the capital, and the 
‘locals’, in this case meaning those residing in Borogram village. I will look at how 
environment as a tool of protest stimulates collaboration between disparate groups and 
experiences 
2. Tentative collaboration 
BAPA’s efforts to stand against the projected environmental degradation that would be 
caused by the Phulbari mine involved periodic visits to the villages in the mine sites, 
protest meetings in the capital and internet campaigns to disseminate the issues of the 
environmental threat21. Their participation in the events of August 2006 was followed 
by discussions with village groups to express solidarity and cooperation in the 
movement against the environmental degradation that could be caused by Asia 
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Energy’s open-pit coal project. They were viewed, as observed by a village activist in 
Borogram, as a group wanting to help local people protect their environment. Since the 
closing down of the Phulbari offices of the Asia Energy Corporation following the 
events of August 2006 their involvement in the movement has shifted to national level 
protests and meetings that they organise periodically in the capital. I discuss the nature 
of their involvement in the movement based on an analysis of the stories of their 
interaction in the villages and their participation in the Dhaka-based activism.  
Efforts to protect the environment are relatively recent in Bangladesh and have 
developed mainly through the activities of national and international development 
organisations and ‘civil society’ activists. This can be traced back to the 1980s when a 
handful of NGOs emerged with environmental protection as their main agenda. During 
that period the Bangladeshi government also responded to growing non-governmental 
efforts for the environment by establishing a separate Ministry for Environment and 
Forests (MoEF), which replaced the smaller Department of Environment and Pollution 
Control (DEPC) under the Ministry of Local Affairs. These developments at the 
national level were accompanied by numerous issues, global and local, which triggered 
the rise of environmental concerns22. It was during the 1980s that local environmental 
degradation issues became prominent; rapidly disappearing forests, wetlands and open 
spaces, the problem of industrial waste, chemical run-off to surface water bodies, urban 
air pollution and loss of biodiversity, were the most common issues that were focused 
on23. In the eighties environmental issues received a lot of attention in developed 
countries, leading to the establishment of a cross-national dialogue about the 
environment and, consequently, the channelling of resources by aid agencies to 
‘developing’ countries. 
 In Bangladesh, the UN sponsored numerous processes of inter-governmental 
deliberation for reaching agreements on environmental issues. International NGOs also 
started to pay a lot of attention to this issue. In response, the Ministry of Environment 
formed the National Environment Management Acton Plan (NEMAP) with 
participation from NGOs and other “civil society” organisations. Institutions like 
UNDP, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank also started to fund various 
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projects to protect the environment. The 1980s can be marked by the growth of a 
‘participatory approach’ to development initiatives in Bangladesh and ideas of 
‘participation’ became a key strategy for environmental protection projects. One such 
example is USAID’s participatory forest management project in Chittagong Hill tracts, 
where community members’ knowledge of local environmental conditions was applied 
to the protection of forests and communities through their participation in decision-
making and protection efforts. The participation of different groups in the 
environmental agenda is now a defining character of environmental discourse in 
Bangladesh. Within this background BAPA was established as an organisation with a 
commitment to protecting the environment.   
BAPA has its origins in a community organisation called POROSH that was formed in 
1997 by a group of senior professionals, along with a few Dhaka-based personalities 
famed for their attachment with issues surrounding human rights and the environment, 
concerned with the pollution in Dhaka city. At the time, industrial pollution in Dhaka’s 
river Buriganga was an issue of regular discussion in the national media and the two-
stroke engine of auto-rickshaws contributed to putting Dhaka in the top half of the list 
of the world’s most polluted cities. This was also during the time when the environment 
and its protection emerged as an essential theme in the auspices of international 
organisations and their domestic partners who made promises for human wellbeing. 
The background of environmentalist efforts in Bangladesh, as presented above, 
suggests that the development of concern for Bangladesh’s environment is related to 
international processes and transnational ideas generally characterised by a global 
commitment for the protection of forests, wetlands, open spaces, biodiversity and 
apprehension regarding the pollution of urban air and water bodies24.  
In synergy with international ideas of the environment that matched reported 
environmental concerns for Dhaka, city members of POROSH took the initiative to 
transform their community organisation into a wider forum for environmental 
campaign and advocacy. In January of 2000 they organised an international conference 
held in Dhaka with the participation of environmental organisations in Bangladesh and 
neighbouring countries, as well as members of the Bangladesh Environment Network 
(BEN), an online environment campaign initiated and operated by US-based non-
                                                           
24
 Islam, 2005 
192 
 
resident Bangladeshis. The conference led to the formation of BAPA made up of 
representatives from the participating organisations with a goal to influence 
environmentally related projects and policies through rallies, meetings, systematic 
analysis of environmental impacts, and the communication of these analyses with a 
broader audience. International groups and campaigns, such as the World Bank 
watch25, collaborate with BAPA in sharing information and knowledge on specific 
projects. BAPA uses the internet as a space for international discussions on 
environmental issues. Through its blog portal, BAPA is linked to various online 
campaigns and groups concerned with the environment26. The environmental languages 
of BAPA suggest synergies with the international environmental agendas. BAPA’s 
programme introduction as written in its brochure states, “The environment of 
Bangladesh is deteriorating fast. Urban air quality is plummeting. Ground water is 
contaminated. Surface water bodies are getting polluted, encroached, and degraded. 
Solid, fluid, gaseous, and hazardous wastes are overflowing. Forests and open spaces 
are disappearing. Noise is increasing. Bio-diversity is vanishing. Health conditions are 
worsening due to pollution.” This synergy suggests that BAPA’s motivation for 
‘global’ environmental concerns have been inspired in order to engage with the 
Phulbari movement.  
Strategies of encounter bring possibilities of cooperation and collaboration. Particular 
issues of protests direct the search for spaces of collaboration. Members of the National 
Committee observed BAPA as a non-governmental organisation as it collaborated on 
campaigns with other NGOs that work internationally, such as BRAC27. Historically, 
left political parties had a generally anti-NGO stance as the growth of NGOs in 
Bangladesh was related to the proliferation of ‘privatisation’ policies in Bangladesh. As 
discussed in the Third Chapter, the first government of an independent Bangladesh in 
1971 adopted certain socialist traditions, such as the nationalisation of industries, which 
gradually shifted towards the policies of privatisation. During the late 1970s and 1980s 
government policies were aligned according to the suggestions of international 
financial institutions that provided Bangladesh with aid, a large part of which was 
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channelled through NGOs28. The availability of donor funds prompted a growth of 
NGOs in Bangladesh during that period29.  This history is often drawn on by the left 
parties in their observations of NGOs and is observed as being essentially related to 
international donors whose suggestions of privatisation policies took Bangladesh away 
from its early commitment to socialist tradition30. A look at the published manifestos of 
the parties that are represented in the National Committee would reveal this general 
anti-NGO political position31. However, there are stories that often “fall away” from 
the published proclamation32. Specific tools of protest open up possibilities of 
contingent collaboration. Concerns regarding the environment as a tool of protest 
provided a stage where both the National Committee and BAPA looked for possible 
areas of collaboration, although tentatively, as one activist of the National Committee 
noted, “Its not that we cuddled BAPA really. Its like, ok, lets see what they could do for 
the movement”. 
“We are concerned about environmental degradation in Phulbari…We 
collaborate with the people protesting against the Phulbari project because the 
mine would have a negative impact on the environment. We work together on 
this point,” - Organiser of BAPA.  
BAPA and NC needed to find common ground for engagement in the movement, 
which had been initiated at the national level by left political activists. ‘Ruling 
discourses’ of the movement, as we have seen in the previous section, were 
characterised by left political languages. Messages and agendas of the National 
Committee were disseminated to villages in the planned mining areas through regular 
meetings and village discussions. BAPA looked for spaces to engage in the existing 
channels of communication between the villages and city-based activists. Movement 
concerns for the local environment provided a space that could be tapped for reaching 
out to the villages. Agendas put forward by the National Committee were carefully 
sorted out to identify compatible areas for involvement. The organisation’s 
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positionalities were expressed in its compatibility searching efforts as demonstrated by 
one organiser’s comment,  
“See we are not a political party nor are we anti government or anti-western. 
Our goal is to analyse specific projects and concerns and the impact they could 
have on the environment and then try to facilitate the decision-making process 
of the organisations or companies responsible for it. Rather than being grossly 
anti-western we talk about the particular project and its problems. We and the 
National Committee are in agreement on many issues about Phulbari project’s 
possible impact on environment.”   
Within the dominant languages of the Phulbari movement that were characterised by 
anti-foreign and anti-western opinions, BAPA acted on specific compatible agendas 
about the environment. Their environmental concerns for the Phulbari project were 
expressed generally around issues of forest destruction in the planned mining areas, and 
the pollution of air and water. BAPA’s analyses of forest destruction and the impacts of 
the open-pit method were communicated with village groups in an effort to learn and 
exchange views about the local environment. They quoted villagers’ stories and 
testimonies of worries about the local habitat in protest meetings. This appears as a 
smooth collaboration between the village groups and BAPA in protecting village 
habitats where BAPA takes the concerns for local environment to the wider networks 
of protests. However, the dilemma inherent in this kind collaboration was revealed 
when I explored the ‘local’ meaning of environment as negotiated in the collaborative 
efforts. Here I focus particularly on the ideas of forest in Borogram village as this was 
campaigned as a local environmental concern in BAPA’s protest agendas.  
As discussed at length in Chapter Five, Borogram village was established by migrants 
from the northern regions of Bangladesh who were forced from their homes by the 
erosion of the river. The people from neighbouring areas gradually moved to Phulbari 
area and settled in unoccupied flat forest land that they cleared and made arable. For 
Borogram people the idea of the forest is related to their experience of settlement in the 
village. This is seen in the statement of one elderly Borogram resident who spoke about 
his memories and ideas of forests:  
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“When I came here first I got scared by the scenes of this place. I couldn’t 
believe I had to live here. It was full of trees and uneven lands. But at least there 
were lands…though forest. I worked hard to clear forests for cultivation. The 
people who came with me to this place all worked hard to gradually clear this 
area. Now you see it’s so nice and flat. We have land; we produce crops. Who 
would have believed that it was possible in this place?”  
He looked over the farmland he possessed to the remaining forest lines that started on 
the edge of his lands and continued,“…forest officials gave us trouble in the early 
periods of this village. They used to come to the village to threaten us…to take money 
from us. We had to bribe them otherwise they used to file police cases against us. They 
told us we were destroying forests. We were destroying the country’s resource”. He 
then directed me to the trees in the forest land and said, “Can you tell me what the 
country gets from those trees? In our country the forest officials and their favoured 
people steal it all! The land we have cleared here produces rice and crops. Don’t we 
need rice? Who should come first, forest or people?”   
This seemingly simple question was not raised with the members of BAPA when they 
came to the village to discuss the importance of forests and the dangers of its loss to the 
surrounding areas as a result of the planned mining. Clearing forest land meant new 
opportunities for the people of Borogram as they moved to the ‘new place’, as was the 
case for Salek Mia. Salek Mia planted fifty mango trees on the land two years ago with 
his hard earned income from selling vegetables produced on this land. His father 
worked hard to make the forest land arable, and he worked hard for the last two years 
nurturing his mango garden hoping for a good return by selling the mangoes when the 
trees start producing. ‘Just two more years brother; you will see a different face in my 
garden; it will be full of mangos.-says Salek Mia.  
Economic opportunities of this kind are accompanied by the social value of forest free 
land in Borogram. For example, land is also required as a playground for the increasing 
number of young children in the village. Sports, such as football, require large maaths 
(playing fields) and the absence of enough maath means the young children would have 
to go outside of the village to play. This involves the risk of conflicts between the 
children of Borogram and those in the village where they go to play over claims to the 
playing field. It would also be considered a disgrace for the Borogram ‘community’ to 
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not have enough play ground for their children who would be made to go to other 
villages to play. In absence of enough maath for children people challenge the value of 
some of the remaining forests occupying the land in front of the local primary school. 
Khalek Sarker of Borogram resents the forest  
“What is the value of those trees standing there in front of the school occupying 
the land when our children can’t find field to play? It’s not right that a big 
village like Borogram don’t have at least four or five maaths. We hardly have 
one or two. Our children go outside the village and often get into conflicts 
trying to manage a playing field. And these trees here…. I don’t know who are 
they for?”  
When agricultural and social opportunities are perceived to be restrained by the forest, 
environmental protection is a “remote concern”33 for the people of Borogram.  
Historically, residents of Borogram experienced conflict and the threat of arrest from 
government forest officials who claimed to be protectors of the forest, but they 
discovered new opportunities in the forest protection claims of this new group who was 
protesting against the mining. They made use of the available forces to make their anti-
mining claim stronger. Collaboration between BAPA and the community groups was 
not just simple learning and sharing about the environment; rather it was an exercise 
where community groups could identify the claims of forest protection as a tool to use 
for making their claims against mining. To do this they looked for “spaces of 
compatibility” despite having distinct and different experiences of the forest. One 
resident said,  
“BAPA people said mining would destroy the forest and if there were no forest 
the neighbouring areas would become hotter. They said there would be less 
rain. Company [Asia Energy] people said they would give us home in 
neighbouring areas. They told us they would build houses for everyone living 
here. If they destroy all forest here and if there is less rain then wouldn’t it be 
difficult for us? There is already very dry land here. We need lots of irrigation 
during dry season. Even the company people don’t give us anything and if we 
have to move from this place we have to find land somewhere nearby. We know 
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only farming. We have to live on farming. We don’t know any other place. We 
only know these areas. If they destroy forests and if there is less rain wouldn’t it 
be hard to cultivate land? If we can’t cultivate land what would we eat?”  
 In this way, the importance of the forest gets local purchase and forest, as an element 
of the environment, becomes the site of collaboration. It is now common in Borogram 
that banners displaying messages of forest protection hang in public places, such as the 
village market. This is a new thing in the village as one said, “People now know what 
to say against the mining. BAPA people and others come and talk about the forest and 
environment. Mining can’t destroy our forests”. In this way, the forest is turned from a 
problem to a means for developing new tools for anti-mining protests. Collaboration 
between BAPA and community groups enable the latter, with their disparate historical 
experience and views about the elements of environment, to connect to the discourses 
of environment held by organisations with ‘global’ linkages. This “tentative and 
contingent collaboration” between disparate experiences acts in establishing an “axiom 
of unity” that opens up possibilities of wider network34.      
Conclusion 
As I participated in the daily life of Borogram I explored distinct social-realities, as 
discussed in Chapter Six (Part One), that stimulate the villagers concerns about the 
proposed mine. How did the ideas of the movement spread so successfully over the 
distinct realities and observations? The movement has so far been successful in forcing 
a halt to the mine project. The August 2006 protest in Phulbari town, participated in by 
local villagers, national activists and environmental organisations, such as BAPA, 
forced Asia Energy to close down their local offices. Since then the movement has 
successfully prevented the reopening of these local offices. How did different groups 
become so unified in opposing the mining project? On the one hand, I tried to establish 
that unification doesn’t mean homogeneity and, on the other, that difference doesn’t 
stop collaboration.  
I have discussed that the National Committee, the organising committee that facilitates 
the movement on the national scale, is an example of how alliances for the movement 
implies an “empathy” for finding general causes for groups with different views on 
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certain ideas of the movement.  Certain opposing views, such as the observations of the 
limits of foreign investment, are brought to the table not to erase the differences, but to 
establish alliances based on a common anti-Asia Energy position in the particular case 
of the Phulbari mine project. This feature of contingent collaboration is characterised in 
the network of actors in the movement. The environment as a language of movement is 
worked-out to find the local purchase and, thus, to be used as a general tool of protest 
for disparate groups.  Despite having incompatible experiences of the importance of the 
forest, the village people discovered a local compatibility of forest protection so that 
the forest, as an element of the environment, could be used to make the protest 
stronger. The environment has thus become a site for this kind of tentative 
collaboration between village people and an environmental organisation with global 
linkages. It is this search for an “axiom of unity” between disparate groups and 
observations at different levels that opens up the possibilities of a wider network of the 
Phulbari movement. It is not a network of groups with uniform ideas, as it may initially 
seem. 
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      Chapter Eight 
        Conclusion 
This thesis has followed in the spirit of scholars whose analyses disrupt the smooth 
flow of ideas of the ‘global’ era. As James Ferguson has written, ‘one cannot expect 
things to simply snap into place through some mysterious black box mechanism’1.  The 
diverse and more open forms of interaction are characteristic to these analyses. ‘Global 
connection[s]’, Anna Tsing observes, ‘turn out to be less controllable than those at the 
top imply. Making claims about scale, including globalization, turns out to be an arena 
of contention’2. I locate this fragmented and contentious feature of the circulation of 
ideas in the spread of the resistance movement against the Phulbari mining project. 
This thesis has, on the one hand, followed particular forms of experience, aspiration 
and ideas of the village groups located at a mining site, as well as those of national 
activists and an environmental group involved in the movement. On the other hand, this 
thesis has aimed to show how the connection and disjuncture of these particularities 
account for creating space for the formulation of political coalition.   
This concluding chapter draws on the themes which have emerged within this thesis to 
identify what this work has recognised in the spread of the resistance movement against 
the mining project in Phulbari.  
Where is my ‘field’? I had to confront this question while designing the conceptual 
structure of my ‘fieldwork’. I dealt with this question as my field sites were ‘envisaged’ 
through the process of my engagement with the field. This is the theme of the 
discussions in the first part of Chapter Two where I reflect on some of the possibilities 
and challenges of multi-sited research and relate them to my engagements with more 
than one location. I discuss how, in the end, my ethnographic endeavour in multiple 
locations conforms to anthropology’s traditional focus on situated realities and 
‘relations’. Though the limitations of time and space require that the extent of the depth 
of focus in the sites have to be varied to allow for the wider ethnographic perspective, 
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in pursuit of this wider ethnographic perspective, I have engaged with the activism in 
the capital Dhaka, as well as the everyday life of Borogram village.  
By taking on the possibilities of a multi-sited approach, where researchers move 
between multiple locations, I was able to follow the realities that shape local resistance 
in Borogram, as well as at the national level. It is only through following the 
ethnographic fundamentals of contextualisation that the realities at different locations 
and relations between them were possible to identify. To this end, multi-sited 
ethnography entails an updated approach to methodologically respond to the supposed 
‘connectedness’ of this era.  
How does my role as a Bangladeshi ethnographer interfere in the process of 
representation? I have examined the researcher’s ‘subjectivity’ concerning the tradition 
of ethnographic fieldwork. I have situated my ‘indigenous’ qualities, i.e. my social 
background, supposed familiarity with the elements of ‘local’ culture such as the 
language, etc., within the social context of Borogram village and postulated whether it 
is possible to overcome the researchers identity as an ‘outsider’ be they ‘indigenous’ or 
not. Reflecting on the kinds of relations I experienced during my fieldwork in 
Borogram, I have argued that the essentialisation of the researcher’s positionality (i.e. 
‘native’/ ‘non-native’) is problematic.   
To drive my arguments I have drawn on historical relations. Chapter Three has 
described the historical background of the political processes of Bangladesh to gain a 
better appreciation of the background of the current socio-political environment in 
which the movement against the mine operates. I have drawn on the history of the 
intelligentsia and its role in forming nationalist ideas, struggle over land, the collective 
image of a foreign company as formed by the ‘unrequited trade’3 of the East India 
Company and neoliberal reform from which Phulbari resistance came. These historical 
relations inform the development of nationalist discourses that play a central role in the 
dissent surrounding mining in Bangladesh. Drawing on the historical context I have 
discussed how ‘nationalism’ in Bangladesh did not take a modular form. I have shown 
how the varying socio-political inspirations contained in the imagination of the nation 
address the political conditions through which the anti-mine protests function. 
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The violent reactions from police and paramilitary forces during the events of August 
26, 2006 sparked the protesters to hold hartal in Phulbari until the corporation’s local 
offices were withdrawn and the government had declared postponement of the contract. 
The ongoing protests against the proposal of mining in Phulbari were observed in the 
analysis of activists from the National Committee. The National Committee was 
responsible for organising the protests at the national level; representing the people’s 
resistance to a global force, pitting the ‘national’ interest against the exploitative 
multinational corporation.One unpublished protest document from the National 
Committee reads,  
“…on August 26, 2006, people gathered in Phulbari to attend the protest 
organised by the National Committee to mark their opposition to the Asia 
Energy Corporation and it’s mining plan…Since coal has been discovered in 
Phulbari a conspiracy to loot it has begun. Plans have been set up to establish a 
coal mine to serve the interests of this multinational corporation. People 
gathered in Phulbari on the 26th to protect the national interest from the 
conspiracy of the corporations”4. ‘People of Phulbari’, writes activist Akmal 
Hossain, ‘stood up to protest to protect their land and the national interest. They 
resisted the initiatives of mining because they have become conscious of the 
national interest”5.   
This portrait of the protest generalises the resistance to the mine in terms of an easy 
proposition of national interest and hides the internal complexities of the organisation 
and the spread of the movement. Chapter Four has focused on the idioms and 
sentiments of ‘nationalism’ that shape the dissent around the Phulbari mine project. The 
chapter is devoted to exploring how they attend to varied, and sometimes conflicting, 
ideas of ‘national interests’. This is explored through historical and specific evidence of 
the context of the Phulbari movement. I have investigated the lines and intersections of 
the conflict as the national interest is projected and played out in the protests. I have 
shown how the differences start to coalesce under a banner of ‘anti-Asia Energy’ as a 
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way to think about nationalism, covering the ‘cleavages’6 in it and creating common 
ground for protests.  
At the local level, ‘anti-mining’ takes on a different meaning. Details of the context of 
social relations and the make-up of Borogram village, as presented in Chapter Five, 
provide a background for this discussion. Contrary to some early analyses of the 
Bangladeshi rural structure, where social politics was conceived in terms of an 
inflexible structure where accumulation , and control over, land were seen as the sole 
determinants of power7, the case of Borogram has showed how people assert power 
from their own position within multi-linear social relations. New lines of social 
relations emerge based on alternate livelihood means, such as irrigations technology, 
where no one possesses absolute power over others. While the owner of an irrigation 
machine experiences newly acquired power to control irrigation services, the success of 
his venture depends on a mutual dependency between the machine owner and the small 
producers or water receivers. This signifies a “diffused”8 nature of power shaped by 
‘personalised’ relations in Borogram. These relations are maintained through the 
collective membership of the ‘community’, which people of Borogram called Chapai 
Samaj, built around relations of trust and faith and supported by social and religious 
norms administered through the informal system of judging the nonconformity, or 
bichar. The functioning of Samaj, thus, implies multiple lines of social relations and 
‘overlapping obligations’9, an aspect which plays a significant role in shaping 
resistance in Borogram (Chapter Six, Part One).  
In Chapter Six (Part One), I have explored how ‘local’ resistance to the mine is 
embedded in the socio-political complexities of the village where the mining is 
planned. I have discussed how the notion of land rights, that are often characterised by 
a longer-term presence on the land and therefore have an uneasy relation with the 
official recognition of land rights, relates to the ‘inner’ spheres of resistance in the 
village of Borogram. I have shown how anxieties derived from the threat of the loss of 
certain ‘social resources’, such as Samman (status) and ‘inclusion in networks’10 in the 
‘community’ provokes resistance to the mine. I have presented ethnographic evidence 
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that shows how individual resistance is inspired by the causes of a ‘private nature’ that 
often remain unexpressed in public discussions of protests in the village. Samman is 
built upon generational community relations and the access to credit mediated by social 
networks and factors, such as the anxiety of losing security for the women, form 
people’s resistance to their possible displacement as a result of the planned mine 
development.  
 ‘Local’ resistance is, thus, rooted in the spheres of ‘multi-dimensional relationships’ in 
the ‘community’.  Through these relationships ‘people come to know their place and 
their possibilities’11; the possibilities of ‘multi-transactional ties’ and associated 
obligations and expectations that, according to Wood, shape the ‘forms of social 
capital’12. The concept of ‘social capital’ implies that these possibilities provide an 
important perspective for understanding the stories of resistance that often ‘fall away’13 
from the public discourse of protests. As we have seen, a host of ‘private’ anxieties 
derived from the threat of the breakdown of ‘home’ built around ‘multiple ties’, longer 
term presence and accompanying rights and claims, are at play. 
On another level, resistance builds upon the ‘moral commitment’14 for the control of 
the benefits and opportunities that result from the protests against the proposed mine. In 
the second part of Chapter Six, I have discussed how the development of the movement 
in Phulbari town is influenced by localised politics. I have discussed how the promise 
of becoming a voice for the people as an elected representative of the state system is at 
play. Desire for the benefits that can arise from mine development activity, such as 
opportunities to employ people by obtaining a contract from the company, interfere 
with the ‘moral purpose’15 of the protests. Groups and actors call upon their ‘own moral 
framework’16 to rationalise their protests for which a simple standard of assessment, 
“greed versus grievance”17, is inadequate. The stories that inform the moral purpose of 
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the protests are discrepant; it is, I have argued, only through the recognition of these 
discrepancies that we can scratch the surface of the ‘local dynamics’18 of the protests.  
If local resistance is rooted in social dynamics then how do village groups in the actual 
mining site, who are threatened by displacement from their land, place themselves 
within the ideas attached to the national protesters? To present this answer I will go 
back to the testimonies of Salek Mia in Borogram village: 
19Salek Mia looked over his piece of land adjacent to his house where he 
planted fifty mango trees. ‘This mining matter is threatening my plan of making 
profit from this garden’ he said with anxiety. ‘Why will we allow a foreign 
company to come to our place and take away our land when they will take all 
the profit to their country? We will never leave this place’.  
‘How about a national company?’ 
‘A national company will at least keep the profit in our country. So it’s better.’  
‘So you mean you will allow a national company to mine here?’ 
‘A national company should understand our problem, shouldn’t they? They 
should not mine here as it will harm our place. Why can’t they find any other 
place where there are no people living. They should explore other places. We 
don’t want any mining in our place.’  
These testimonies offer insights into how lived realities drive the forces of local 
resistance and how they can place perceived local and national interest as incompatible. 
While the proposal of mining by a state-owned company using the underground 
method20 is observed as being compliant with the national interest by the National 
Committee, as is evident in its protest agendas and protest documents, the local 
community is opposed to any kind of mining in their village. As discussed in Chapter 
Six, the stories of misery shared by people affected by landslides and the uncertainties 
of getting compensation from a state-owned underground coal mine in Borogram’s 
neighbouring villages, add to the people’s opposition to any kind of mining, whether 
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national or foreign. Here the National Committee’s ideas of national interest become 
entangled with observed local interest. Yet, village groups in Borogram regularly 
participated in protest activities organised by National Committee activists. Those from 
the Phulbari branch of the National Committee expressed that Borogram became one of 
their stronger points for their ‘hat’ (village market) discussions, where villagers and 
activists gather in the village market to share and discuss protests agendas. One of the 
activists said, “You must have noticed people participate in our hat meetings in big 
numbers there. Anti-mining emotion runs high there.” Referring resident’s history of 
land loss from river erosion and subsequent migration to the ‘new place’21 he observed, 
‘they have no place to go if they are displaced from here. They have no other way than 
to resist. We find very good cooperation from the village.” I asked him if he thought 
people would be happy to accept an underground mining proposal by a state-owned 
company, to which he replied, “This has become an issue…people are actually against 
any kind of mining. We need to discuss with the village people more to exchange our 
views. We need to discuss within ourselves as well as to how we can respond to this 
issue.”  
The ‘local’ and ‘national’ become intertwined by this drive to find allies in forcing their 
respective causes. At some point local interest conflicts with the national, and at other 
points they converge around specific agendas of resistance to the mining project in 
Phulbari. The anxieties and observations presented by Salek Mia do not always match 
with the concerns of national interest as expressed by the national protesters. However, 
local people use the means and ideas of national activism to force their demands, in the 
same way that the national protesters continually strive to find spaces of engagement.  
The protest language of the National Committee, the leading organising group of the 
Phulbari movement, is characterised by antipathy towards multinational capital and 
foreign (western) investment. The National Committee was initiated by a group of left-
political party members and involved intellectuals and sympathetic professionals. An 
apparent left-oriented National Committee operated through an alliance of the members 
of political parties and individuals who did not bring uniform observations about the 
aspects of the movement. The limits and conditions of foreign investment, for example, 
were contentious issues as some left political parties and professionals applied 
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suggestions of differentiating between ‘good investment’ and ‘bad investment’, while 
others stressed complete opposition to foreign investment. These differences, as we 
have seen, did not deter the building of the alliance against the mine as they strived to 
find common causes. 
This feature of contingent alliances allows, as I have shown in Chapter Seven, 
collaboration between the protesters and the groups with ‘universalist’ ideas. To 
explore this kind of collaboration I looked at collaborative efforts between an 
environmental group, the national protesters and local people. I focused on a particular 
environmental campaign group (BAPA) in the capital of Bangladesh to allow extensive 
ethnographic details.  The collaboration between the National Committee and BAPA, 
as we have seen, emerged out of each other’s desire to find compatible forces for the 
movement. BAPA, which has its origin in the universal processes of environmental 
concerns, and its network within a transnational web of environmentalism, and the 
National Committee communicate and collaborate with each other on agreeable 
agendas of the protests where environmental concerns become the point of agreement. 
While BAPA does not take any position on certain protest agendas, such as opposition 
to mining contracts with foreign companies, environmental concerns become a space of 
limited agreement.  
In the same spirit, the environmental group BAPA facilitates the conjuncture where 
differences in experiences and observation of forest conservation between the 
‘community’ and BAPA turned into possibilities of finding “space for the formulation 
of new, unexpected coalition”22. Environmental discourse provides that space allowing 
the community to use the environment as a new tool for protests. The community’s 
experience and struggle for the possession of land and the clearing of the forest 
conflicts with BAPA’s ideas of forest conservation. However, those same people find 
that ideas of forest conservation are compatible for their cause arising at the suitable 
logic that drought may arise out of the forest destruction for the mine. Though clearing 
forests for the possession of land has been the main strategy for the establishment of 
Borogram village, banners opposing the open-pit mine in the name of forest 
conservation, as provided by BAPA, hang in the local shops. Local people and the 
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environmental group make their “misunderstandings…productive”23 as the ‘friction’ of 
different ideas and observations only open up the possibilities of finding common 
grounds of protests. The network of resistance extends over tentative yet productive 
common ground. 
 
**    ** 
The movement against the mine developed based on a set of, what Maarten Hajer 
called, ‘storey-lines’ that “provide actors with a set of symbolic reference[s]” that 
suggest commonality”24. Hajer’s concept of storey-lines refers to narratives of social 
reality that plays a role in the clustering of knowledge and the positioning of actors, 
which, ultimately, creates a space for coalition. It refers to a set of ideas and concepts 
that provide the possibility for communicative networks among “actors with different 
or at best overlapping perception and understanding”25. In the Phulbari movement the 
narratives of national interests emerge accommodating different understandings and 
observations of mining.  Differential observations of the mining method, foreign 
investment and the issues of mineral export are all concerned with how things should 
be in relation to the mineral industry in Bangladesh. Different opinions of how things 
should be find a way to fit into the narratives of national interests to secure support for 
their observation. National interests work as ‘discursive cement’26 in the 
communicative networks of different, and often conflicting, observations. Similarly, the 
concept of the environment plays such a role of discursive cement in forming the 
coalition between the actors, as exemplified in the interaction between the people in 
Borogram and the environmental group. The concept of forest conservation provides 
the actors in Borogram with ideas to “select and adapt thoughts, mutate and create 
them”27 in their favour and to find suitable tools of protests. The Phulbari movement 
does not have uniform goals, choices and interest, yet it operates on a network 
characterised by ‘discontinuity and awkward connection’28.  
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Social movement processes, as the case of the Phulbari movement illustrates, entail a 
connection between ‘differently-framed agendas’29. This is not a process of smooth 
connection; ‘friction’ is central to it. As the ‘cultural politics’30 approach to social 
movements has suggested, people mobilize collectively on the grounds of very 
different sets of meanings, stakes and practices.  Political coalitions and alliances 
between sets of actors, who perceive their position and interests differently, are formed 
based on ‘common discourses’ of protests where contradicting practices and 
observations find a meaning in a common political project31.  Narratives of national 
interest or environment form such common discourses in the protests against the mine 
in Phulbari and the “conscious use” of these narratives is part of building a network of 
resistance32.  
A central concern, in writing this thesis, has been to counter the representation of the 
protests against the mine in Phulbari as a uniform movement against the global mining 
corporations. Instead, I have shown that the dynamics of the movement need to be 
understood in relation to the socio-political processes and the ideas that configure the 
situated practices of the protests. As I have argued, the ideas that shape the organisation 
of the Phulbari movement are neither uniform nor disconnected; the movement spreads 
through the simultaneous processes of conflict and collaboration between different 
ideas and observations.  
Such terrains of strategic collaboration on the part of the village people whose land and 
livelihoods are threatened by the mine are not limited to the patterns of everyday 
resistance that Scott33 has drawn our attention to some years ago. The protest 
movement builds as people transform their resistance rooted in everyday life to adopt 
tools for more overt protests. Recognising aspects of everyday resistance is essential to 
understanding the social and historical contexts that drive strategies for more elaborate 
protests. To this end, the concept of social capital provides us with an important 
perspective to understand how local resistance is rooted in social experience as it 
applies to certain narratives of the protest movement, such as the destruction of land 
and environment. If contemporary mobilisations are of a diffused nature and involve 
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multi-layered forms of networking and alliance34, they should be understood in terms of 
both these processes as specific to everyday life, as should the transformative power of 
these narratives. Protest narratives take on different meanings according to the purpose 
of particular groups and the actors who subscribe to them, providing the basis for what 
Hajer called a ‘discourse coalition’35. This is a coalition that derives from ‘not singular 
utopias or a unity founded upon identity positions’36 but from a strategic drive of 
diverse groups to find a suitable meaning of the narratives of protests.  As Tsing37 
argues, the network in this global era does not operate as smoothly as theorists of 
globalisation have assumed, one can understand the nature of contemporary social 
movement in terms of both the conflict of ideas and meaning, and coalition among the 
compatibles.   
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Annex: 1. Map showing the location of Phulbari in Bangladesh  
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2. Map showing the location of Phulbari town, Borogram and Baropukuria Caol 
Mine in Dinajpur district  
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